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The problem of regional development is a concern of underdeveloped as
well as developed countries of the world. The purpose of this thesis,
broadly defined, is: to establish a clear connection between the growth
theories as they have developed in economics, and the theory of regional
development planning; to develop methodologies for simultaneous selec-
tion of regions and economic sectors for development; and to explore the
mechanism of growth, in the absence of planning and under planning
conditions.
It is assumed that the main objective of each planning effort is growth
and development. The methodology developed in this thesis (Chapter ii1),
presupposes the national goal to be a minimum acceptable rate of growth
for the national income. The national growth rate is defined as a func-
tion of regional growth rates. The regional objectives, if defined at
regional levels, should be adjusted in a way to achieve the national
growth objective. The choice of growth strategy is made at the national
level with reference to specific goals for development of selected
regions.
In the empirical part of the thesis (Chapters IV and V), two recent
cases of regional planning activities, Mezzogiorno, Italy and Guayana,
Venezuela are discussed. An historical review of the economic perfor-
mances of the two countries, in the absence of deliberate planning, and
the statistical analyses of the more recent data for the pre-planning
period (Venezuela), and the planning period (Italy), corroborate the
theoretical arguments made in Chapters I and 11.
The results of findings and conclusions drawn from these case studies
may be summarized as follows: first, the goal formulation differs in
its process and content for countries at different stages of economic
development. In Venezuela, the goals were set up at the national level,
with limited participation of the regions. In Italy, the objectives of
the economic plan also were determined at the national level, but with
particular emphasis on development of the underdeveloped regions, and
with more participation of social and political groups. Secondly, the
developmental programming in countries at the middle-phase of economic
ii
development, as long as they are based on the principle of exploitation
of the regions for the benefit of the national economy, would further
increase regional differentials. Moreover, the existing economic
forces in already developed regions, makes the process of adjustment and
regional equalization long and tedious. Thirdly, the adoption of the
strategy of concentrated decentralization suggests solutions to the
problems of planning for the "middle-phase" and the "micro-phase", by
allowing degrees of trade-off between concentration and decentralization
of people and of economic activities.
Thesis Supervisor: Lloyd Rodwin
Title: Professor
ii i
7
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere
gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Professor Lloyd Rodwin, from whom I
have received inspiration and invaluable counsel in the choice and
development of this thesis around the theory of ''concentrated decentral-
ization.''
I benefitted enormously from several discussions with Professor
Jerome Rothenberg, Professor of Economics at M.I.T., who gave generously
of his time by reading earlier versions of the theoretical chapters of
this thesis and made numerous valuable comments and corrections.
My special thanks go to Professor Alexander Ganz, Lecturer in the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning at M.I.T., who read the earlier
draft of this thesis, for his comments, continuous guidance, provision
of the data on Venezuela from his personal file, and for the facilities
of his own office at M.I.T.
I am particularly grateful to Professor Rosenstein-Rodan, Professor
of Economics at M.I.T., who made available the data used in the Italian
case study. I should like to thank Professor Richard Ekaus, Professor
of Economics at M.I.T., for his valuable comments on the general concept
of this thesis.
I should also like to thank Messrs. Richard C. Rosane, David W.
Anderson and Kevin O'Marah at Drummey, Rosane, Anderson, Inc. for their
understanding and help over the years of my study at Harvard and M.I.T.
Miss Penelope Prutsalis has helped me in editorial work and in many
other ways throughout the preparation of this thesis. Without her
invaluable assistance and exceptional dedication, it would have been
very difficult to complete this task.
My thanks and appreciation also extend to many individuals who have
offered generously of their time in preparation of supplementary items.
Mr. Harold Morgenstern prepared extensive graphs from data on Italy and
Venezuela. Messrs. Marshall Meeks and William Nemmers prepared the final
form of maps and graphs.
iv
I would also like to thank Messrs. Umberto Allori and Edgardo Derbes
for translation of original materials in Italian and Spanish.
The author gratefully wishes to acknowledge the financial
assistance received from the Government of Iran and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
I owe a debt of gratitude to Professor John T. Howard and to
all members of the faculty of the Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, who have always been encouraging and helpful.
I would like to thank Miss Jean McBeth who typed the text.
Miss Patricia Antonellis was responsible for the superlative typing
job done on tables and mathematical parts of the thesis. I greatly
appreciate their work.
Finally, to my wife, Manije, I owe a great debt of appreciation for
her patience and understanding through the years of my study. I wish to
dedicate this work to her.
Cambridge, Mass. P.S.T.
June, 1970
v
-'I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER I:
CHAPTER II:
INTRODUCTION: THE THEORY OF CONCENTRATED
DECENTRALIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW
B. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
1. Balanced Growth Theory
2. "Balanced Growth" with Unlimited Supplies
of Capital and Labor
3. Unbalanced Growth Theory
4. Spatial Equilibrium Theories
5. Theories of Spatial Concentration
6. The Concept of Polarization in Regional
Context and the Theory of Unbalanced
Growth
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THE STRATEGY OF
CONCENTRATED DECENTRALIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
B. THE OBJECTIVES OF A REGIONAL GROWTH PROGRAM
1. Size of the Country
2. Resources
3. Stages of Economic Development
C. SOME CLARIFICATIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF
"CONCENTRATED" GROWTH AND THE 'NATIONAL'
AND 'REGIONAL' SPECIALIZATION IN RELATION TO
THE REGIONAL GROWTH OBJECTIVES
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
vi
Page
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION 69
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCED INVESTMENT 70
C. A STATIC DECISION-MAKING MODEL FOR
SIMULTANEOUS SELECTION OF LEADING REGIONS
AND SECTORS FOR DEVELOPMENT 72
1. Definition of the Problem 72
2. Data Sources and Problems 72
3. Analytical Technique 72
4. Shortcomings of the Model 74
D. A DECISION-MAKING MODEL OF SIMULTANEOUS
SELECTION OF REGIONS AND SECTORS FOR
INVESTMENT 75
1. Definition of the Problem 75
2. Analytical Technique 75
3. Some Suggestions on Further Refinements
of the Model 81
E. A MULTI-REGIONAL GROWTH MODEL 86
1. Definition of the Problem 86
2. Mathematical Structure of the Model 86
3. Operational Properties of the Model 89
F. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES USED IN ANALYSIS OF
THE DATA 91
1. Percentage Share Analysis 91
2. Rate of Growth 91
3. Index of Prosperity 92
vii
~~*9 U
Page
CHAPTER III (Continued)
4. Index of Capital Intensity 92
5. Ratio of Percentage Distribution of the
Gross Fixed Investment to the Percentage
Distribution of Gross Product 93
6. Ratio of the Percentage Change in Net
Product to the Percentage Change in Net
Investment 94
7. Rank-Size Technique 94
8. Regression Analysis 95
9. The Coefficient of Correlation 95
CHAPTER IV: THE EMERGENCE OF THE STRATEGY OF CONCENTRATED
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REGIONAL
DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR MEZZOGIORNO, ITALY
A. INTRODUCTION 97
B. THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
MEZZOGIORNO 100
1. A Brief Review of the Historical Back-
ground 100
2. Recent Development Planning Activities 102
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF DATA 105
1. Growth of Population and Product 105
2. Per Capita Income 116
3. Sectoral Structure of the Regional
Economies 121
4. Investment 129
5. Consumption 146
6. Regional Centers 150
7. Regional Migratory Movements 157
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 160
viii
-UI
Page
CHAPTER V: THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE STRATEGY
OF CONCENTRATED DECENTRALIZATION - GUAYANA
PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION 166
B. THE HISTORY OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN GUAYANA 167
1. A Brief Review of the Historical
Background 167
2. Recent Development Planning Activities 174
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 175
1. Growth of Population and Product 175
2. Per Capita Income 197
3. Sectoral Structure of the Regional
Economies 199
4. Investment 216
5. Regional Centers 226
6. Regional Migratory Movements 232
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 235
CHAPTER VI: COMPARISON OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR
SOLUTIONS IN ITALY AND VENEZUELA
A. INTRODUCTION 242
B. STATISTICAL DIFFERENTIALS 242
1. Population and Product 242
2. Per Capita Income 243
3. Differences in Sectoral Structures
of the Two Economies 245
4. Investment 246
ix
CHAPTER VI
APPENDIX A:
APPENDIX B:
APPENDIX C:
BIBLIOGRAPHY
(Continued)
5. Differences in the System of
Regional Centers
6. The Differences in the REgional
Migratory Movements
C. DIFFERENCES IN THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
SETTING AND PLANNING STYLE
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
INCOME DISTRIBUTION OBJECTIVE AND THE RATE OF
GROWTH AND THE STRATEGY OF CONCENTRATION
STATISTICAL TABLES OF ITALY
STATISTICAL TABLES OF VENEZUELA
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
x
Page
248
248
249
254
259
264
293
313
329
LIST OF TABLES
Table Title Page
IIl-i Rank Ordered List of Projects According to
Their Net Benefits and Their Corresponding
Requi red Investments 79
ITALY
IV-] Population of Mezzogiorno by Sub-Regions,
For Selected Years 106
IV-2 Population of Mezzogiorno as Percentage of
the North and Italy for Selected Years 107
IV-3 Rates of Growth of Regional Incomes -
Mezzogiorno, North and Italy for Selected
Periods 109
IV-4 Rates of Growth of Population of Mezzogiorno,
North and Italy for Selected Periods 109
IV-5 Percentage Share of Gross Product and
Population by Three Major Regions 1951-1961 111
IV-6 Population of Sub-Regions of Mezzogiorno as
Percentage of Mezzogiorno for Selected Years 113
IV-7 Index of Prosperity for Sub-Regions of
Mezzogiorno for 1951 and 1961 114
xi
- I
Title
IV-8 Rates of Growth of Population for Mezzo-
giorno and Its Sub-Regions for Selected
Periods 115
IV-9 Percentage Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita
Gross Income, 1951/50 - 1961/60 118
IV-10 Per Capita Income of Mezzogiorno as Percen-
tage of the North 119
IV-ll Regional Net Income Per Capita as Percent-
age of the National Average, 1951 and 1961 120
IV-12 Percentage Composition of Regional Income by
Major Sectors in 1958 124
IV-13 Percentage Composition of Regional Product by
Major Sectors in 1961 125
IV-14 Percentage Change in Net Product by Economic
Sectors for Mezzogiorno and the Centro-Nord,
1951-1960 126
IV-15 Percentage Change in Net Investment by
Economic Sectors for Mezzogiorno and the
Centro-Nord, 1951-1960 127
iV-16 Ratio of Percentage Change in Net Product to
the Percentage Change in Net Investment by
Economic Sectors for the Mezzogiorno and the
Centro-Nord, 1951-1960 128
xii
Table Page
Table Title Page
IV-17 Marginal Capital-Output Ratio Calculated
Triennially for Two Major Geographic
Regions of Italy 130
IV-18 Net Investment as Percentage of Net Product
by Sectors of Economic Activities and by
Geographic Areas 133
IV-19 Net investment - Mezzogiorno as a Percentage
of Centro-Nord by Sectors 1951-1960 134
IV-20 Percentage Annual Growth Rate of Per Capita
Gross Income and Percentage Annual Increase
of Net Investment of Mezzogiorno, 1950-1961 140
IV-21 Net Investment in Mezzogiorno and Per Capita
Income of Mezzogiorno as Percentage of the
North, 1950-59 144
IV-22 Gross Fixed Investment and Incremental Value
Added - Mezzogiorno, 1951-60 145
IV-23 The Average Propensity to Consume by Two
Major Geographic Regions of Italy 148
IV-24 Per Capita Income and Consumption in Mezzo-
giorno as Percentage of the Centro-Nord 149
xiii
U
Title Pag
IV-25 Rate of Growth of Urban and Rural Population
by Two Major Regions for Selected Years as
Percentage of Existing Population 152
IV-26 Migratory Movements to the North and within
Mezzogiorno as Percentage of Total Regional
Emigrations by Sub-Regions of Mezzogiorno 159
VENEZUELA
V-1 Population of Seven Major Regions of Venezuela
for Selected Years 176
V-2 Percentage Distribution of Population by Seven
Major Regions of Venezuela, for Selected Years,
1936, 1953 and 1961 189
V-3 Percentage Distribution of Income by Seven
Major Regions of Venezuela, for Selected Years,
1936, 1953, and 1961 192
V-4 The Rates of Growth of Gross Product for Seven
Major Regions of Venezuela for 1936-1953,
1953-1961 and 1936-1961 Periods 193
V-5 Index of Prosperity for Seven Major Regions of
Venezuela for 1936, 1953 and 1961 195
xiv
TablIe e
Regional-Sectoral Coefficients
Product of Venezuela, 1936
Regional-Sectoral Coefficients
Product of Venezuela, 1953
for Gross
209
for Gross
210
Regional-Sectoral Coefficients for Gross
Product of Venezuela, 1961
Ranking of Regions by Their Percentage Share
in Agriculture, 1936, 1953, 1961
Ranking of Regions by Their Percentage Share
in Manufacturing, 1936, 1953, 1961
Ranking of Regions by Their Percentage Share
in Commerce (Trade), 1936, 1953, 1961
Regional-Sectoral Growth Rates of Gross
Product, 1936-1953
Regional-Sectoral Growth Rates of Gross
Product, 1953-1961
xv
.q *
Page
198
Title
Per Capita Gross Product by Seven Major
Regions of Venezuela
Ranking of Regions by the Rate of Per Capita
Income Growth
Table
V-6
V-7
V-8
V-9
V-10
V-I
V-12
V-13
V-14
V-15
211
212
213
214
217
217
199
Title
V-16
V-24 Internal and Foreign Migration,
1936-1950
Venezuela,
233
xvi
-~--q U
PageTable
Percentage Distribution of Capital Stock
by Economic Sectors, 1950-1959
Net Capital Stock
Output-Capital Ratio by Region, 1960
Index of Sectoral Capital Intensity
Ratios of Percentage Distribution of Gross
Fixed Investment to Percentage Distribution
of Gross Product by Economic Sectors,
1950-1959
Distribution of Urban Population by Groups
of States, 1936, 1950, 1961
Ranking of the Ten Largest Venezuelan Cities
According to Their Population Size
Typical City Expansions, 1950-1961
V-17
V-18
V-19
V-20
V-21
V-22
V-23
220
221
222
223
225
227
228
230
Table Ti tie Page
ITALY and VENEZUELA
VI-1 The Ratio of Net Investment to Net Product
for Mezzogiorno and Centro-Nord, 1951-1953
and 1958-1960 247
VI-2 Percentage Distribution of Gross Fixed
Investment by Economic Sectors for Italy
(1960) and Venezuela (1959) 247
xv i
U
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Title
1-1 Balanced and Unbalanced Growth Paths
lil-1 The Mechanism of Induced Investment
111-2 A Case for Spatial Decentralization
111-3 A Case for Concentrated Decentralization
IV-] Italy - Population Density - Number of
Inhabitants Per Square Kilometer
IV-2 Italy - Regional Boundaries and Centers
Relation Between Percentage
Income and Percentage Share
Italy, Mezzogiorno
Share of Regional
of Regional Population -
117
Italy, Centro-Nord - Net Product by Sector,
1951-1960 122
xviii
Page
23
71
90a
90b
98
IV-3
IV-4
99
I V-5
Figure Title Page
iv-6 Italy, Mezzogiorno - Net Product by Sector,
1951-1960 123
IV-7 Italy - Relation Between Incremental Change of
Net Product and Capital, by Region, 1951-1960 132
IV-8 Italy - Gross Fixed Investment by Region,
1951-1960 135
IV-9 Italy, Mezzogiorno - Net Investment by Sector,
1951-1960 136
IV-10 Italy, Centro-Nord - Net Investment by Sector,
1951-1960 137
IV-l1 Italy, Mezzogiorno - Relation Between Annual
Growth Rate of Per Capita Gross Income and Rate of
Growth of Net Investment 139
IV-12 Italy, Mezzogiorno - Relation Between Net
Investment and Per Capita Income as Percentages
of Centro-Nord, 1951-1959 142
IV-13 Italy, Mezzogiorno - Relation Between Incremental
Value Added and Gross Fixed Investment, 1951-1959 143
xix
-~ I
Title
Italy - Relation Between Per Capita Regional
Income and Per Capita Consumption for
Mezzogiorno and Centro-Nord, 1951-1961
Italy, Mezzogiorno - Major Population Centers
Italy - Relation Between Rank and Size of
32 Italian Cities with 100,000 or More
Inhabitants, 1961
Italy - Relation Between Rank and Size of
36 Italian Cities with 100,000 or More
Inhabitants, 1965
Italy - Migratory Movements to Principal
Reception Areas, 1960
Venezuela -
Inhabitants
Population Density - Number of
Per Square Kilometer
Venezuela - Regional Boundaries and Centers
Venezuela -
1936, 1953,
Gross Domestic Product by Region,
1961
xx
Figure
IV-15
IV-16
IV-17
IV-18
Page
147
151
155
156
158
V-1
V-2
V-3
168
169
177
k
Title
Venezuela - Gross Domestic Product by Sector,
1936, 1953, 1961
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Western Oil - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
Mountain - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
Mountain - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
Central - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
Central - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
Llanos - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
Venezuela,
by Sector,
East Coastal
1936, 1953,
- Gross Regional Product
1961
Venezuela,
by Sector,
Eastern Oil - Gross Regional Product
1936, 1953, 1961
xxi
Figure
V-4
Page
178
V-6
V-6a
179
180
181
V-7
V-7a
182
V-8
183
V-9
184
V-10
185
186
.~ U ~1
Figure Title Page
V-1l Venezuela, Guayana - Gross Regional Product
by Sector, 1936, 1953, 1961 187
V-12 Venezuela - Relation Between Percentage Share of
V-13
v-14 Regional Income and Percentage Share of Regional
Population 196
V-15 Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Agriculture
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961 200
V-16 Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Mining
by Region (Guayana only), 1936, 1953, 1961 201
V-16a Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Mining
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961 202
V-17 Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Petroleum
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961 203
V-18 Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Manufacturing
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961 204
V-19 Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Construction
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961 205
xxii
41
Title
Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Commerce
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961
Venezuela - Gross Sectoral Product - Services
by Region, 1936, 1953, 1961
Venezuela - Major Population Centers
Venezuela -
Cities with
1936, 1950,
Relation Between Rank and Size of
10,000 or More Inhabitants, 1926,
1961
Venezuela - Migratory Movements to Principal
Reception Areas Up To 1950
xx i i
Figure
V-20
V-21
V-22
Page
206
207
V-23
V-24
229
231
234
L
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: THE THEORY OF CONCENTRATED DECENTRALIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION: AN OVERVIEW
There has been a growing awareness of the necessity for regional
development programming in the world in recent years. Since there is
no definition for a region with regard to its boundaries, actual
regional programming is being implemented both at the intranational
and international level. The symptoms of regional imbalances and
inequalities have been considered to be generally the same regardless
of national or international classification. In this dissertation,
however, we are concerned strictly with the problem of regional
planning within the national boundaries. Historical facts on economic
development processes among different nations and different zones
show varying degrees of imbalances. The inquiry into the nature and
causality of regional differentials has been the subject of an exten-
sive survey in the literature of the growth and development economy.
The spatial factor as a new dimension in the analysis of national or
supra-national economies has introduced new problems in the selection
of goals and strategies for economic development. On the national
level, regional goals are described as detrimental to the achievement
of national goals, and any attempt for equal distribution of income
among geographic regions are considered as brakes on the rate of
I
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growth of the economy as a whole. Most often the efficiency criterion
in economic planning dictates that some regions would never be
developed.
augmented i
economic va
wardness of
of the worl
a high rate
are only a
programming
The ne
well as reg
The problem of underdevelopment of some regions would be
f a single efficiency criterion is being used. Non-
riables sometimes are as much responsible for the back-
a region as economic variables. Underdeveloped countries
d are confronted with a complex problem: How to attain
of growth without widening the regional gaps. These
few of many problems of national and regional developmental
which this dissertation will attempt to explore.
ed for an integrated growth model to deal with national as
ional goals is evident. Meanwhile, any planning model
must be sensitive
forces at work, to
development being
reverse the undesi
The structural shi
constrained by an
initial stages of
to the past trends and
avoid any unrealistic
essentially a long pro
rable trends must be d
ft in the regional and
upper bound set by exi
economic development,
the prevailing economic
target setting. Economic
cess, any attempt to
one on an incremental basis.
sectoral composition is
sting conditions. In the
strategy of "concentrated"
growth seems to be a solution to the problem of rapid growth. But
in the long run, a proliferated policy of concentrated growth will
jeopardize the chances of potential but untapped regions for
growth. The history of economic development in today's developed
countries has shown that development of one section of the country
is often achieved at the expense of another. It has been the
experience of the developed countries that attempts to close
3the enlarged gap between regions at later stages of development is,
if not impossible, at least impractical and prohibitively costly.
Learning a lesson from this experience, it seems that there are
more options available to underdeveloped economies to integrate
a policy of "decentralization" into a "concentrated" growth scheme,
while the regional differentials still have not reached an irrevers-
ible level.
The main theme of this dissertation is to emphasize the degrees
of trade-off that a country at different stages of development can
choose between a policy of "concentration" and a policy of "decen-
tralization" by adopting the strategy of "concentrated decentraliza-
t ion.''
The two case studies selected for an exposition of the effective-
ness of the strategy of ''concentrated decentralization,'' if imple-
mented, are typical of the two categories of countries with regional
differentials described earlier. Italy is a highly developed
country with extreme regional inequalities developed over a century.
On the other hand, Venezuela with a relatively recent history of
rapid growth has been moving toward regional disparities, in spite
of the existence of untapped regional resources.
The historical and recent data are used in both cases and under
various analytical techniques; a full picture of the regional
economic characteristics in relation to the national conditions is
shown. Then an attempt is made to exhibit the future patterns of
economic development, if different degrees of a policy of
4"concentrated decentralization'' is applied to the problem of national
and regional growth. Several regional-sectoral decision-making models
also are suggested. Finally, a multiregional-multisectoral-multiproject
paradigm for simultaneous selection of regions, sectors and projects is
presented.
The organization of the dissertation is as follows. Chapter I
reviews the theoretical controversies in the literature of growth and
development on the issues of "balanced vs. unbalanced" growth, spatial
equilibrium theories, theories of spatial concentration and the theory
of polarized regions. Chapter I I focuses on selection of the regional
objectives and the choice of strategy. It also presents a discussion
of the major constraints to development and its effect on the choice
of strategy. Some clarification on the concept of "concentrated"
growth and the national and regional "specialization" in relation to
regional growth objectives terminates the theoretical research of this
dissertation. Chapter III is confined to an explanation of the
principle of induced investmentdevelopment of some decision-making
models of simultaneous selection of regions and sectors, a multiregional-
multisectoral-multiproject net benefit decision matrix and a multi-
regional growth model. Of the several models developed, only a simple
decision-making model for selection of regions and sectors and the
multi-regional growth model lent themselves to some experiments with
the existing regional data on Italy and Venezuela. Chapters IV and V
choose two case studies of regional development in Italy and Venezuela
and contain the historical background of regional economic character-
istics, the statistical analyses of the data, and the summary of
5findings and conclusions.
Chapter VI is an attempt to spell out the differences between
Italy and Venezuela with respect to the economic performance,
political environment and planning style of the two countries.
In order to keep the chapters as self-contained as possible,
Appendix A is added to supplement the discussion of Chapter II
on income distribution and the policy of concentration.
Appendices B and C contain several statistical tables, derived
or computed from original material, used as sources for computation
and formation of tables in Chapters IV and V.
6B. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this chapter the theories of "balanced" and "unbalanced"
growth are critically evaluated. In the field of spatial economics,
related works to the theories of economic growth and development
are analyzed and evaluated for their contributions to the issue of
development programming. The intention of this review is to cite
major works on the foregoing subjects rather than a comprehensive
survey of the literature.
The objective of the review is to arrive deductively at the
conclusion of what strategy is best suited to the process of growth
and development.
In the literature of economic development two theories have
emerged. These two theories have provided two different answers
to the question: "What strategy leads to a rapid growth?"
We will first review the literature of "balanced" growth, because
it would help to a great extent in understanding the counter-
arguments made in the theory of "unbalanced" growth.
1. Balanced Growth Theory
An initial objection to the liberal school of economic thought
of Adam Smith and his followers was made by Friedrich List, notable
7German economist who received more recognition after his death than
during his lifetime, not only for his theory of "balanced" growth,
but mostly for his patriotic efforts in the creation of a "unified
Germany." List, emotionally disturbed by the empirialistic policies
of Great Britain toward her colonies and other nations, tried to
prove that the British economic school was closely tied to the
political ambitions of the Empire.I
He did not actually deny the validity of international economics,
but viewed it as ''economics of the most distant future.'' He thought
of "universal union and absolute freedom of international trade" as
a ''cosmopolitan dream only to be realized perhaps after the lapse of
centuries." He explicitly pointed out that in his belief the liberal
trade theory of "Adam Smith on the dreams of Quesnay...does not
understand the needs of the present and the meaning of nationality --
in fact, it ignores national existence, and with it the principle of
national independence." It is probably an unnecessary clarification
to point out that the strong desire for a balanced growth in today's
underdeveloped countries stems from the kind of ideology presented
by List.
Hirst, 59, p. 305. List argued that: "Since individual nations,
through specially favorable circumstances, gained an advantage over
others in manufactures, trade, and shipping, and since they early
understood the best means of getting and maintaining through these
advantages political ascendency they have accordingly invented a
policy which aimed, and still aims, at obtaining a monopoly in
manufactures and trade, and at checking the progress of less
advanced nations.''
8List, of course, was not a nationalist for all seasons. He
believed in international union as an ultimate utopian goal. He was,
however, trying to associate different types of economies with
different stages of economic development. He believed in an evolution-
ary process of economic development starting from "the savage" to
"commercial." Although List's classification was somewhat different
from the Marxian classification of evolutionary process, it shared
common points with Marx's theory, both in concept and in rationaliza-
tion for the choice of a "national" economic system in a particular
period of economic development which he phrased as "the agricultural
and manufacturing." He was actually referring to the transitional
period from an agricultural society to an industrial, to be called
by later writers as ''industrialization''.
List's "balanced" 2 growth theory, therefore, was closely tied to
the political reality of the nineteenth century as much as he claimed
that the British school of economic thought was. In the meantime,
List did not fail to mention that "manufacturing power embraces
so many branches of science and knowledge, and presupposes so much
2When we refer to balanced growth theory (or strategy) we always mean
an attempt to develop simultaneously all sectors within an economy
which are prerequisite for national self-sufficiency. An "unbalanced"
national economic system might be in equilibrium within the inter-
national economic system. Therefore, any attempt to balance the
sectoral growth at the national level may be considered as a disturb-
ance in the international equilibrium system. Hence, our references,
in this work, to "imbalance" and "disequilibrium" are always aimed at
the state of national economic conditions. Moreover, it must be noted
that at each stage of development, the strategies of "balanced" or
"unbalanced" growth may either be a move toward national equilibrium
or away from it.
9experience, skill, and practice, that national industrial development
can only be gradual."
It is not surprising that the celebrated article of Paul
Rosenstein-Rodan on the "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe" -- now known as a pioneering effort in
the development of the modern theory of "balanced growth" --
appeared at the time when countries of Eastern and South Eastern
Europe, in order to retain their national entities were in need,
more than ever, of a national economic system, although the notion had
never been put as explicitly as it appears in List's writings.
Rosenstein-Rodan followed the same line of argument which led
Ricardo to the "Doctrine of Comparative Advantage" 3 , namely, that
"If the principles of International division of labour are to be
applied, labour must either be transported towards capital (emigra-
tion) or capital must be transported toward labour (industrialization).
From the point of view of maximizing world income, the difference
between these two ways is one of transport costs only, and may be
assumed to be negligible. Emigration and resettlement would, how-
ever, present so many difficulties in immigration areas (and in
3 Ricardo, 107, writes: "If the profits of capital employed in
Yorkshire, should exceed those of capital employed in London,
capital would speedily move from London to Yorkshire and an equal-
ity of profits would be effected: but if in consequence of the
diminished rate of production in the lands of England, from the
increase of capital and population, wages should rise, and profits
fall, it would not follow that capital and population would necess-
arily move from England to Holland, or Spain, or Russia, where
profits might be higher." (p. 134)
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emigration areas) that it cannot be considered feasible on a large
scale. A very considerable part of the task will have to be solved
by industrialization."4
Ricardo was assuming perfect mobility of labor and capital at
the national level, and practical (not theoretical) imperfection of
mobility of the two factors internationally. In contrast, Rosenstein-
Rodan, even assuming transport costs to be negligible, considered
the mobility of labor impractical within the national boundaries.
Industrialization in his view was seen as a problem of transportation
of capital toward labor, somehow implying the dispersion of capital
resources over a national territory.
He also argued that only creation of "a complementary system"
reduces the risk of not being able to sell, and, since risk can be
considered as cost, it reduces costs. It is in this sense a special
case of "external economies."
Thus Rosenstein-Rodan's main theme of the strategy of "balanced"
growth in his model is based on complementarity among different
sectors of the economy. 5
Nurkse, in his Istanbul lectures, described the notion of
balanced growth as follows:
Rosenstein-Rodan, 115.
51bid., 114, p. He made one more statement which was later
considered to be meant as simultaneous expansion of all sectors in
a "balanced" growth system: "We have seen how complementarity
makes to some extent all industries 'basic'."
i
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In the absence of vigorous upward shifts in
world demand for exports of primary products a
low-income country through a process of diversi-
fied growth can seek to bring about upward shifts
in domestic demand schedules by means of increased
productivity and therefore by increased real pur-
chasing power. In this way, a pattern of mutually
supporting investments in different lines of pro-
duction can enlarge the size of the market and
help to fill the vacuum in the domestic economy
of low-income areas. This in brief, is the
notion of balanced growth.
In this remark, Nurkse, along with his predecessors Rosenstein-
Rodan and List, agreed with Allyn Young's famous variation of Adam
Smith's dictum: "the inducement to invest is limited by the size of
the market," but unlike List, with respect to small countries which
may have to rely on foreign trade, Nurkse did not make any exception.
He did not elaborate on how a country with a small domestic market
could diversify its economic activities in the first place.
Several points in Nurkse's formulation and description of the
balanced growth theory are worth mentioning. In contrast to List's
proposition of the linkage between the international trade theory
and imperialism, Nurkse announced that in his view "Imperialism had
very little to do with the expansion of trade." Basically his theory
followed the traditional argument of international division of labor
vs. national economic independence and self-sufficiency. He also
claimed that, because of an uncertainty in interdependency of, say,
industry A to industry B, the unbalanced growth of A may not be a
stimulus for expansion of industry B, and therefore the process of
6 Nurkse, R., 96, p. 247.
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unbalanced growth would tend to be slow. Meanwhile the application
of capital to industry A as a result of the passivity of industry B
would be subject to diminishing returns. He concluded his argument
by saying that "as a way of escape from slowness if not stagnation,
the balanced-growth principle envisages autonomous advance along
a number of lines more or less simultaneously." 7 Confronted with
the insoluble question of resource scarcity in underdeveloped coun-
tries he had to sacrifice the generality of the theory by saying that:
"In my presentation, balanced growth is an exercise in economic
development with unlimited supplies of capital, analogous to
Professor Lewis' celebrated exercise in development with unlimited
labor suppl ies." 8
Nurkse repeatedly points to the notion of the center-periphery
relationship. He equates the strategy of unbalanced growth for
peripheral countries with the continuation of the traditional policy
of specialization in primary products. Thus, he argues that "In the
absence of vigorous upward shifts in world demand for exports of
primary products a low-income country through a process of diversi-
fied growth can seek to bring about upward shifts in domestic demand
schedule by means of increased productivity and therefore by increased
real purchasing power. '
71bid., 96, p. 248.
8 lbid., 96, p. 250.
9 bid., 96, p. 247.
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Arthur Lewis' theory of economic development with unlimited
supplies of labor is indeed a "classical" academic exercise. In
contributing to the theory of balanced growth, Lewis says that:
"all sectors of the economy should grow simultaneously, so as to
keep a proper balance between industry and agriculture, and between
production for home consumption and production for export."10 Some
writers on the subject of balanced vs. unbalanced have considered
the Lewis version of the theory as a "moderate view," against the
"extreme view" suggesting simultaneous development of all sectors
at equal rates.ll, 12, 13
Balanced growth theorists have their claims on the "external
economies" property of the theory. Nurkse, for example, pointing
to the problem of the small size of the market says that "at least
in principle, the difficulty vanishes in the case of a more or less
synchronized application of capital to a wide range of different
industries. Here is an escape from the deadlock; here the result
is an overall enlargement of the market. People working with more
10Lewis, 78.
11Lipton, 79.
12Nurkse, 96 , writes: ''within the manufacturing field alone the case
for balanced investment implies a horizontal diversification of in-
dustrial activities all pushing ahead, though naturally at varying
rates."
13 Von Neumann, for instance, uses the balanced growth meaning the
expansion of all industries at equal rates, Sutcliffe, R. B., 134,
footnote p. 624.
14
and better tools in a number of complementary projects become each
others' customers."11 Even in the case where capital is available
in unlimited supplies, it would be inefficient to develop industries
to satisfy all the effective demands of the market. This is because
of peculiar structural characteristics of a society's demands. At
the initial stage, the demand structure is nondirectional and the
dictates of the market may not be an economical solution in the long
run. It is especially important in underdeveloped economies with
skewed income distribution, where a minority in the high-income
bracket has a large share in the demand for consumption goods --
mostly imported luxury items -- which may lead the planners to
develop industries to satisfy the existing demand. At the later
stage of development, with a less skewed income distribution, the
demand structure may shift to the production of mass consumption
goods. It is in this sense that the initial emphasis on the develop-
ment of some sectors following the market demand may not be compatible
with long-run production and consumption goals. Moreover, the
demand for products of different sectors must be sufficient enough
to justify their initiation or expansion. This is exactly the
peculiar problem of small markets. Therefore, the theory of balanced
growth, as an operational methodology, does not provide a definite
answer to the problem of resource allocation.
14Nurkse, 97, p. 11.
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2. "Balanced Growth" with Unlimited Supplies of Capital and Labor
Two types of balanced growth theories have developed under the
assumptions of availability of unlimited supplies of labor and of
capital. Since both theories ignore a fundamental problem of under-
developed economies, namely, resource scarcities, it was considered
that further investigation about the two theories would be necessary
to understand the nature of planning problems in underdeveloped
countries and the probable contribution of the theory of unbalanced
growth to their solutions.
Professor Lewis' argument never reaches the reality of today's
undeveloped world when he assumes, in the tradition of classical
economists, that there are unlimited supplies of labor at subsistence
wages.15 Underdeveloped countries today are suffering from acute
shortages of the type of labor necessary for the development of key
sectors of their economies. One reason for this shortage is the
distribution of labor with respect to the level of education.
Unlike the 19th century development atmosphere in the western
world, the underdeveloped world is confronted with a serious
obstacle: i.e., the "technological gap." In the 19th century,
developing countries were innovators and developers,16 while the
developing countries of the 20th century are borrowers of innovations
15Lewis, W.A., 70, p. 400
16Kuznets, 72.
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and developers. It might be argued that the underdeveloped countries
are in an advantageous position, since they do not have to bear the
cost of innovation. While this argument is valid, especially endorsed
by the fact that most underdeveloped countries are enjoying high rates
of growth, it does not however answer the problem of the labor supply. 1 7
Modern industry uses specialized techniques that require a great deal
of knowledge and sophistication. Although the machinery is importable
instantly, the knowledge of operating the machine is not so easily
importable. Vast programs of education and training are needed. When
considered that development in one sector's technology requires the
technology of other sectors to catch up, the handling of the problem
becomes especially insoluble for underdeveloped countries. It might
be argued that since unlimited supplies of labor at a subsistence
wage level usually exist in the agricultural sector, and probably
at the initial stage of development, this "reserve army" can be used
to increase agricultural production (which uses a relatively simple
technology) or some primary productive activities which do not
require a high level of skill. Some economic case studies on
India and Egypt19 have shown that even in the agricultural sector
17This argument is close to the model presented by Kindleberger which
attributes the redundancy of labour in densely populated under-
developed areas to the limitation in the existing technology or the
structure of demand (Ekaus, 35, p. 350).
18Schultz, 120, pp. 63-70.
19Hansen, 50, pp. 367-407.
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such an excess supply of labor with zero marginal productivity does
not exist. Even if Professor Lewis' theory were actually correct
with respect to the existence of such labor, from the viewpoint of
economic development, a country with surplus labor may still have the
labor scarcity, an assumption general to neoclassical models. 20 The
scarcity of labor, in the sense used here refers to the shortage of
skilled labor in certain industrial sectors, while the supply of
unskilled labor may be abundant in non-industrial sectors. The
problem is not only of physical mobility of labor from one sector
to another, but also of the mobility on the educational and skill
level.
Yet, there are other characteristics of Lewis' model to be
discussed. Professor Lewis argues that "as more capital becomes
available, more workers can be drawn into the capitalist from the
subsistence sector."2 1 At another point he says that the process of
capital accumulation in capitalist sector "continues so long as there
is surplus labour."22 It seems that the model turns out to be a growth
model with limited supplies of labor if the capital for investment
is regarded as "unlimited." It is interesting to note that Nurkse's
model of "balanced growth" which he calls a growth model with
unlimited supplies of capital is this version of Lewis' model. There
is no need to point out that neither case (unlimited supplies of labor
2 0Lewis, 77, p. 425.
2 1Lewis, 77, p. 408.
22Lewis, 77, p. 413.
18
and capital) has any relevance to the situation of underdeveloped
economies. Even developed countries cannot carry on a "balanced
growth" program based on the premise of availability of unlimited
supplies of capital. 2 3
In contrasting the doctrine of comparative advantage with the
argument of diversification, Nurkse recommends "concentration of
efforts on a limited range of activities rather than by trying to
do everything at home." But there is no reason to believe that the
two strategies of specialization and diversification cannot both
be part of a country's economic program. A small country such as
Cuba under a temporary hostile economic environment may concentrate
heavily in a single industry (sugar), but in the long run may
pursue the objective of diversification.24
3. Unbalanced Growth Theory
Perhaps any review of the literature of the development theory
ought to start with Schumpeter. He argued that economic history
could not be separated from total history. Therefore "because of this
fundamental dependence of the economic aspect of things on everything
else, it is not possible to explain the economic change by previous
economic conditions alone. For the economic state of a people does not
23Nurkse, 96.
24The objective of diversification as we will see later is not
incompatible with the theory of unbalanced growth.
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emerge simply from the preceding economic conditions, but only from
the preceding total situation."2 5  It is necessary to read Schumpeter
on the development theory, since most of his arguments are followed
rigorously in the writings of other development theorists. He wrote
that "static analysis is unable to predict the consequences of dis-
continuous changes in the traditional way of doing things,...it can
only investigate the new equilibrium position after the changes have
occurred."26 This line of argument was closely followed by
Hirschman later. He also asserted that in his theory, the growth of
the economy as shown by the growth of population and wealth must be
differentiated from the process of development.
Schumpeter clearly states that the spontaneity and discontinuity
of changes are not due to the wants of the consumers of final products,
but "these disturbances of the center of equilibrium appear in the
sphere of industrial and commercial life." He considers the spontaneous
and discontinuous changes in consumers' tastes and preferences as "a
sudden change in data with which the businessman must cope" and he does
not consider it as a sufficient motive for development. "It is,"
Schumpeter argues, "however, the producer who as a rule initiates
economic change, and consumers are educated by him if necessary....
Therefore, while it is permissible and even necessary to consider
consumers[ wants as an independent and indeed the fundamental force in
25Schumpeter,
26 Schumpeter,
121, p. 58.
121, pp. 63 and 64.
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a theory of the circular flow, we must take a different attitude as
soon as we analyze change."2 7
Schumpeter's theory of development is based on the capacity for
innovation and introduction of new goods, new techniques of produc-
tion, opening of new markets, conquest of new sources of supplies
and creation of new organizations. He favors a competitive economy,
since it is in such an economic environment that the emergence of a
new combination would mean the replacement of the old. He believed
that imbalances may be contributory circumstances, favorable condi-
tions "and even incentives to the emergence of new combinations,"
but at the same time are consequences of non-economic events. And,
moreover, these conditions would not exist in "a well balanced
circular flow" system.28 He objected to the proposition that
economic development employ the unused capacity of factors of pro-
duction, but insisted that "the carrying out of new combinations
means, therefore, simply the different employment of the economic
system's existing supplies of productive means." Schumpeter
recognized that "in carrying out new combinations, 'financing' as a
special act, is fundamentally necessary, in practice as in theory."2 9
Schumpeter, indeed, has the answer as to how the process should be
financed. The "method of obtaining money," he wrote, "is the creation
2 7 Schumpeter, 121, p. 65.
28Schumpeter 121, p. 67.
2 9 Schumpeter, 121, p. 70.
21
of purchasing power by banks."
Scitovsky distinguishes between the traditional doctrine of
comparative advantage and the modern arguments for "concentrated
growth."3 0 He thinks that the modern theory of concentrated growth
is based mostly on technological considerations. There are certain
technological advantages in concentrated growth that have something
to do with the economies of scale. In a dynamic setting, the scale
economies and economies of concentration result in a higher rate of
technological change, while at the same time creating some imbalances.
In Scitovsky's model the higher rate of technological change is
associated with the higher rate of growth. Thus he concludes that
"unbalanced growth appears, therefore, as the price of the fast
growth that in a variety of ways stimulates technical progress.''
Through the linkage of technical progress and a high rate of growth,
Scitovsky's model comes close to satisfying one of the conditions
of Schumpeter's theory of economic development. Scitovsky empha-
sizes the cancelling effects of investment and profit in a single
industry and the inducement effects of investment in one industry
on the profit of the other. In other words, he regards profits as
a sign of disequilibrium, and, at the same time, an inducement for
additional investment. And, since additional investment in turn
3 0Scitovsky, 123, p. 214. He writes that the "dependence on foreign
trade, however, is very different from that which accompanies un-
balanced growth concentrated on industries with a comparative advan-
tage. For one thing, this is a temporary dependence, while that is
permanent; for another, the dependence here is primarily on foreign
import supplies, there, on foreign export markets."
22
results in more production and a higher rate of growth, a disequili-
brium policy therefore is more inducive to economic growth than an
equilibrium policy. This mechanism works under a freely competitive
market, indeed.
Scitovsky also points out two important cases of the failure of
the "balanced" growth theory: (1) "insufficient effective demand to
render profitable, and (2) insufficient savings to render possible,
the construction of productive capacity of optimum size...[of] a wide
range of industries.''
Hirschman has obviously followed Schumpeter's theory of economic
development. On his strategy of "unbalanced" growth, however, he
has not entered the dichotomy of the growth vs. development, the way
Schumpeter has clearly defined them. To avoid any confusion, we
evaluate Hirschman's theory strictly on its relation to the growth
process rather than development, although the relation of the two in
the imbalance growth models are elaborated by Scitovsky.
Hirschman sees the pattern of "unbalanced" growth as a kind of
seesaw advance in different sectors of the economy, always the
uneven advance of one sector followed by the catching up of the
other sectors. This process is shown for the two sectors of the
economy in Figure 1-1.
23
UG PATH At
BG PATH
0I
InI
A0
Sector il
FIGURE 1-1
Hirschman claims that the smooth curve of growth process between
the two equilibrium points Ao and At hypothesized by "balanced"growth
theorists is fictitious, since these theorists used two still photo-
graphs of points Ao and At to construct the curve.
Hirschman essentially follows the profit-motivation argument of
Scitovsky in defining the concept of "induced investment" in his model
of unbalanced growth. But he differs in a fundamental aspect, namely
the causal relationship between the shortages and the technological
innovations. He agrees with Veblen that "invention is the mother of
necessity'' rather than vice versa,31 while Scitovsky believes that
3 1Hirschman, 50, p. 68. In his view the theory of balanced growth is
an exercise in "comparative statics," not a theory of development
process. What actually happened between the two equilibrium points
is the unbalanced growth of one sector over the other in each stage
of growth process.
MMM
24
"many of the major technical inventions have been sparked by
shortages created by an unbalanced pattern of growth."32 Hirschman's
viewpoint stresses furthermore the effect of supply on economic
development in general. On the level of abstraction, his view is
somehow analogous to the notion of spontaneity and discontinuity
of "change in the channels of flow" in Schumpeter's theory of
economic development.
In addition to the above, there are several other character-
istics of Hirschman's model that are important for the reformulation
of an "imbalanced" growth model to be presented in this work. These are:
1. If development means a disturbance in the state of low
equilibrium, every attempt to balance the state of unbalance will
overcompensate to the degree that the next stage would become another
unbalanced situation. And it is exactly this state of perpetual
unbalance which forces the energies and materials to produce more
and expand further.
2. The self-correcting forces are propelled "through a variety
of market and non-market mechanisms,'33 implying among other things,
that state intervention is necessary to conduct a strategy of
unbalanced growth. The reason for this necessity, perhaps, is the
fact that the private sector would not be induced to invest in
production of items above the level of effective demand, since beyond
3 2Scitovsky, 123, p. 216.
33Hirschman, A. 0. and Charles E. Lindblom, 58, pp. 211 and 212.
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that no profit will be gained. For the state, however, it is
possible to overproduce in one sector and cause shortages in others
so as to induce the private sector to invest in bottleneck sectors.
In such cases, governments are not profit-maximizers, but the
private sector certainly is.
3. The process of development through an imbalanced growth
path is conceived "to be more costly in terms of resource utiliza-
tion."3 4
4. The self-correcting mechanism is believed to make the
growth under the conditions of unbalance speedier than under the
conditions of balance expansion.3 5
5. The expansion under the conditions of unbalance calls forth
more resources and investment than would otherwise become available.
This. is based on the assumption that there is some "slack" in the
economy. 36
34 Hirschman, A. 0. and Charles E. Lindblom, 58, pp. 211 and 212.
351bid.
3 6Hirschman, 58, p. 212. "On the assumption of a given volume of
resources and investment, it may be highly irrational not to
attempt to come as close as possible to balanced growth; but
without these assumptions there is likely to exist such a thing
as an 'optimal degree of imbalance."
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6. There are varying degrees of pressures imposed by shortages
and bottlenecks pending the selection of sector(s) to be expanded.
One of the pressures imposed by the unbalanced growth is on the
decision-making processes. Hirschman considers "genuine decision-
making" as the "principal scarce resource," and argues that
"shortages" and "bottlenecks" cause the imposition of political as
well as psychological pressure on the decision-making bodies to
accelerate the decision-making process and therefore to economize
this scarce resource. 3 7
7. The theory recognizes the direct connection "between the
investment of one period and that of the next.3 Therefore, the
notion of complementarity which is absent in the traditional theory
of comparative advantage is the principal theme of the Hirschman
theory of ''imbalance."
3 7Hirschman's theory of "unbalanced growth" is designed to be a
descriptive theory, especially on the subject of "decision-making"
processes on planning issues in most underdeveloped countries
(with great reliance on Latin American experience). But he
genuinely thinks that "unbalanced" growth strategy can be used
as an effective tool to create deliberate shortages and bottle-
necks to accelerate the process of decision-making. Note that
Hirschman is not worried about the availability of capital, but
is concerned about the creation of social and economic tensions
in the system, which he thinks would speed up the developmental
efforts.
38Hirschman, 58, p. 213. "For instance, to start by developing...
industry is likely to introduce more compelling pressures (be-
cause of the resulting food shortages, or, if food is imported,
because of the balance-of-payments difficulties) than if the
sequence is started by an expansion in agricultural output."
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8. The sequential development of complementary sectors
indicates the preference of the model for a long-run policy of
diversification of sectoral activities. In this respect, it is not
what the balanced growth theorists claim it to be: a theory of
specialization in primary products.
Hirschman argues that the reason why the theory of growth
in developed countries did not incorporate the sequential character-
istic of development into a structural framework of the growth theory
is that in an advanced economy, the development of all sectors were
supposed to be "instantaneous" and "automatic". 39
9. The concept of "induced investment" is defined by the
"provision that the projects that fall into this category must be
net beneficiaries of external economies."40
4. Spatial Equilibrium Theories
Parallel to the development of economic theories on subjects such
as growth and international trade, spatial economists have tried to
develop theories of interregional trade and regional growth within
a national boundary.
The structural framework and the determinant elements of a
regional system were borrowed directly from the international trade
theory. Regional economists, land economists, and location theorists
added new dimensions to the field of regional sciences, namely the
3 9Hirschman, 57, p. 42.
40Hirschman, 57, p. 71. He adds that there is no connection between
the size of an investment and its net "input" of external economies,
although some association between these two magnitudes may be
expected to exist.
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taxonomy of economic regions, the land value and the cost of friction
(transport costs). In the international trade theory, the national
boundaries were given by political agreements. In addition, the
theory dealt with the volume and aggregate value of trade among
nations. Trade theory was indeed the only segment of economics which
was directly and separately dealing with transport costs. Location
theorists put greater emphasis on transport costs of resource
mobilization. The economists had, of course, their explanations.
They said that there is no difficulty in measuring the transport costs
as part of the production costs, or allocating them proportionally
to other factor costs (labor and capital). The same was true about
land. Unlike capital and labor, however, the total amount of land
was considered to be fixed. 4 1
Ricardian theory of rent proved to be wrong. The share of
landlords did not increase in the course of time but rather decreased.
von Thunen's descriptive theory of agricultural rent was a useful
exposition of the mechanics of the agricultural land market for its
own time, but ceased to be so, as soon as transport costs became
negligible in relation to the total cost. ~ The modern urban rent
4 1Ricardo's theory of rent that eventually all the profit goes to the
landlord, or von Thunen's agricultural rent theory and Alonso's
model of urban rent structure all stem from the economic conditions
of the time, when the theories took form.
42This is not a general statement on all production functions. In
retrospect, however, the transport costs' share in the total cost
was higher in the past than it is today.
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models the direct descendants of the theory of agricultural rent,
also lose even their descriptive quality when the transport costs
become a negligible part of the family budget of urban dwellers. Thus,
the contribution of the location theory and land economics to the re-
gional economic theory as far as rent and transport costs are concerned
is a matter of relativity. If the cost of land or transportation is a
major component of the production costs, it is important to be singled
out and if it is not, there is no need for undue complication of the
programming model. The transport costs, however, were a major factor
in the theory of international trade and even tariffs and custom duties
were considered as artificial transport costs.
The pioneering works of Christaller and L*sch in the development
of the spatial theories of regions and central places are germane to
the understanding of the theoretical and analytical direction of
regional planning thoughts.
L6sch in several theoretical works on the location theory in
general and economic regions in particular, introduced a model of the
market area "starting with assumptions of evenly and adequately dis-
tributed raw materials over a wide plain and homogeneity in every other
respect," described the tendency toward specialization and large-scale
production on one hand and toward self-sufficiency on the other.4 3
43Losch, 80, p. 108. Several observations on the LUsch model must be
made: (1) the model is made in the tradition of all equilibrium
models, assuming a demand must exist to justify the supply and the
supply must be made as much as satisfies the demand. (2) There is a
precise recognition of large-scale economies, but that, too, is a
function of the size of the market. (3) A clear trade-off schedule
is suggested between the shipping costs and the advantages of large-
scale production.
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In his geometric presentation of regions as networks of
market areas, L5sch elaborated on the equilibrium system to the
extent of algebraic and geometric abstracts. His attempt to create
a theory of regions was a deliberate one, particularly designed to
find a way out of the theory of international trade. He wrote about
a few economists who tried to identify economic regions with
political boundaries (among them Ohlin) that: "Actually they did
alter little more than words; they began to speak of interregional,
in addition to international trade; and what had held for states
now held also for regions.",4 4
L6sch was modestly critical of his own theory as well -- not
that he saw anything wrong with the theory but the fact that
spatial utopia was not exactly materializing in the real world.
He wrote: "We have found three main types of economic regions:
Simple market areas, regional networks, and regional systems....
The members of this series become, in that order, increasingly com-
plicated, increasingly self-sufficient, but unfortunately, increas-
ingly uncommon too."
In the process of evolution of the location theory, one finds
a continuous and deliberate effort to build a general equilibrium
4 4L6sch, 80, p. 104. He also added that the definition of a region
as a locus of equal prices is erroneous. "This definition is
unsuitable, however, because there are no such regions; and even
if there were, they would be without significance and thus not
worth our attention."
45L-sch, 80, pp. 218 and 219.
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theory which encompasses the spatial aspects. Alfred Weber,
Laundhardt, Predohl, Palander and L6sch, all followed the equilibrium
analysis' framework in the line developed by Walras, Pareto and
Cassel. Predohl, for instance, concluded his investigation into the
question of the position of the location in the general equilibrium
theory by saying that land as well as capital and labor is subject
to factor distribution analysis. "Therefore general location theory
is deducible from the application of the principle of substitution
to the employment of the several groups of productive factors." 4 6
The original Weberian equilibrium theory of location was
based on the following notorious assumptions: (1) the location
and size of the places of consumption are fixed; (2) the location
of raw materials is given; (3) "the geographic cost pattern of labor
is given, and at any one point labor is unlimited in supply at
constant cost." 4 7
The general location theory formulated as such could at best
only partially describe the spatial relationships of the economic
activities in particular parts of the world and had no validity as
a developmental planning tool, nor did it, indeed, claim to be.
The fact that initial formulations of the location theory were
developed in Germany is not incidental. It was a part of a total
reaction of economic thought to the Anglo-Saxon bias in economics. 48
46 lsard, 65, p. 33.
41bid., footnote p. 28.
48 Ibid., p. 24.
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The connections between List's balanced growth strategy for development
and self-sustained economic units in L6sch's general system of regions
are evident.
Walter Isard in the Preface to Location and Space-Economy after
a quotation from Abbott P. Usher 9 remarks that "Despite the disrupt-
ing effects of technological advance and other dynamic phenomena
and the consequent failure to attain equilibrium in the secular sense,
there is still value in equilibrium analysis." And so goes the rest
of the Location and Space-Economy, elaborating the ceteris paribus
type general and partial equilibrium models of the past contributors
and adding some new ones.
Isard, however, acknowledges that "the general theory of
location developed in Location and Space-Economy does not consider,
except in minor fashion, the aggregate demand and income side of the
picture, particularly as they relate to regions and to inter-
regional trade. In his view of the concept of opportunity
cost and transport-orientation into trade theory would contribute
''to the fusion of trade theory and location theory.''
Undoubtedly, Isard is not much concerned with the problems
of growth and development strategies. His emphasis on analytical
49"Classical and neo-classical theory rest upon a concept of equili-
brium that becomes a source of serious difficulty in historical
analysis. It is implied that disturbances of the socio-economic
equilibrium are small in magnitude and quickly corrected by adap-
tive changes. Such disturbances do exist, and market processes
have developed that deal with some measure of adequacy with these
minor disturbances of the equilibrium. But these are not the
only disturbances that occur in the socio-economic world. The
world economy is beset by other disturbances, whose magnitude is of
such an order that adjustments require several generations..., "65,
p. ix.
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properties of location theory and specific stress on the importance
of transport cost, turns the theory into a sterile device, devoid
of any flexibility or potential of being incorporated into a
development theory, although it must be acknowledged that it may
serve as an analytical tool to observe how the adjustment process
operates.
The tradition of equilibrium analysis in spatial economics
is followed in the field of regional sciences as a direct result of
Isard's revival of the German school of thought in space-economy.
Lsard attempts, in his latest writing, to build a holistic
equilibrium model embracing the social and the political factors as
well as economic factors.50 His general theory assumes that (1) there
are indifference consumption curves for individuals as well as for
economic regions, (2) total supply at the market of each region must
equal total demand for each good, (3) the exporting unit is motivated
by the possibilities for profit, (4) the exporting unit considers
the market price of the commodity at the importing region plus
transportation costs, (5) the economies of the regions consist of
large numbers of competitive traders who are maximizing their gains
from trade (a necessary condition for the existence of an equili-
brium), (6) the traders do not have any influence on prices, i.e.,
50 Isard, 68, pp. 519-520. In an introduction to Chapter 11, titled
"General Equilibrium of the Economic Subsystem in A Multiregional
Setting" he affirms that he draws "heavily upon works of diverse
economists who have been concerned with general economic equili-
brium."
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regional prices are given, (7) the condition of diminishing return
prevails, i.e., there is a point where the increase in volume of
shipments to other regions results in zero or negative net gain. etc. 5 1
Apart from a consideration of several technical problems
(example: construction of indifference collective consumption curves
for the regions) the basic premises of the model do not guarantee
an analytical property for the explanation of the regional growth
and development. The model fails especially in its applicability
to the regional development processes of underdeveloped nations.
The following may be cited as major shortcomings of the theory:
1) Most underdeveloped countries can be classified as those
with mixed economies. State planning efforts might not necessarily
be oriented toward profit maximization, while its policies must
induce the profit maximizer entrepreneurs in the private sector for
investment. Since the model does not recognize the public sector
activities, its use as a planning tool is almost nil. 5 2
2) The model is typical for a free-market competitive economy
where the prices are given. Because of state intervention, most
developing countries are run as Chamberlinian monopolistic economies.
Price policies are one of the important instruments of central
governments in the inducement of growth in some sectors of the economy
or in the stoppage of others.
5 1 1sard, 68, pp. 527-535.
5 2 This criticism may not be warranted, since the theory is intended to
be a descriptive theory for the private sector, not a normative theory
for the public sector.
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3) The model following the tradition ignores the economies of scale
and externalities that cause the net gains of some exporting sectors
to fall.
5. Theories of Spatial Concentration
Among development economists, Tinbergen has addressed himself
precisely to the questions of different stages of planning, sectoral
expansion and the regional development. Tinbergen has come very
close in conciliating such disciplines as general economic theory,
welfare economics, theory of economic development, theory of
regional economic development and city and regional planning.
His model recognizes three main stages in planning over time:
(1) macrophase, (2) middle phase and (3) microphase. In the
macrophase, Tinbergen stresses that economy must show development
only in macro-terms, "without subdivision into regions or industries."
The middle phase is the time for introducing sectoral and regional
dimensions into the picture. Finally, the microphase is a continua-
tion of the middle phase with more precision and detail, dealing
"with separate projects and even smaller geographical regions,
perhaps even separate rural and urban districts." 5 3
The middle phase which is of the utmost concern in our work
(accepting the classification of Tinbergen) is described by Tinbergen as
a temporal stage in which the country "is divided...into a limited
5 3Tinbergen, J., 136, p. 76.
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number of sectors, or industries in the broadest sense. In both
cases, this number may vary from two to twenty, but it is preferable
not to deal with too many regions and sectors at the same time."
On the question of migration, Tinbergen believes that "voluntary
migration of a section of population from a poorer region to more
prosperous areas will make the development problem easier."54 At
most, he recognizes regional aims as those concerned with the equali-
zation of income among regions, the rise in per capita income of
particular regions, and the increase in the level of regional employ-
ment. Although he mentions transport costs and migration of the labor
force, he apparently does not consider the spatial dimension in the
middle phase to be so important. It seems that he is more interested
in the rehabilitation of man by increasing his income than in the
development of the land, although the suggested index of the well-
being of the population is the familiar term of per capita income.
In the selection of sectors, Tinbergen advises that "a
relatively small number of sectors that are fairly homogeneous" be
chosen. 55
It is obvious that Tinbergen suggests concentration, but
not in line with the liberal trade theorists or even in the way
recommended by the "unbalanced growth" theorists, but purely from
the practical point of view. He neither preaches rapid industrialization
nor specialization in primary products. Instead, he refers to the
54Tinbergen, J., 136, p. 90.
55 1bid.
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size and the share of particular sectors in the national economy.
It seems natural to him to treat the oil sector in Venezuela and
cotton in Egypt as separate sectors. But he does not exclude the
possibility of development of those sectors "which are for the time
being 'empty',... but do show imports." He makes a distinction between
"regional, other national and international sectors."5 6 He defines
the regional sectors as sectors whose products cannot be transported
to other regions. The other national sectors are those whose
products cannot be transported abroad, and the international sector
whose products can be transported abroad. 5 7
The international sectors are "all branches of industry,
agriculture and mining, which produce material commodities.58
Tinbergen thinks that further detail and breakdown of the
sectors in the middle phase is not necessary. He considers this
degree of refinement as characteristic of the micro-phase, in which
problems such as the relation of the regional center to the hinterland
ought to be considered. He points out that "along the lines of town
and country planning, the country has to be divided in the micro-phase
56Tinbergen, 136, p. 92.
5 7Among the strictly regional sectors are the building industry and most
service activities. At times it is difficult to define the national
sectors as separate from regional sectors or international sectors.
Coal, steel and building materials in a large country may be considered
as national industries, but in a small country may be classified as
international sectors.
58Tinbergen, 136, p. 93.
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into even smaller territorial units."59
One more point on the Tinbergen model is that he eliminates the
transport cost variable by differentiating between the commodities
that are or are not to be transported outside a certain territory.
The reason for this simplification is that an aggregate transport
cost minimization in conjunction with the minimization of total
production cost is cumbersome and sometimes quite unnecessary.
6. The Concept of Polarization in Regional Context and the Theory
of Unbalanced Growth
Although the theory of regional polarization is only 25 years old,
it is conceptually a classic.60 A polarized region, according to
Boudeville, is a set of neighbouring towns whose exchange is more
with the regional metropolis "than with other cities of the same
order in the nation." 61 In a closed regional system the notion of a
polarized region is synonymous with Christaller's hierarchical
system of cities. A polarized region which appears as an hierarchical
system implies the existence of an equilibrium. The rank-size
studies made originally by Zipf and followed by others, state that an
hierarchical order of cities is an equilibrium system, when a linear
curve with the slope of -1 could be fitted to a plot of rank against
size of cities within national boundaries on double-logarithmic
59Tinbergen, 136, p. 159.
60Boudeville, 15, p. 9.
6 1Ibid., p. 11.
6 2 Berry,
63Boudevi
13 and 40, p. 118.
lle, 15, p. 11.
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62paper. For most underdeveloped countries as well as some developed
countries the curve is non-linear and is convex to the origin (a
rectangular hyperbola). There has been a long search for a theoretical
basis by which linear regularity can be called an equilibrium and
the deviation from it a state of disequilibrium. There is only
an intuitive belief that a skewed distribution of cities according
to their sizes might be an implication of disequilibria in social and
economic activities, and therefore an unhealthy situation.
One important distinction must be made between the concept of
a polarized region and the theory of growth poles developed by
Frangois Perroux. The regional growth-pole as Boudeville defines
it is ''a set of expanding industries located in an urban area and
inducing further development of economic activity throughout its
zone of influence." 6 3 Since regional growth-pole is designed to
create a deliberate imbalance in a previously "balanced" but stagnate
system, it would be different from a steady state of relationships
among hierarchically ordered cities within a so-called polarized
region. For those who are apt to look for an equilibrium after any
stage of disequilibrium, it would be easy to see the end product of
a growth-pole strategy as an equilibrium system in a polarized
region. It is one of the intentions of this work to show that that
eventual equilibrium system, if it can be theoretically proved to
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be meaningful, may only be a special case among a large number of
possible consequences of the strategy of growth-poles. There are
two aspects of such an equilibrium that must be analyzed:
(1) The Spatial Equilibrium - In discussing the L6schian
spatial equilibrium system, it was noted that the strong homogeneity
assumptions were responsible for the resulting equilibrium pattern
of market places.
(2) The Price Equilibrium System - Most neoclassical two-sector
models are based on the assumptions that a scarcity of capital raises
the interest rate and that a scarcity of labor raises the wage rate,
resulting in a mobility of capital from a low-interest rate to a
high-interest rate sector and in the mobility of labor from a low-
wage rate to a high-wage rate sector. There are several reasons
for the failure of these equilibrium models. As much as the two
sector models can be related to the regional transfer of labor and
capital, the most important reason cited by John Friedmann is "the
failure of diminishing returns to set in at the center." Hirschman
has provided a psychological reason, namely that private investors
consistently overestimate the profitability of investments at the
64
center, relative to the periphery.
The existence of economies of scale, external economies and
technological innovations at the center that are principally responsi-
ble for the failure of the equilibrium system, all have something to
do with the economies of concentration, whether these economies are
64Hirschman, 57, p. 185.
141
resultants of concentration of population by their sheer numbers,
concentration of capital resources, or concentration of human energies,
talents and innovative capacities. 6 5
The theory of growth-pole as applied to French regional planning,
contains the concept of decentralization in terms of administrative
power as well as social and economic activities. This approach, as
its title "Metropoles d'Equilibre" implies, is another attempt to
achieve an integrated social, economic and political equilibrium within
a spatial system, using both concepts of concentration (on regional
metropoles) and decentralization (dispersion of the social-economic-
political power).
In underdeveloped countries, however, no such refined and
elaborate schemes can be implemented. The development of a single
region surrounding the capital cities of most underdeveloped countries
creates a great "imbalance" which Hirschman might have called a
non-optimal unbalance.
There have been no systematic studies concerning the benefits
and costs of creating new (or expanding the existing) regional centers
(excluding the capital cities) in underdeveloped countries. Intui-
tively, however, it is easy to conceive that some underdeveloped
countries may lack the economic strength to create more than one or
two sizeable regional centers.
65The term center does not refer to the central city, but to a larger
entity such as large metropolitan areas and regional conurbations.
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This problem has been analyzed by Lloyd Rodwin in his attempt
to develop a theory of "unbalanced" or "concentrated" growth in
conjunction with the notion of "decentralization." In his formulation
of the theory of "concentrated decentralization," Rodwin states that
the encouragement of economic activities oriented to leading sectors
would appear to be an effective strategy "to promote development in a
few 'leading regions' and to push those programs which would stimulate
leading sectors within the regions...'balance' would imply simultaneous
development of some related sectors within the region; and imbalance
or what I prefer to call concentrated decentralization, would mean
that some regional and sector development would be stopped, curtailed
or not encouraged until some later stage, because of scarcities of
capital, managerial and administrative talent and markets." 6 6
The main features of Rodwin's theory are:
(1) Recognition of the viability of some leading or "key"
sectors in promoting economic development at the regional level. The
notion of key sector(s) has been extensively discussed by W. W. Rostow.
He groups the sectors of an economy into three categories: primary
growth sectors, supplementary growth sectors and derived growth
sectors. Among these three only the primary growth sectors can play
the role of leading sectors, since they derive their "momentum
essentially from the introduction and diffusion of changes in the
66Rodwin, Lloyd, 112.
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cost-supply environment.1" The supplementary growth sectors advance
in response to the requirements of the primary growth sectors.
Therefore, their expansion is indirectly related to the supply side.
In contrast, the derived-growth sectors enjoy a "fairly steady relation
to the growth of total real income, population, industrial production
or some other overall, modestly increasing variable."6 7 These sectors
are demand-oriented sectors and are, therefore, unable to create
a stimulus for growth. Rostow believes that in the early stages of
development the rapid expansion " in a limited number of primary
sectors, whose expansion has significant external economy" will
result in accelerated growth. As a rule of thumb, he suggests that
since the overall rate of growth is the weighted average of the
growth rates in various sectors of the economy, the leading sectors
can be defined by the growth rate criterion. This indeed implies
that there is no single sector which universally can be recommended
for development as "the magic key." Thus in Rostow's conception of
the "leading sectors," there is no preference for rapid industrializa-
68tion or promotion of agriculture. Rodwin, however, does not
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Rostow, W. W., 118.
6 8Rostow also introduces four basic factors as required conditions for
considering a sector as a leading sector. These are 1) the existence
of an enlarged effective demand, 2) an introduction of a new produc-
tion function, 3)the social capability for generating required capi-
tal for developing the sector, and 4) the capability of the leading
sector to "induce a chain of requirements for increased capacity and
the potentiality for new production functions in other sectors."
Rostow adds that "a considerable array of sectors appears to have
played this key role in the take-off process.''
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elaborate on how the leading sectors at the regional level must be
chosen. If we assume that these sectors are the national leading
sectors, then, it would be useful to investigate their contributions
to the regional well-being as well as to the national objectives.
(2) Introduction of the term "leading region" has supplemented
the sectoral growth theory with a spatial dimension. It is not to
say that the problem of selection of the regions for development
have not been considered before, but that emphasis can be made on
the embodied notion of concentration both in sectoral and regional
development which makes the theory distinctive from Boudeville's
regionalization of the national plan6 9 or the regional equilibrium
system of Perroux. Following the same line of argument in the
selection of the leading sectors, the leading regions can also be
defined as those regions showing a high rate of overall growth.
But this criterion completely overlooks the possibility of development
of regions with tremendous potential which at the time of planning
may show no rate of growth at all. Such a situation is analogous
to a sector which shows no production at the base time, but promises
a great potential for expansion. The issue of the establishment of
certain criteria for selection of the leading regions will be
discussed fully in Chapter 1I1.
(3) Introduction of the concept of "unbalanced" growth to the
problem of regional development. If we can make the assumption that
69Boudeville, 15.
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the term "region" implies (in the narrow sense) a territory smaller
than a national state, then, the application of the "unbalance"
approach to the problems of the regional development requires some
clarification. There are two types of resources: mobile and
immobile. The immobility of some resources creates natural advantages
as well as disadvantages for regions. Thus, a fixed pattern of
preferences for development of some regions over others in relation
to the immobile factors exists. The mobile factors also are not
moving freely from one region to another. There are costs to be
borne. Therefore the fixed list of development priorities will
change according to a new list, considering the costs of mobilization
of other factors. The regional inequalities seem to be induced
by both the unequal distribution of immobile factors of production
and the expulsion of mobile factors caused by the existing state of
disequilibrium in the distribution of immobile factors. It seems
almost absurd when one tries to build a theory of regional equili-
brium on the basis of equal distribution of all factors of production.
And since it is very unlikely that anyone, even the sincerest
proponents of "balance" and equilibrium would go that far, the
''imbalance'' in theory of ''concentrated decentralization'' intentionally
is not used to describe the obvious, but to mean precisely:
"concentration." It is within the property of "concentration" which
need not be in contrast with the equilibrium analysis. As will be
shown in a hybrid version of the Kaldor-Harrod models of growth,
concentration may occur in an equilibrium system.
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(4) The classical overlapping of the "balance" and "imbalance'
with regard to the problem of sectoral development. The theory
of "balanced" growth as is cited in the above quotation implies
"simultaneous development of some related sectors" and imbalance
seems to do exactly the same thing. The difference, perhaps,
is only in the degree of concentraiton, since the balanced growth
doctrine as cited above does not recommend the expansion of all
sectors simultaneously. This is not caused, however, by the fact
that unbalanced growth theorists have not been fighting the right
enemies, but because most of the balanced growth theorists have been
hesitant to express such an extreme view as recommending simultaneous
expansion of all sectors. Beside the notion that in some cases
concentration may be acceptable to the balanced growth theorists,
the concept of "sequential" sector development versus simultaneous
expansion of some sectors in my belief is more basic to the theory
of "concentrated decentralization" than the concept of imbalance.
C. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The review of the literature on growth and development theories
is aimed at finding an appropriate strategy for developmental
programming.
Although the theory of "unbalanced" growth was found to be more
descriptive of historical growth patterns, because of its overlapping
properties with the theory of "balanced" growth, it was abandoned
in favor of a strategy of "concentrated decentralization" which in my
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belief is more flexible for an application to various economic
environments aiming at a higher rate of growth than either theory
of "balanced" or "unbalanced" growth. It was argued that concentra-
tion is not a peculiarity of a disequilibrium system, but may occur
in an equilibrium system as well.
It was stressed that the main feature of the strategy of
"'concentrated decentralization'' is the concept of ''sequential''
sector development and not the notion of "imbalance." A policy of
concentrated decentralization in the long run may move toward
equilibrium, while initially it can be considered as the originator
of disturbances in a previous state of equilibrium.
The achievement of an equilibrium, however, does not imply
"balanced" growth. An economic system may reach equilibrium by
following either strategies, "balanced" or "unbalanced."
El
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CHAPTER II
REGIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THE STRATEGY OF
CONCENTRATED DECENTRALIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In the Introductory chapter, we defined the regional objectives
as subordinates of the national economic goal. We stated the
national goal as a certain per capita rate of growth. We argued that
a strategy of "concentrated decentralization" at particular stages of
economic development will serve the stated national objective best.
The theoretical controversy on the subject of selection of
national and regional goals, however, is going beyond the level of
simplicity of a national goal such as the one stated above.
In order to be able to introduce some regional objectives into
the general objective at the national level, we will first review the
major arguments around the issue of national and regional goals
selection. In doing this, we will attempt to draw heavily on the
theoretical discussion of Chapter I, and make some conclusive remarks
on the effectiveness of the strategy of concentrated decentraliza-
tion toward the general end of economic development.
B. THE OBJECTIVES OF A REGIONAL GROWTH PROGRAM
A distinction must be made between the ''regional programs'' and
El
the "regionalized programs." The latter refer to national programs
which by operational necessity are regionalized. The goals are
set at the national level, with a certain rate of growth for GNP or
per capita income. Those regions which best contribute to these
objectives are chosen as programming regions. The Regional Program
for Guayana, Venezuela is of this latter type. The former type
regional programs are designed specifically to achieve some regional
goals, although these goals may not be inconsistent with the
national development objectives. These targets have been derived
from regional needs, and might be of a higher level of consumption,
a higher level of employment or a more equitable distribution of
income. In any event, in either case the objectives must be stated
in operational form and as a part of a national plan. The prerequisite
condition makes it necessary to consider several national variables.
The most important of these variables are:
1. Size of the Country - Size is a primary binding factor in economic
development. Small countries with limited size of their markets may
not be able to diversify their economic activities, and even if
capable, it may not be to their advantage to do so. A high degree
of specialization in these countries may lead to the most efficient
pattern of resource utilization. Looking at size in geographical
terms, a small country may not even encounter the regional inequalities
problem because of even distribution of population over the land and
the negligible effect of transport costs. On the other hand, a large
country, in terms of area and population size, with a large market,
would have to diversify sooner or later because a large market bears a
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greater risk and uncertainty by relying on international trade. Even
if the flow of goods and services were guaranteed to continue from
abroad, an excessive volume of trade becomes uneconomical because of
transport costs and distributional problems. In a country such as
India, the specialization on some sectors of the economy may prove to
be a wrong strategy in the long run.
2. Resources - The problem of resources to a large extent is
related to the size of the countries. A country with a single natural
resource endowment such as Kuwait will probably always be better off
to concentrate on the exploitation of her oil resources and import
almost all other goods from abroad. The large and medium-size coun-
tries with abundant natural resource endowments are constrained by
the availability of capital for extraction of these resources. While
in the long run, diversification of economic activities by the
expansion of the potential capacities may be an ultimate goal, the
short-term programs, however, should follow a path of the most
efficient way of allocating scarce capital resources. The case of c
constraint with unlimited supplies of other factors of production,
especially that of labor, was discussed in the review of the Lewis
theory of growth. Upon the availability of additional capital, the
capitalist sector (Lewis' definition) can be expanded indefinitely.
However, the resource availability is not limited to natural endowme
and capital. The labour shortage in most underdeveloped countries m
be a serious bottleneck. The problem of factor unemployment in some
underdeveloped countries is not in the monopoly of labor alone, but
in capital as well. Economists may argue that any amount of capital
apital
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becoming available to underdeveloped countries can be used with no
problem. There may be, however, situations called "underemployment"
and "disguised unemployment" of capital in some underdeveloped
countries, when such a country decides to employ masses of unskilled
labor in certain economic activities with low skill requirement and
in most cases with a low level of productivity. It is important to
note that the "underemployment" of capital is a direct result of the
"labor shortage" in this particular sense, a shortage of the right
kind of labor. If the above analysis is correct, then some of the
medium and large-size countries with adequate natural and capital
resources, and in some stage of development will follow the strategy
of concentration, until the time that the labor force of the right
kind is in excess supply. This at times may imply the concentration
of planning efforts on the expansion of education and training
sector of the economy. This, indeed, has been a controversial issue
in economic development because of the difficulty of measurement
of the return on educational investment.1
3. Stages of Economic Development - The choice between the two
types of regional programming approaches depends also on the stages
of economic development in the countries concerned. Regional
differentials and inequalities are not peculiar to the underdeveloped
countries. Developed countries show a larger gap between the
IMcClelland, David C., 82.
El
52
regional indices than the underdeveloped nations. Apart from the
conventional reasons such as labor immobility, poor natural endowments
and geographical and climatic conditions, the tendency of a free-
market economy is toward concentration, because of scale economies
and advantageous externalities of concentration. For reasons that
do not yet constitute a theory, the concentration of population and
economic activities is not only common to the free-market economy,
but is evident as well in socialist-planned economies. Therefore,
a certain degree of regional inequality (if it is assumed that equality
is a good thing) is unavoidable. If there are certain economies in
concentration, then it is not justifiable at least on economic
ground for a state to follow the strategy of dispersion. It might be
argued that in a free-market economy, since the share of the private
sector is large (in relation to the share of the public sector),
free enterprise would benefit from the economies of scale and of
concentration, while it will not carry the burden and costs of the
diseconomies of concentration. So far, there has been no satisfactory
empirical work on such an hypothesis, and even if it is proved to
be so, it would probably affect the economies of developed countries
more than those of developing nations. If, in underdeveloped
countries, the diseconomies of concentration appearing in later
stages of development and the regional differentials in an early
stage of development were not so great, then a program based purely
2 In underdeveloped countries, only primate cities show a tremendous
difference with other regions, but these other regions among them-
selves show few inequalities.
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on the "regional" objectives seems to be senseless. However, the
question of concentration of population and economic activities in
most underdeveloped countries cannot be separated from the question
of the economic and social structure of the country under considera-
tion. Most underdeveloped countries have their largest concentration
in one (mostly capital) city or a few large cities as consumption
centers and a large dispersed rural sector as the productive sector
of the economy with a low level absorption capacity for industrial
products.3  Some economists, especially the proponents of the
"balanced" growth theory, have pointed out that the low income
elasticity of demand for industrial products of the ruralites is
caused by the inadequacy of farm production. Therefore, any concen-
tration of resources on industrial activities (in the narrow sense)
at the center, is doomed to failure, as structuralists are pointing
out (see Hirschman). The problem of development in these countries
is not the availability of resources but the socio-economic
structure. The center constituting somewhere around ten percent
or more of the national population is heavily dependent on the
importation of consumer products from abroad. There is no domestic
or international market for the industrial (better to say manufactur-
ing) products of the economy. Thus the only way to get out of the
vicious circle is to increase agricultural productivity, reduce
the importation of consumption goods (especially luxury goods) by
3 For example, Lampard has stated that "the presence of an overly large
city in a preindustrial society may act as a curb rather than a stimu-
lus to wider economic growth." He is specifically referring to the
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the imposition of tariffs and custom duties, and restrict the imports
to necessary capital goods as much as scarce resources of foreign
exchange will allow. Despite the fact that there is no mention
of the dispersion of economic activities in such a prescription, it
is evident that a policy for expansion of the agricultural productivity
necessitates the dispersion of capital and managerial resources over
a vast agricultural territory. The opposing viewpoint is that an
increase in agricultural productivity is extremely costly. The
income elasticity of consumption of agricultural products at home
is quite high (because of a low level of previous consumption).
Finally, the exportation of surplus agricultural products for obtain-
ing necessary foreign exchange is very difficult. The obvious rea-
sons for this difficulty are: 1) most developed countries with a
sizeable market for agricultural products are countries of "surplus
agriculture," therefore, are in a better position to compete with
agricultural exports of underdeveloped countries, 2) the technology
of agricultural production in underdeveloped countries is retarded,
and takes a large investment and much time to update it, and 3) if
all underdeveloped countries were to try to become agricultural
surplus countries, there would be no foreign market for their
products, since the diversity of agricultural products relative to
manufacturing products is quite limited.
life of "parasitical" cities which are not economically productive.
Lampard, Eric E., 73, p. 131.
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Most economists are in agreement on the question of an
agricultural surplus as a prerequisite for economic development.
They differ mostly in their next suggestions on which sector is to
be developed and how. The growth theorists are silent on the
question of where the economic activities must be initiated or
expanded. It is the question of least interest to them. Regional
economists, regional scientists and location theorists have addressed
themselves to the problem of location and spatial relationships of
economic activities which were discussed in Chapter 1.
Both "balanced" growth patterns based on the dispersal of
manufacturing activities in rural areas and "unbalanced" growth
programs based on the concentration of industries in large centers
are criticized for creating "white elephants" in the economies.
The criticism rotates around two pivots; supply and demand
function. The balanced growth theorists argue for balance in
demand. Their prescription therefore would be to find demand elastic-
ities for all primary, intermediate and final products, to project
the demand according to these elasticities, and to produce just as
much output as can be absorbed by the new incomes created. The
"unbalanced" growth theorists argue that supply creates it own
demand, and if not exactly by amount supplied, at least it induces
a level of demand above the one obtained at the equilibrium point
of the balanced growth path. Some regional economists working on
4Lipton, 79, pp. 642-57.
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regional objectives have considered the regional differential in
per capita income (the only measurable and agreed upon index) a
transfer problem within a maximization problem given the scarcity
of resources; namely labor and capital. The results of their
efforts are a handful of simplified two-sector models devoid of any
reference to the stages of economic development. The prevailing
assumption is that "equality is good" and as long as by bettering
off someone we are not causing some other one to become worse off,
the maximization problem can be solved successfully. 5
The formulation of the regional objectives, however, without
consideration of the particular stages of economic development is
an exercise in futility.
For highly advanced countries with an elaborate tax system
it is theoretically possible to channel the public funds to the
development of depressed regions. Most underdeveloped countries
lack a strong and operational tax system. Moreover, if the taxes
are collected, it is more appropriate to expand existing rapidly
growing industries in already developed centers rather than to
transfer them to new regions because of scarcity of investment funds.
In addition, by analogy to what Professor Rosenstein-Rodan, a
forerunner of the "balanced" growth strategists, once pointed out,
that in underdeveloped countries all industries are to some extent
"basic," we may say that in most underdeveloped countries all regions
5 Mera, 86, p. 2.
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are to some extent depressed. Therefore a strategy of simultaneous
equalization of per capita incomes in all regions means spreading
scarce capital resources thin over several regions. Thus, it
seems that a scanning and selection process is unavoidable. In
prior arguments, we mentioned the inadequacy of the "balanced"
growth theory on the basis of its fundamental error of assuming
unlimited supplies of labor (Lewis) and unlimited supplies of
capital (Nurkse). The problem of development is essentially a
scarcity problem. There is, indeed, a relativity in scarcities. By
definition, when there is a scarcity of one factor and plenty of
another, if they are substitutable, we try to use more of the plenti-
ful and less of the scarce. There are always sectors which are more
economical for development under labor-or-capital-intensity conditions.
If there is a factor-improportionality in an economy, certain
sectors cannot be developed. In other words "imbalance" is an
inevitable solution.
The "imbalances" and "inequalities" at the regional level, of
course, are not synonymous, although the former may intensify
the latter. As Hirschman had suggested that there must be an optimal
level of "imbalance," we may say also that there must be an
optimal level of regional "inequality" which is economically,
socially and politically tolerable, if it is an unavoidable choice
to develop some regions over others.
In attempting to clarify the relationship between "goal identi-
fication" and choice of "strategy", it seems irrelevant to use a
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purely deductive method in arriving at universally acceptable goals
for regional economic development, and then search for the strategy
which best suits our goals and objectives. We believe that
regional "goals" must be based upon national and regional means which
ought to be used to achieve such "goals." Without denying the
importance and plausibility of utopian models designed for the
equalization of regional indices, the fact of regional development
programming, we believe, is more complex than can be solved by
such models. A distinction must be made between the spatial static
equilibrium models of concentration (i.e. models developed around
the concepts of central place theory, rank-size and cities as
systems) and the dynamic disequilibrium model of concentrated
decentralization.
The models of the former type are mostly descriptive and
when applied to the developing economies for predictive purposes
show a poor forecasting capability. The latter type models are
essentially planning models. Their function is to create a deliberate
imbalance in spatial order to promote growth. In one sense their
objective is more general than the term regional objective may
imply. Their objective is to cause rapid growth. But at the
same time, since each pole of concentration has an influence on
its immediate hinterland, the objective of rapid growth is contribut-
ing to the regional objective. Whether this contribution satisfies
the interests of the majority of the region's population or not
is more a question of the prevailing social and economic system
rather than the choice of the strategy.
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A model of concentrated decentralization may lead to more
equal distribution of income or further polarization of the income
strata, depending on the economic system in which the model
operates. An exposition of this fact is made in Appendix A
using a hybrid of Harrod-Domar national accounting model and
Kaldor's model of income distribution. The results of this model
show that an initial emphasis on a concentrated growth strategy
will produce in the long run economic systems which have more
equal distribution of income while maintaining a rate of growth.
C. SOME CLARIFICATIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF "CONCENTRATED"
GROWTH AND THE 'NATIONAL' AND 'REGIONAL' SPECIALIZA-
TION IN RELATION TO THE REGIONAL GROWTH OBJECTIVES
There has been some misdirected effort in confronting the
"balanced" growth strategy with the strategy of "unbalanced" growth
by equating the latter with the principle of international speciali-
zation and investment in primary production. We've abandoned the
term ''imbalance" in favor of the term "concentration." But we are
aware that regional concentration may lead to regional specialization.
Therefore, we feel that there is a need for further clarification on
the difference between the concept of concentrated growth with the
theory of international specialization on one hand and the inter-
national and interregional specialization on the other.
Chenery writes: "In most cases there remains a wide margin
of disagreement between the advocates of international specializa-
tion and investment in primary production on the one hand, and the
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proponents of 'balanced growth' and industrialization on the other."6
In our argument on concentrated growth, there is no need for
confrontation of the two fronts; namely, proponents of "balanced"
and "unbalanced" growth, at least in the way they are classified by
Chenery. The theory of concentrated growth in the sense used in this
work does not imply, necessarily, international specialization, nor
does it suggest investment in primary production. It may well be
advantageous for a country to concentrate on what Chenery calls
''industrialization'' (as opposed to involvement in primary production),
and still have a pattern of unbalanced or concentrated growth. The
other point which makes our analysis different from that suggested
so far by advocates of the "unbalanced growth" theory is its spatial
dimension of the developmental scheme. A model of concentrated regional
growth which implies sectoral and regional concentration may well be
a rapid industrialization program. Such a program, if successful,
would certainly create inequalities among the regions. But the long-
run objective of the unbalanced growth is not the creation of
persistent inequalities. Quite the contrary, unbalanced growth aims
at promotion and inducement of activities in regions suffering from
inequality. This process, however, is by no means automatic.
If the process of development is left to the private sector
because of large benefits occurring to the private businesses from
scale economies and external economies of concentration, the
inequalities would persist indefinitely. The examples of West
6 Chenery, H. B., 25, p. 450.
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Virginia in the U.S., Brittany in France and Glasgow in Scotland are
witnesses to the laissez-faire operation of the market in the
western capitalist world. It follows that any concentrated regional
program must be made with the objective of creating shocks which can
be absorbed by other regions. This implies the complimentarity of
the regions rather than competitiveness. The objective of a
concentrated regional growth program is not the creation of a self-
sustained region, but development of a regional economy operating
on excessive supply of some products and deficit in some others.
This pattern of development will give rise to regional specialization
within the national boundaries, and in the short run may lead to
some extent to national specialization. It ought to be remembered
that regional specialization mentioned above is quite different
from the concept of international specialization. Opponents of
international specialization7 may argue that the present pattern
of specialization, namely that of underdeveloped countries producing
primary products and developed economies specializing in manufactur-
ing products, is imposed by the advanced countries over the inter-
national trade system, since they (developed countries) are the
ones who control the world market prices and also have a lower
elasticity of demand for primary products than the underdeveloped
countries for manufacturing products. Therefore, international
7List, F., "National System," in Hirst, 59.
8 Prebisch, R., 102.
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specialization may result in a deterioration of the terms of trade
for underdeveloped countries. 9  In spite of the fact that part of
this argument is applicable to regional specialization within the
national boundaries, there are two points which make the regional
division of labor distinctive from international specialization.
First, that regional specialization is not in jeopardy with the
national development objective (growth of the economy as a whole),
while the international specialization, following the argument
of Prebisch, may well be. Second, theoretically, regional
inequalities within the national boundaries can be eliminated by
policy manipulation of the central government, while there is no
international government to be concerned with national inequalities.
Some part of the regional inequalities is caused by the resource
endowments and the size of the regions. These two factors are
shared in the realm of international trade as well. Some countries
do have to specialize in production of some commodities because of
the limited resource endowments and the small size of their national
9 Nurkse, obviously, makes two important points here: (1) the strategy
of unbalanced growth is justified if the demand elasticity for exports
of primary products is higher than the demand elasticity of imports
of manufacturing products, i.e. favorable terms of trade for under-
developed countries, and (2) within the framework of an "unbalanced"
growth strategy, he is assuming that underdeveloped countries can
only expand their primary products. The first point reduces the
attractiveness of "balanced" growth theory as a general theory of
growth, and the second is not a criticism of the "unbalanced" growth
theory. The confusion about the contents of an "unbalanced" growth
strategy stems from the fact that opponents refuse to make the dis-
tinction between the Ricardian comparative advantage type of growth
in the 19th century and the modern theory of "unbalanced" growth.
The historical pattern of development in the 19th century, especially
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markets.10 In such cases, economists have suggested economic integra-
tion, which is nothing more than consolidation of specialized econo-
mic regions. In other words, the aim is to internalize the regional
externalities in a new unit which for all practical purposes will not
be different from a national economy with specialized regions.
D. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The first and probably most important conclusion that may be
drawn from discussions in this Chapter is that neither strictly
"regional programs" with individually derived regional goals, nor
the "regionalized programs" with a single national growth objective
are performing to the best advantage of a country's economy, at least
in the long run. A proper choice is a multi-regional growth strategy,
in countries under colonial rule was specialization in primary products.
Some underdeveloped countries today may still continue to follow this
19th century policy, and the terms of trade for their products may not
be favorable to them in the foreseeable future. The theory of un-
balanced growth does not prefer the expansion of any particular sector
of the economy over any other. It simply says that given scarce
resources, some sectors of the economy must receive priority for
development. It is a sequential development strategy with no explicit
reference to the order of sectoral development. The order may change
for different countries, given their resources and their positions in
the development path, with relation to the rest of the world.
10 List, 2. cit., 59. He, a proponent and probably the original author
of "balanced growth" theory, acknowledges that some countries have no
choice but to specialize.
Boudeville, 15.
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satisfying a specified minimum measure of national growth. The second
conclusion is that the degree of concentration or decentralization is a
function of several variables, among them the size of the country con-
cerned, resource availabilities and the stages of economic development.
Thirdly, the resource scarcity always implies selectivity in sectoral and
regional development. This condition may or may not necessitate the
adoption of an "unbalanced" growth strategy. It is essentially an
allocation problem. The fourth conclosion is that a strategy of con-
centrated decentralization may lead to more equal distribution of income
or further polarization of the income strata, depending on the economic
system in which the model operates. The fifth conclusion is that the
strategy of concentrated decentralization is not necessarily a develop-
ment policy toward specialization, although it may call for specialization
in early stages of development.
Before proceeding to Chapter III on research methodology and Chapters
IV and V on case studies, a summary of what we have said about the strategy
of concentrated decentralization would seem appropriate.
We have argued that in the absence of planning, regional inequalities,
such as income differentials, unequal distribution of factors of production,
differences in wage rates, variations in size of the markets and in the
level of scale economies, would always favor economic expansion of some
regions over others.
The familiar argument in favor of continuation of a policy of con-
centrated growth is that as long as by concentrating economic activities
in one or few regions, the national income is maximized, regional equal-
ization of income will gradually be approached by the market mechanism
itself via mobilization of labor from low to high wage regions and
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movement of capital from low to high interest rate regions. Thus, in the
long run an equilibrium position will be reached. In the real world, such
equalization of regional per capita incomes over time has not yet material-
ized.
The long-run automatic equalization theory is based on the assumption
that perfect mobility of factors of production exists. Such mobility, for
one reason or another, has failed to materialize at a rate high enough to
bring the situation to an equilibrium, even in the long run. This is
especially true for countries whose backward regions' populations are
growing at a higher natural growth rate than their developed regions.
The Italian case presented in Chapter IV is a clear example of the failure
of the theory over a hundred year period.
On the other hand, the supposition of a higher rate of return to the
factors of production in existing centers of concentration of population
and economic activities has seldom been put to a test of reliability. In
a number of cases where such test has actually been performed (Guayana,
for instance) the rate of return to the factors in the periphery were
substantially higher than in the center.
Moreover, most developed nations have already entered an era of
insurmountable difficulties caused by over-concentration of population
and economic activities. Economically (if not technologically), it has
become increasingly difficult to combat environmental pollution. If the
diseconomies of high concentration were properly quantified, the net return
on the resources used in some of the world's largest population centers
might prove negative. In underdeveloped countries, such diseconomies
are already in existence, while the technology and knowledge of how to
eliminate them, not to mention the financial resources, are non-existent.
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This, indeed, is not an argument against the policy of concentrated
growth, but the recognition of the existence of some optimal level of
concentration. The policy of decentralization may be pursued under two
conditions: 1) when an existing center of concentration of population
and economic activities has already reached the saturation level, beyond
which further investment would result in a lower rate of return than that
of other regions, considering all costs and benefits, and 2) when the rate
of return at the center is still higher than other regions but is gradually
declining. In the latter case, a policy of decentralization diverts the
forces which ultimately may force the center into its decline, notably the
influx of an unwanted labor force. This latter is a dynamic, not com-
parative static, argument, and recognizes the lags and irreversibilities
inherent in many economic location decisions.
It is a well known fact that the elasticity of migration with respect
to change of income at the center is greater than one, especially in
underdeveloped economies. If the rate of change of income at the center
is x, the rate of growth of migration to the center is ax, where a is
greater than 1. The higher rate of in-migration in the center, other
things (the rate of growth of income and the natural rate of growth of
population) being equal, clearly means a lower rate of per capita income
growth. One would expect that the lowering of the rate of per capita
income growth, in turn, would result in a lowering of in-migration rate.
In actuality, however, the response of the labor force is not instant-
aneous and "rational". The rate of in-migration remains high while the
rate of per capita income growth falls, partly because of the high level
of expectation of the labor force to find jobs in large market areas.
IN"
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In other words, the rate of in-migration is a function of volume of output
at the center rather than the rate of growth of per capita output.
In the following two case studies an attempt is made to show the
decline of the centers and the possibility of expansion of some sectors in
the periphery which obviously enjoy higher rate of returns on investment.
If either condition, the decline of the center or the relative
advantage of some sectors in the periphery are established, the adoption
of a policy of decentralization may be justified.
The policy of decentralization, however, cannot be applied by spreading
investment funds thinly over a wide range of sectors and over so many
regions. We have discussed in the present chapter and in Chapter I the
beneficial aspects of the strategy of concentrated growth. In this context,
under the capital and managerial scarcity constraints some degree of
concentration within a framework of decentralization is not only desirable
but necessary.
We are now in a position to define the strategy of concentrated
decentralization more precisely as follows:
The strategy of concentrated decentralization is an attempt to de-
centralize economic activities from a previous state of centralization
having used the strategy of concentrated growth to expand and develop a
few peripheral regions and a few sectors within these regions which clearly
show an existing economic advantage or a potential for growth.
In Chapter 111 an attempt is made to develop simple models for the
recognition of growth potentials of sectors and regions of a national
economy in order to direct the decentralization efforts to the regions
holding potentials for growth and the areas of sectoral concentration
within these regions.
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Chapters IV and V, the case studies are concerned with the historical
trend of concentrated growth policies in the absence of planning, the
identification of factors contributing to regional differentials, the
recognition of regions and sectors as candidates for application of the
strategy of concentrated decentralization, and the behavior of the
economic systems under planning conditions, and its relevance to the
strategy of concentrated decentralization.
'U
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Development planning is a complex matter, dealing with all kinds
of variables, quantifiable and non-quantifiable in social sciences.
No single method or technique is capable of handling the whole
problem from the initial stage to the end. In the field of regional
analysis, numerous analytical techniques have developed, ranging
from simple statistical analysis to highly sophisticated mathematical
and programming models, and from macro-models dealing with regional
aggregates to highly detailed micro-models of interregional-intersec-
toral input-output analysis.
The objective of this chapter is a rather modest one, namely to
introduce simple models of decision-making for the use of decision-
makers in a form that can easily be understood and acted upon. These
models are also designed to suit the condition of data availability
at several ranges, from aggregate regional data on population and
income to the detailed data on the inter-industry basis. Another
objective following the design of these models is to make them
flexible enough to allow a measurement of some non-economic factors
as well as economic factors. This is particularly true of the multi-
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regional-multisectoral-multiproject decision matrix presented in Section
D of this Chapter. The models are basically static models, and the time
dimension enters only in the form of period analysis and streams of costs
and benefits over time.
The organization of this Chapter is as follows: In Section B, the
principle of induced investment in relation to the sectoral development
is explained. In Section C a static decision-making model for simul-
taneous selection of leading regions and leading sectors by the use of
regional and sectoral growth rates in the past is exhibited. In Section
D a more elaborate model for the selection of regions and sectors for
investment using cost-benefit analysis is suggested. A refinement of
the same model using the industrial complex analysis and a third model
with additional objective function is presented later in Section D. In
Section E a multiregional growth model which satisfies a certain per -
capita income growth rate, given the regional objectives and constraints,
is developed. Finally Section F lists a number of statistical techniques
for regional analyses used in the case studies.
B. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDUCED INVESTMENT
We discussed in Chapter I the principle of induced investment.
The main argument was that the private sector is essentially profit-
motivated, and it will not invest in the production of items above the
level of effective demand. But the states, we argued, are not a profit-
maximizers - they can overproduce in one sector and cause shortages in
others so as to induce the private sector to invest in bottleneck
sectors.
71
The argument's validity rests entirely on the existence of ''slack"
in the economy. If such a condition exists, state involvement in over-
production may result in an upward shift of the demand curve in other
sectors. The shift of the demand curve and the rise of profits in the
sector expanded by the private sector is shown in Figure 111.1.
FIGURE Il-1
THE MECHANISM OF INDUCED INVESTMENT
0 Q
increased Profit = AiEiBiCi- AEBC
For the economy as a whole, the net result of the losses suffered by the
public sector and the gains enjoyed by the private sector must be positive
to justify government investment.
NENWF_ -wI.
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C. A STATIC DECISION-MAKING MODEL FOR
SIMULTANEOUS SELECTION OF LEADING
REGIONS AND SECTORS FOR DEVELOPMENT
1. Definition of the Problem. Planning authorities in developing
countries are confronted with the problem of how to choose from among
various regions and sectors, those which may achieve the highest rate
of growth of the national economy and the regional output.
2. Data Sources and Problems. In most underdeveloped countries,
data on a regional basis are almost non-existent except for some
aggregate measures, such as Gross Output, Gross Investment and the
like. Ordinarily the selection of regions and sectors in countries
with limited data on economic indicators is made on the basis of
intuitive judgment of public officials who may not have a deep under-
standing of the interplay of economic forces in the development
process. To cope with the problem of data scarcity, a simple static
decision-making model is presented here, which is capable only of
pointing out the sectoral and regional potentials for development.
A final decision on the selection of regions and sectors is made only
after extensive feasibility studies are made, which will be presented
later as a cost-benefit analysis.
3. Analytical Technique. We use a simple criterion for the
selection of regions and sectors, i.e., rate of growth of sectors and
regions in the past. In other words, we are assuming that if the
rate of investment remains constant, the sector with a high rate of
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growth in the past will continue to grow as rapidly or even faster.
Let us assume a country with seven regions and seven major
sectors. We choose the rate of growth of the gross product as the
single criterion of selection. If we calculate the sectoral rates
of growth in each region for an immediate time interval in the past
we might obtain a matrix as is shown below:
DECISION-MAKING MATRIX
(TABLE V-14)
Sectors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total
-1.9 6 .4 -1.0 - .8
- . -2. 5 .2 4.7
- .1
5-1 .4 -1 .5
.2
-2 .7
2 .3
1.6
- .7
3.5
-2 .4
2 .4
.1
5.3
5.9 5.8
3.02
3
4
5
Regions
7 -1.1
.4Nat ion
I
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Now we can define the criterion (or criteria) for the selection
of sectors and regions more explicitly: 1) make an initial selection
of all sectors which show a higher rate of growth than the average
sectoral rate of growth at the national level; 2) choose those
regions with higher rates of growth than the national average. If
the above criteria are applied, regions 3, 4 and 6 are candidates
for development. Region 3 has three sectors with rates of growth
higher than the national-sectoral average. Region 4 also has three
sectors performing better than the national average. And Sector 6
has four sectors each with a higher rate of growth than the national-
sectoral average.
4. Shortcomings of the Model. The model presented above has
the simplicity of revealing the picture of past trends in different
sectors and regions but at the same time as any static model can do,
it holds the danger of misleading planning authorities in the course
of decision-making. First, there is the problem of young industries
within each sector which may not yet have shown a high rate of
growth, but in the course of time may do so. Secondly, few sectors
within a region even with higher than average rates of growth cannot
bring the regional rate of growth as high as to be considered candi-
dates for development. Thirdly, the model does not recognize the
development potential of some sectors or industries which have never
been promoted in some regions, or show a low rate of growth because
of under-investment. Finally, as it is characteristic of any strategy
of concentrated growth, the model recommends further expansion of
I.-
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already growing sectors and regions at the expense of slow-growing
or depressed sectors and regions.
D. A DECISION-MAKING MODEL OF SIMULTANEOUS SELECTION
OF REGIONS AND SECTORS FOR INVESTMENT
1. Definition of the Problem. A national development plan
consists of several projects within each economic sector to be
realized in various regions. The problem to be solved in this model
is how to choose these developmental projects. The solution to this
problem is simultaneously a solution for the selection of regions and
sectors for investment.
2. Analytical Technique. We start with presenting a paradigm
which has the form of a Tinbergenian regional-sectoral matrix. The
original Tinbergen model consisting of three regions and five sectors
is reproduced below:
MATRIX (1)
Regions
2 3
1 yi 2 y 1  
3 y 1
2 1y2  2 y 2  3 y 2
Sectors 3 y y y
4 y4 24 3y
51 y5 2 y5 3 y5
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In the above matrix, y's represent incremental incomes to the
national income by each sector within each region. The superscripts
at the left and right of each y represent numbers of regions and
sectors respectively.
Tinbergen has suggested the matrix as a simple linear program-
ming model. With a slight modification, however, the matrix can be
turned into a decision-making model for solving the problem of
selection of leading regions and sectors.
Development plans as was mentioned above usually contain a
number of specific projects which can be classified under several
sectors of the economy. The investment on each project must be
justified by satisfying some selection-criteria.
The model presented here uses the maximum value of net benefits
resulting from a combination of projects, subject to the capital
constraint as the only criterion for simultaneous selection of
regions and sectors. Any number of criteria, however, can be
added without changing the principal format of the model.
We start with the simple benefit-cost criterion. The benefit
side can be extended to the point of embracing all kinds of
benefits which are economically quantifiable. These benefits are
calculated for the lifetime of the project, then discounted to the
present value. The concepts of scale economies, externalities and
complementarities, may enter the calculation of the benefits of the
projects. On the cost side, the initial investment, operation and
maintenance costs over the lifetime of the project are computed. The
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costs also are discounted to the present value. Any internal or
external diseconomies which are predictable and quantifiable may
be added to the overall costs. The net benefit figures found for
different projects can be stated as:
B - C = v
If we calculate these net benefits for different industries in
different regions we will have a matrix of the following form (we
are keeping the number of sectors and regions the same as in
Matrix 1):
MATRIX 2
Regions
2 3
1 v1 2 1 3 1
Sectors/ 2 1v2 2 2 3v2
1 3 2 3 3 3
or Industries/ 3 v v v
1 4 2 4 3 4
or Projects 4 v v v
5 1v5 2 5v 
3v5
A numerical example may be useful in showing how the selection
of leading regions and sectors is made.
The v's in Matrix 3 represent the net benefit figures for five
sectors (or industries/or projects) in three different regions.
Matrix 3, however, is not sufficient as a decision-making tool.
Each sectoral development is tagged with a minimum amount of invest-
ment necessary for initiation or expansion of certain industries.
MATRIX
Unit: Billions
Regions
1 2
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of Dollars
3
.5 .3 .4
.2 .5 .6
1.5 1.0 .5
2 .0 1 .0 2 .0
1 .0 .5 .2
5 .2 3 .3 3 .4
In the calculation of devel
are the most important part
one constraint. The second
minimum initial capacity of
opmental projects, the initial investments
of the problem. Availability of capital is
is the problem of individibility and the
some projects. We attempt to show these
problems by a numerical example given in Matrix 4. Each investment figure
in Matrix 4 corresponds to a value v in Matrix 3. It is important to note
that in spite of the fact that the candidate sectoral projects for each
region are identical, the amounts of initial investments, because of
regional differentials, are not. These differentials are also reflected
in the v values. We have, indeed, exaggerated the differentials in v
values for the purpose of more clarity in exposition of the results. The
same is true for the initial investment figures.
Sectors
1
2
3
4
5
Unit:
1
MATRIX 4
Billions of
2
Dollars
3
bThe values in the matrix are fictitious and have no real economic meaning.
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Sectors
1
2
3
4
5
1.2
1 .3
3 .0
5 .0
1 .7
.10 .08 .05
.10 .10 .12
.50 .65 .25
1 .00 .55 .30
.45 .40 .28
k
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If we divide the v values in Matrix 3 by their corresponding values
of investment requirement in Matrix 4, we can make a rank-ordered list of
projects according to the values of v* = v/I such as shown in Table 111-1.
The larger the value of v*, the more efficient the project is. If capital
is unlimited in supply, all the projects with the value of v* higher or
equal to one (unity) can be developed. Such a selection criterior excludes
only project PS3 with the value of v* equal to .71.
Project
Number
P'l3
P 13
P 3
P 22
P23
P12
P 3
P 3
P 51
P 4
P 4
P 32
P5 2
P21
P 53
TABLE I 1 1-1
V Requi red
Val ues Investment = I
.4 .05
2.0 .30
.5 .10
.5 .10
.5 .12
.3 .08
1.5 .50
.6 .25
1.0 .45
2.0 1.00
1.0 .55
1.0 .65
.5 .40
.2 .12
.2 .28
V* Val ues
8.00
6.66
5.00
5.00
4.16
3.75
3.00
2.40
2.22
2.00
1.81
1.53
1 .25
1.66
.71
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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Now let us introduce one constraint into the model. Suppose
that the total investment funds are 1.00 units (billions of dollars).
The decision-maker starts with the project ranked 1 in Table 111-1 and
distributes investment funds in descending order until he runs out of
capital. In the example given above, when the decision-maker reaches
the ninth project in Table 111-1, P S, the total amount of investment
funds allocated is 1.88 units of capital, and the next project, P 4 ,
needs 1.00 units of investment. Suppose that because of the indivisi-
bility problem, it is not possible to make partial investment (.12
units of the remaining investment funds) in projects P 4 1, P4 2 ' P3 2 '
and P5 2. Hence, the project ranked fourteenth in Table 111-1, which uses
exactly .12 units of investment but is lower in ranking than the four
previous projects can be chosen to complete the list of selected
projects. If the decision-maker does this, within his 1.0-unit hypo-
thetical budget, he will be able to develop the projects shown by "x"s
in Matrix 5.7
7The simple maximization problem in the case above can be stated as
follows: x
Max. Z v* subject to the constraint I = 1.0. The
xx
solution of the above problem in: v x = v*13 + v*43 + v* + v*22 +
v* + v* + v' = 4.8 which satisfies the constraint. Summing up
23 12 33
the amounts of corresponding investment required for the selected project
we will have 113 + 143 + 111 + 122 + 123 + 112 + 1 = 1.0. Any other
combination in this case proves to be sub-optimal.
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MATRIX 5
Regions
1 2 3
1 X X X
2 X X
Sectors 3 X
4 x
5
3. Some Suggestions on Further Refinements of the Model.
There is a major problem in defining net benefits on a project-
by-project basis, because this procedure does not take into account
the inter-relationships of the projects and the economies resulting
from them. Thus, it would be more appropriate to lump inter-related
projects or complementary sectors and evaluate the composite value of
net benefits for the package projects or sectors rather than on an
individual project basis. This kind of analysis, known as industrial
complex analysis, will also allow us to deal with inter-regional
complementarity as well as inter-sectoral interdependency. The net
benefits of each package accrued to a single region or a number of
regions can be shown in a matrix such as Matrix 6.
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MATRIX 6
SECTORS
REGIONS 1 2 3 m
2 x x x x
3 x x x
xI x x1X x xL x x
x x x X
x X X
x x x
x x x x
x x x
x Xx x
x Ix
x x x
x x x x IxII
x x x xI x
x x x
x x x X
The v* values in this matrix reflect such considerations as availability
of resources, economies of scale, agglomeration economies, sectoral
complementarities and regional proximities. When the investment
constraint matrix is applied, the solution will define the choice
between the clusters rather than cells in Matrix 6.
One possible problem with the aggregate value of net benefits for
each cluster may be the creation of an artificial indivisibility of
the complexes. This in turn would limit the flexibility of the
decision-making model in finding compromised or satisficing solutions.
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To overcome this problem, several combinations of intersectoral and
interregional projects in terms of their net benefits could be
analyzed. There, indeed, would be one maximum net benefit among
various combinations, but the existence of non-optimal combinations
will make the selection procedure more flexible in similar conditions
as described in the example given for the case of project-by-project
selection.
In previous analyses, we introduced only the capital constraint
matrix. Theoretically, however, it is possible to introduce as many
objectives as well as constraints as may exist. The existence of
the optimal solutions, indeed, is not guaranteed. In the development
of such decision-making models we are aiming at satisficing, rather than
maximizing, and looking for compromise schemes rather than absolute
solutions.
In what follows, we will introduce a short-run objective, i.e.,
an employment target which may have been set up not necessarily for
economic reasons, but mostly because of political and social pressures.
Note that this objective could have been incorporated in the
calculation of costs and benefits of the projects, but since the net
benefits are calculated for the lifetime of the project(s), a short-
run employment objective, even if weighted very heavily in the initial
years of the projects would not affect the result as much as to
shift the selection entirely from one set of projects to another.
Let us assume that the employment target for a short-term of a
five year planning period is set up as E = 10 unit (1000's) increments.
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In Matrix 7 the employment capacity of each project for the same
time interval is shown.
MATRIX 7
Regions
2
Sectors
1
2
3
4
5
3
Our maximization solution in the example given before results
in the selection of P13' P43' Pil 22' P 12 and P 33 The total
employment capacity created by these projects in the short-run is
as follows: E + E + E + E2 2 + E +E + E =1.0 + .5 +13 43 1 22 23 +12 33
3.0 + .2 + 2.0 + .5 + 3.0 = 10.2. Thus the maximization solution
has over-satisfied the employment objective in the above case.
But consider the case of Matrix 8.
3.0 .5 1.0
5.0 .2 2.0
2.0 1.0 3.0
1.0 1.0 .5
1.0 .2 .1
1I
El ~-
MATRIX 8
Regions
1 2 3
1 1.0 .5 1.0
2 5.0 .3 1.0
Sectors 3 1.0 1.0 1.0
4 .5 3.0 1.0
5 6.7 2.0 1.0
In this example the solution to maximization of v does not satisfy
the employment objective. The aggregate value for employment is 5.8 or
slightly more than half the stated target figure.
The problem, indeed, is insoluble if we insist on maximization of
the net benefits.. But a compromised solution exists if we satisfy
primarily the employment objective and accept a minimum loss in net
benefits. If projects Pl3' P4' Pll, and PI are selected, the
investment constraint and employment objective are satisfied, while the
net benefit is no longer a maximum.
The employment objective was added for an exposition of how one
can find a compromised solution in a case with more than one objective.
Obviously the same procedure may be pursued for finding satisficing
solutions to problems with any number of objectives and constraints.
86
E. A MULTI-REGIONAL GROWTH MODEL
I. Definition of the Problem.
An attempt is made to develop a satisficing model which satisfies
a certain per capita rate of growth of the national income with reference
to the regional components in the over-all growth rate.
2. Mathematical Structure of the Model.
We consider a country with r regions. The national income of this
country can be written as follows:
(1:1) Y = Yi + Y2 + ... + Y
Dividing Equation (1:1) by Y we can write:
Y Yi Y2 Y
(1:2) = g+7-+ ... +
Let the percentage share of each region in national income be
called yi, y 2 , -. - Yr respectively.
Then Equation (1:2) may be rewritten as:
(1:3) 1 = Y1 + Y2 + .. + yr
Multiplying both sides of Equation (1:3) by Y we will have:
(1:4) Y = Y (Y1 + Y2 + .. + yr
Let us also assume that the national income Y grows at annual rate
g, and the regional incomes grow at gj, g2 , .. gr respectively.
Assuming a linear growth, the total national income in time (t)
will be
(1:5) Y(l + g)t = Y[y 1 (l + g1 )t + Y 2 (l + 92)t
+ ... + Yr(I + gd t]
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In the same way as was shown for national income, we can write
the following equation for national population as follows:
(1:6) N(l + n)t = N[X1(l + nj)t + X2 (l + n2 )t
+ ... + rr(I + nrdt
whe re
endi
the
N = national population
n = annual rate of population growth
X = percentage share of regional population
The rate of growth of national income for the planning period
ng at the year t can be written as a difference equation of
(1:5):
(1:7) g* = Y[(l + g)t - 1] or g-Y = Y[(] + g)t - 1
Y
and
The same
of population
(1:8)
and
g*Y = Y[X (I + g1 )t + 2(l + g)t
+ ... + Xr + gr t
type of equation may be written for the rate of growth
by writing a differential equation for (1:6):
n= N[(l + n)t - 1] or n*N = N[(l + n)t _
N
n*N = N[A(1 + ni)t + t + 
+ ... + Xr(1 + nr t n 1
Dividing both sides of Equations (1:7) and (1:8) by Y and N
respectively we will have two equations for the rates of growth of
national income and population.
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(1:9) g* = [y 1 (0 + gi)t + Y2 0 + g) t
+ ... + Yr(I + gr 1t
and
(1:10) n* = [X1 (l + n)t + X2 (0 + n2 ) t
+ ... + 1r]( + nrdt
We define per capita national growth rate for the planning period
as:
(1:11) n = g* - n*
Substituting the values of g* and n* from Equations (1:9) and
(1:10) and writing it in a more general form we can write the
satisficing problem as follows:
(1:12) Satisfy n = Z[y r(1 + gr)t rr + nr t
(r = 1, 2, ... , r)
subject to the constraints:
1) T > n' where rl* is a minimum acceptable national per capita
income rate of growth
and
r 2
2) min. E (Y r )
r=l
Replacing gr by Harrod's rate of growth, gr = Sr - , we can rewrite
r
Equation (1:12) in the following form:
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(1:13) Satisfy n = E[y r(1 + ]t _
r
[ A r (1 + n 
r t _
(r = 1, 2, ... , r)
subject to the constraints:
I) n > n* and
2) min Z (Yr/A - 1)2
r=1
Two points should be clarified. First, constraint (1) means that
the transfer of investment funds or savings of one region to the others
is permissible as long as the rate of growth of the national income does
not fall below a certain level (n*). Second, constraint (2) which is a
welfare objective states that the deviation of regional per capita
incomes from the national per capita income be minimized. Since we are
using the ratio of percentage share of regional income over percentage
share of regional population in the above formulation, the national
index is always equal to unity.
Another way of stating the problem is to write:
r
(1:14) min. Z (Y A 2
r=1
subject to the constraint:
[Y (l + r)t - 1] - [A (1 + n ) - 1] > f*
r v r r-
r
3. Operational Properties of the Model
Since the model is sensitive to the savings rate, the capital-output
ratio, and the rate of population growth, the constraint in formulation
(1:14) will set the pace for transfer of savings to the various regions.
In cases where domestic savings would staisfy the national per capita
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income growth rate (n*), the transfer of savings is an interregional flow
of investment funds. But when the total national savings cannot achieve
the rate of growth n*, the low savings rate of some regions must be
supplemented by borrowing from abroad.
The behavior of the model will be as follows:
1) Regions with the ratio y/X higher than unity will transfer part
of their savings to regions with the ratio y/X below unity up to the point
where yr r : 1.
2) Regions with higher savings rates will transfer part of their
savings to regions with lower savings rate.
3) Regions with lower capital-output ratios are potentially capable
of transferring part of their savings to regions with higher capital-output
ratios.
4) The sensitivity of the model to the rate of growth of population
is reflected in the ratio yr r'
5) The constraint stated in the formulation (1:14) sets the degree
of trade-off between concentrated growth(a higher rate of growth) and
decentralization (a step toward regional income equality). The concen-
tration of investments in regions with a higher percentage share of income
(yr ), a lower percentage share of population (X r), a higher savings rate
and a lower capital-output ratio results in a higher rate of growth. If
the problem were stated as a maximization of the per capita national rate
of growth, the concentrated growth strategy would be pursued until the
capital-output ratio in the center falls below that of the periphery, thus
justifying decentralization. This case is shown in Figure 111-2. The
curves vI and v2 depict a hypothetical variation of capital-output ratios,
overtime, for regions I (center) and 2 (periphery) respectively. The
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maximization problem would suggest the investment of all the funds in
region 1 to the left of point e, and diversion of all investment funds to
region 2 to the right of point e. This case may be called a sort of spatial
decentralization.
FIGURE 111-2
A CASE FOR SPATIAL DECENTRALIZATION
V
0 Y
But it hardly makes any sense since, socially and politically as well
as economically, it is impossible to divert all the investment funds from
a center with high concentration of economic activities to the periphery.
The maximization model, however, may be useful if expanded to a level
of disaggregation where it deals with capital-output ratios in various
industries. Then, the policy of decentralization can be applied to those
industries in the periphery showing lower capital-output ratios.
In the formulation presented above, the welfare objective (minimization
of regional income inequalities) would allow some degree of decentralization.
The degree of decentralization is obviously given by the value of n*.
The value of rn*, however, cannot be determined by economic criteria
alone. A high rate of growth and some degree of decentralization are both
socially and politically desirable. Therefore, the choice of an appropriate
national rate of growth (rin) is a political decision.
What the model can offer, to make such decision-making simpler and
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more sensitive to regional economic conditions is an exposition of the
degree of trade-off between the higher rate of growth and the higher degree
of regional income equalities.
The ideal curve lies entirely on the horizontal coordinate in Figure
111-3, where for any value of ri, the expression Z(yr r - 1) 2 = 0.
The model can present different rates of growth (ri) which achieve
various degrees of regional income disparities. It is sensible to assume
that higher rates of growth can be achieved by higher degrees of regional
income inequalities. The hypothetical curve aa in Figure 111-3 shows the
deviation of the curvature from the ideal line (abscissa) by applying
different rates of growth.
The rate of growth r* should lie somewhere on this curve. The model
is only capable of showing to the decision maker the degree of trade-off
which ought to be made between the higher rate of growth and the higher
degree of regional income equalities.
FIGURE 111-3
A CASE FOR CONCENTRATED DECENTRALIZATION
E ( /A- )2Z(Y r/X r 1)2
a
a
0
It is then a case where a decision-maker chooses a lower rate of
growth to allow for some degree of decentralization that we call a strategy
of concentrated decentralization.
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F. STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES USED IN ANALYSES OF THE DATA
Several statistical techniques and methods of calculation are used
in the analyses of the data related to the case studies. These
techniques and methods are listed below:
1. Percentage Share Analysis
The percentage share of several variables in their respective larger
entities is calculated according to the formula:
(2:1) = ix
where
X; is the regional share of factor X in the nation; or it is
the share of a sector in the regional income, etc., and
X is the total value of the factor at the national level,
regional level, etc.
2. Rate of Growth
The rates of growth for all variables considered in the statistical
analyses are computed according to the following formula:
(3:1) 6  = - j x 100
where
6 = compounded rate of growth,
Xt= the value of the variable at time t,
Xo= the value of the variable at time o and
n = the number of years between time t and o
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3. Index of Prosperity
The index of prosperity used in the data analyses can be expressed
in the following form:
Y
r
(4:1) N
r
where
Yr is the income of the region (or sub-region),
Y is the national income (or regional income),
Nr is population of the region (or sub-region), and
N is population of the country (or region).
Equation (4:1) can be written as
Y
(4:2) C N r . N
r N Y
r
where
Y
is the regional (or sub-regional) per capita income
r
. r - we can write the equation (4:2) asStat ing N as Yr
r
(4:3) = Y N
rY
4. Index of Capital Intensity
An index of capital intensity c for various sectors is established
according to the following formula:
K./K
(5:1) a = L /L
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whe re
K; is the amount of capital stock in Sector i,
K is the amount of total capital stock in the economy,
Li is the number of active population in Sector i, and
L is the number of active population in all economic activities
Equation (5:1) can be simplified and be written as follows:
(5:2) Ki 
L
L K or
(5:3) a = k; L
where
k; is the capital-labor ratio in Sector i.
5. Ratio of Percentage Distribution of the Gross Fixed Investment
to the Percentage Distribution of Gross Product. The formula used is as
follows:
(6:1) i/I)YiY or
(6:2) Is = -Y
where
I; is the gross fixed investment in Sector i,
I is the total gross fixed investment,
Y; is the gross product in Sector i, and
Y is the total gross product
MM-I MMMMW
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6. Ratio of the Percentage Change in Net Product to the Percentage
Change in Net Investment
It i
investmen
This
(7:1
wher
s assumed that a linear function exists between the level of
t and the level of output.
function in a general form can be expressed as follows:
)Yt = f (it-,)
e
Yt is income at time t, and
It-1 is investment at time t-l.
Differentiating Equation (5:1) with respect to time, we will ,have:
(7:2) Yt+l - Yt = It ~ It-]
Yt 
_- It-] I
The elasticity F then, can be written as:
Yt+l - Yt
(7:3) = Yt or
It ~ It-1
It-1
(7:4) Yt+ - Yt. It-1It - It-l t
7. Rank-Size Technique
The formula used for rank-size analysis is as follows:
(8:1) Nne = Nl/n
where
N1
Nn
8
is
is
is
the population of the largest or first-ranking city,
the population of the city of rank n, and
a constant
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whence it follows that
(8:2) log n = log N1 - e log Nn
so that a plot of rank against size on double-logarithmic paper would
give a straight line with the slope of -0.
8. Regression Analysis
In order to observe and predict the behavior of some inter-
related economic variables, a linear equation of the form
(9:1) Y = a + bx
is fitted to several pairs of data in the statistical analyses of the
two case studies.
To fit a straight line to data consisting of paired observations
of two variables x and Y, the method of least squares is used.
The numerical values of the constants a (the point of intercept)
and b (the slope of the regression line) are found according to the
following formulas:
(Ey)(Ex 2 ) - (EX)(EXy)(9:2) a = n (Ex') - (Ex)/
(9:3) b = n(Exy) - (Ex)(Ey)
n(Ex') - (Ex)'
9. The Coefficient of Correlation
To describe how well a regression line, obtained by the use of
least squares method fits the data, we compare the sum of the squares
of the vertical deviations from the least-squares line with the sum of
the squares of the deviations of the y's from their mean. The degree of
the 'goodness of fit' is measured by r (coefficient of correlation)
according to the following formula:
mi
96
(10:1) r = n (Exy) - (Ex) (Ey)
-x/n(Ex2) - (Zx)2Vn(Zy2) - (Ey)2
The values found for coefficients of correlation are checked
against the levels of significance of U/2 = .025, .010 and .005 for
selected values of n (number of samples in observation). The null
hypothesis of no correlation at the level of significance a, then, is
rejected if the value of r, calculated for a set of data is less than
or equal to -ra/2 or greater than or equal to ra/2. If the value
obtained for r falls between -ra/2 and ra/2, the correlation coefficient
is considered not significant, and the value of r can be attributed
entirely to chance.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EMERGENCE OF THE STRATEGY OF CONCENTRATED
DECENTRALIZATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR MEZZOGIORNO, ITALY
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this Chapter is to review and survey the histori-
cal and recent planning activities in Mezzogiorno, Italy by use of
various statistical techniques, in order to find answers to the
following questions:
1. What are the objectives of the Mezzogiorno development
program?
2. What strategies and policies have been selected toward the
achievement of planning objectives?
3. How successful have the plans been in the short-run? Is
there any prospect of better performance in the long-run?
4. Is there any indication of a tendency toward adoption of a
strategy of "concentrated decentralization" as a result
of recent experiences in regional planning in
Mezzogiorno?
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FIGURE IV-]
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FIGURE IV-2
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B. THE HISTORY OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN MEZZOGIORNO
1. A Brief Review of the Historical Background. From Greek
and Roman times, through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance,
Mezzogiorno had been characterized as a rich agricultural region.
During the Napoleonic era, it was viewed as a granary and Napoleon
tried to implement land reforms to increase agricultural produc-
tion. Until the unification of Italy in 1861, Mezzogiorno was
ruled by the Bourbons as the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, and during
this time, a budding industrial sector had developed to the extent
that employment figures for the year 1861 showed a larger percentage
of the working population in industry, transport and communication
in Mezzagiorno (30.4%) than in the North (25.8%).2 At this time,
the population of Mezzogiorno was 39 percent of the total population of
Italy. 3
With the unification of Italy, the industrial sector of
Mezzogiorno disintegrated with the abolition of internal tariffs
and the lowering of external tariffs. The free trade policy was
abandoned in the 1870's, but industrial development henceforth would
benefit mainly the North.
IWadsted, 139, pp. 35-36.
2Rosenstein-Rodan, 116, p. 5.
3Wadsted, 139, p. 53.
4Rosenstein-Rodan, 117, p. 12.
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In this last century, Mezzogiorno has been plagued by all the
economic characteristics of an underdeveloped country: an
agrarian surplus population, open and disguised unemployment, a
low income per head ($180), in 1955, as opposed to the national
average ($350) and that of the North ($450), and a rate of growth
that is lower than the rest of the country. 5
Although Mezzogiorno covers 40 percent of the area of Italy,
and its population is 37.2 percent of the total Italian population,
its percent of the national income in 1951 was 21.7 percent, and
its net industrial production was 13.6 percent of the Italian total.
Although the rates of population growth for the two major regions
are about equal, the natural growth rates in Mezzogiorno have
always been higher, and out-migration rates have been high enough
to equalize the total population growth rates of the two regions.
As early as the beginning of the 1950's over 50 percent of
the working population of Mezzogiorno was engaged in agriculture
and slightly more than 25 percent in industry, transport and
communications. At the same time, about 35 percent of the North's
population was employed in agriculture and 40 percent in industry,
transport and communication. Private investment in the South
accounted for 40 percent of total investment while 75 percent of
the total investment in the North was made by the private sector.
By 1950, while the Italian economy as a whole was surpassing
all the conventional standards of underdevelopment, the South had
5Rosenstein-Rodan, 117, p. 12.
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remained a backward region within a developed economy.
The regional differentials had reached an intolerable thresh-
old. The potential for a social and political explosion could be
felt in the Italian atmosphere. An urgent need for remedial action
was recognized by all political groups from extreme left to the
right of center.
2. Recent Development Planning Activities. The problem of
underdevelopment of Mezzogiorno has been a standard political
topic for at least fifty or sixty years after 1890. By the
industrialization of Italy in this century, the problems of the
South have become more apparent. In spite of much political dis-
cussion, no developmental programs evolved until 1950, by the
establishment of The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. In 1955, the Ten-
Year Economic Development Program (Vanoni Plan), presented by the
Italian Government, aimed at three main objectives: (1) "to
achieve full employment for which purpose 4 million new jobs have
to be created; (2) to achieve a rate of growth of 5 percent per
annum in GNP, and (3) to reduce the inequality between Northern
and Southern Italy." 7
By 1961, the Italian economy as a whole was in serious
trouble. Wages began to rise, bank credits rose rapidly and a
consumption boom created shortages. In 1963, by forbidding banks
6Rosenstein-Rodan, 16, P. 5.
7 Ibid., p. 2.
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to borrow from abroad, reserves could not be protected any more.
"Food imports reached record levels. Some capital fled abroad,
and by March 1964 devaluation was being seriously mooted." 8
Meanwhile, the third objective of the Vanoni Plan never came
close to reality, not to mention "a large fall in the rate of
expansion of real gross national product to 2.7 percent in
1964."9 As a result, the 1965 Economic Plan (Five-Year Plan) was
designed to lubricate the wheels of a slowing-down economy. But
the stated objectives of the Plan had to satisfy the political
mood of the country, and as a result, they were explicitly geared
to the ideology of attaining "substantial" equality between
incomes in industry and agriculture on one hand, and closing the
gap between incomes in the backward areas, in particular the
Mezzogiorno, and the rest -of the country.I1
The emphasis in the Five-Year Plan (1965-70) was placed "on
the structural reforms necessary for balanced growth rather than
on an increased rate of growth,"1 1 although the Plan sets the
target rate of growth for the average annual increase in Italy's
gross national product at 5 percent.
As a general strategy toward the objective of rapid growth
8EIU 135, p. I.
9 lbid., p. II.
10 Ibid P. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 3.
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in the South, the industrialization of the Mezzogiorno from the
time of the establishment of The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno has been
the main theme of the developmental programming in any single
national economic plan of Italy. But the 1965 Economic Plan has
more explicit and adequately developed regional policies for the
achievement of this goal.
The EIU Report prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit
points to the fact that:
One of the worst problems encountered in
the initial stages of development work in the
Mezzogiorno was that of dispersion of effort:
too many people and places chasing large but
necessarily limited resources for local develop-
ment. A considerable step towards curtailing
this dispersion of money and effort was the
decision in 1957 to recognize specific dis-
tricts as Areas for industrial development
and smaller zones as Nuclei for industriali-
zation. This decision was reinforced by
further measures enacted in 1959, 1961 and
1962, which strengthened investment incentives
and improved the control of activities in the
Areas and Nuclei." 12
These considerations, which clearly indicate the tendency of economic
planning toward the adoption of a strategy of "concentrated decen-
tralization," were further pursued by the Common Market authorities
in developing a sectoral expansion program in the case of the
Apuglian growth pole. 1 3
The purpose of the statistical analyses which follow in this
12 E[U, 135, p. 8
13Ibid., p. 13.
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Chapter, however, is not a detailed analysis of the regional-
sectoral structure of the Mezzogiorno and its sub-regions, but
is mostly concerned with the behavior of some macro-economic
variables during 1950-1960 and in some cases beyond 1960, which
led to the idea of the adoption of a "concentrated decentralization"
strategy with reference to such objectives as rapid growth of the
South via industrialization and reduction of the regional
inequalities.
The statistical analyses of economic variables in a short
period (about ten years) must always be accompanied by all kinds
of reservations and qualifications, when the objectives of the
developmental programs are of a long-run nature. This has been
done throughout this Chapter for most of the following statistical
analyses, and as a general concern, it must be extended to all
findings represented in this work.
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSES OF DATA
1. Growth of Population and Product. The population of
Mezzogiorno as a percentage of the North declined from 64.0 percent
to 57.9 percent over a century, 1861-1961. In the same period,
Mezzogiorno's share of the national population dropped from 39.0
percent (in 1861) to 36.9 percent (in 1961). This period, however,
was not characterized by a straight line sloping downward. A
sharp decline in percentage share of Mezzogiorno's population
occurred between 1861 and 1936, from 39.0 percent to 35.3 percent.
TABLE IV-1
POPULATION OF
SUB-REGIONS, F
1936 1951
MEZZOGIORNO BY
OR SELECTED YEARS
1953 1959
Mezzogiorno 9,768 15,030 17,380 17,410 19,455 18,576 18,787 18,979
1,213
2,626
1,313
493
1,140
2,392
588
1
3
2
1
3
1
,546
,645
,632
532
,721
,929
,025
1,615
4,308
3,1186
613
1 ,974
4,418
1 ,264
1 ,623
4,374
3,263
617
1 ,996
4,479
1 ,291
15,249 27,436 29,358 29,630
25,016 42,445 46,738 47,040
Source: Data for 1861, 1936 and 1951 are taken from Wadsted, 139, Table 2 MZ. Data
estimated on the basis of extrapolation of 1936 population to the year 1953
percentage growth rate between 1936 and 1951.
for 1953 are
using the
1861
Mol iseAbruzzi &
Campania
Pugl ia
Basil ic
Calabria
Sicil ia
Sardegna
1961 1963 1964
North
ITALY
1 ,685
4,794
3,478
666
2,166
4,832
1 ,437
1 ,562
4,866
3,467
638
2,046
4,773
1 ,433
1 ,564
4,760
3,421
644
2,045
4,721
1,419
32,046
50,623
1 ,569
4,937
3,516
640
2,058
4,809
1 ,448
C
0'
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TABLE IV-2
POPULATION OF MEZZOGIORNO
AS PERCENTAGE OF THE NORTH AND ITALY
FOR SELECTED YEARS
1861 1936 1951 1961
Population of Mezzogiorno
As Percentage of the North 64.0 54.7 59.2 57.9
As Percentage of Italy 39.0 35.3 37.1 36.9
Source: Table IV-1.
In the same time interval, Mezzogiorno's population as a percentage
of the North declined from 64.0 percent to 54.7 percent. The period
between 1936 and 1951 witnessed an increase in the region's popula-
tion. In 1951, Mezzogiorno contained 37.1 percent of the national
population and its population as a percentage of the North rose from
54.7 percent (in 1936) to 59.2 percent. This trend was reversed
in the decade 1951-1961. In 1961, Mezzogiorno's population as a
percentage of the North and as a percentage of Italy was 57.9 and
36.9 respectively. The conclusion may be drawn from the data that,
if population increase of a region is an indication of economic
growth, Mezzogiorno, during the 1936-51 period has been recovering
from the economic decline suffered after unification in 1861.
Judging from population data, the second setback for Mezzogiorno
was experienced after World War I in the "Big Push" period for
reconstruction and revival of the North's industrial power, implying
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that Mezzogiorno's problems of underdevelopment, though historical,
had become accentuated in the 1950's.
The data on regional income growth, however, does not support
the hypothesis that Mezzogiorno's population growth in the period
1936-51 was due to economic growth. Mezzogiorno's income between
1928 and 1938 rose by .6 percent per annum, while that of the
North increased by 1.1 percent per annum (Table IV-3). In the
years of decline for the Italian economy in 1938-48, Mezzogiorno's
Gross Product decreased by 1.5 percent per year, two and one half
times faster than the North. In a short period after the war
(1948-51) the rate of growth of income in the South was slightly
below that of the North (7.1 vs. 7.3), but it fell sharply during
the 1950's. Mezzogiorno's income in this decade grew at 4.6
percent per annum, while that of the North increased by 6.2 percent.
The data on population reveal that in the period of decline
of Mezzogiorno's income, the population of the region grew one and
one half times as fast as the population of the North. The rates of
growth of population for Mezzogiorno and the North in the period
1936-51 were .9 and .6 per annum respectively (Table IV-4). In
other words, when the two variables combined are analyzed,
Mezzogiorno's per capita income gap with the North has increased
more than three times in this period.
The widening of the per capita income differential between
the South and the North during this period can be attributed to two
major factors, 1) the inefficiency and underinvestment in Southern
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TABLE IV-3
RATES OF GROWTH OF REGIONAL INCOMES -
MEZZOGIORNO, NORTH AND ITALY FOR SELECTED PERIODS
Ratel of Growth % Per Annum
1928-382
Mezzogiorno
North
ITALY
.6
1.1
1.0
1938-482
-1.5
-. 6
-. 9
1948-512
7. 1
7.3
7.2
1951-613
4.6
6.2
5.9
TABLE IV-4
RATES OF GROWTH OF POPULATION OF
MEZZOGIORNO, NORTH AND ITALY FOR SELECTED
Ratel of Growth % Per Annum
1921-364
Mezzogiorno
North
ITALY
.4
.7
1936-514
.6
1951-615
.6
.9
'Compounded Rate
2Wadsted, 139, Table 7 MZ, p. 59
3Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, 8
4Source: SVIMEZ Statistics, Table 16. Quoted from Wadsted, 139,
Table 2 MZ, p. 53
5 Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, 8
PERIODS
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industries, and 2) the higher rate of growth and lack of mobility
of population of the South.
The shifts in percentage distribution of population and
income among three major Italian regions: North, Central and the
South for the years 1951-1961 are shown in Table IV-5. The
percentage share of Mezzogiorno of the total national income
dropped from 22.94 percent in 1951 to 20.38 percent in 1961. In
the same period, the share of Mezzogiorno in total population of
Italy decreased only slightly, from 38.80 to 38.50 percent. An
index of prosperity 4 established for the comparison of the degree
of regional inequality in terms of per capita income decreased
from .59 in 1951 to .52 in 1961. The most prosperous region,
the North, remained at the same position as it was in 1951, with
the value of 1.57 in 1961. The Central region with a value of
1.04, which means a slightly higher percentage share in the national
income than the percentage share in total population, increased
its index of prosperity to a new level of 1.08.
There are differentials in population and income distribution
among the sub-regions of Mezzogiorno as well as between Mezzogiorno
and the North, although the former type differentials are not as
severe as the latter. Among seven sub-regions of Mezzogiorno, the
percentage share in population fell for four of them (Abruzzi and
Molise, Campania, Basilic and Calabria) and rose for the rest
14For definition of The Index of Prosperity see Section F-3 of Chapter
III.
TABLE IV-5
PERCENTAGE SHARE OF GROSS PRODUCT AND
POPULATION BY THREE MAJOR REGIONS 1951 - 1961
Year Regions Gross Product Population
y s X's C=y/X
1951 I 38.85 24.72 1.57
11 38.21 36.48 1.04
I 1I 22.94 38.80 .59
1952 1 39.13 24.71 1.58
11 38.89 36.43 1.06
111 21.98 38.86 .56
1953 1 38.61 24.70 1.56
I 38.53 36.33 1.06
Il1 22.86 38.97 .58
1954 I 38.99 24.70 1.57
I 38.80 36.23 1.07
111 22.21 39.07 .56
1955 I 39.56 24.73 1.59
11 39.21 36.10 1.08
111 21.23 39.17 .54
1956 I 40.03 24.78 1.61
I 38.57 36.00 1.07
I I 21.40 39.22 .54
1957 1 4o.o5 24.86 1.61
1I 38.27 35.91 1.06
I 21.68 39.23 .55
1958 1 39.66 25.02 1.58
II 38.86 35.84 1.08
III 21.48 39.14 .54
1959 I 40.23 25.22 1.59
II 39.27 35.78 1.09
II 20.50 39.00 .52
1960 1 41.34 25.47 1.62
11 38.97 35.73 1.09
III 19.69 38.80 .50
0
1961 1 40.73 25.78 1.57
11 38.89 35.72 1.08
111 20.38 38.50 .52
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(Puglia, Sicilia and Sardegna) between 1861-1964. In a recent
shift in percentage population (1951-1961), Campania, Puglia and
Sardegna increased their shares, while others decreased
(Table IV-6). In the same time interval, the percentage share in
net regional products increased for Campania, Puglia and Sicilia
and decreased for others (Table IV-7).
In order to draw any conclusion on the regional growth trend
during the period 1951-61 for which data are available, the ratio
of percentage distribution of net product over the percentage
distribution of populations are calculated for 1951 and 1961. The
results are shown in Table IV-7 as y/X ratios. These prosperity
indices show that in per capita income terms, Abruzzi and Molise,
Puglia and Sicilia improved their conditions slightly. On the
other hand, the losses in index values were greater for the losers,
especially of Sardegna.
Of two regions whose indices deteriorated during the 1951-61
period, one, Sardegna, had a substantially higher rate of population
growth, and the other, Calabria, had the lowest rate of population
growth in the Mezzogiorno Region (Table IV-8). Moreover, with the
exception of Calabria, the development program in Mezzogiorno, as
the indices for 1961 show, has had an equilibrating effect on the
regional shares of population and income. In other words, the
regions with higher indices in 1951 declined, and the regions with
lower indices in 1951 grew in the period 1951-61 (with the exception
of Basilic and Calabria). Even with the inclusion of Calabria in
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TABLE Iv-6
POPULATION OF SUB-REGIONS OF MEZZOGIORNO
AS PERCENTAGE OF MEZZOGIORNO FOR SELECTED YEARS
1861 1936 1951 1961 1964
Mezzogiorno 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Abruzzi & Molise 12.43 10.29 9.29 8.42 8.27
Campania 26.89 24.24 24.78 25.62 26.02
Puglia 13.44 17.52 18.34 18.42 18.53
Basilic 5.06 3.54 3.53 3.47 3.37
Calabria 11.67 11.44 11.36 11.01 10.84
Sicilia 24.49 26.14 25.43 25.42 25.34
Sardegna 6.02 6.83 7.27 7.64 7.63
Source: Computed from Table IV-1
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TABLE IV-7
INDEX OF PROSPERITY FOR SUB-REGIONS OF
MEZZOGIORNO FOR 1951 AND 1961
1951 1961
y C=Y/A Y X C=Y/
Abruzzi & Molise 9.16 9.29 .98 8.63 8.42 1.02
Campania 27.06 24.78 1.09 28.08 25.62 1.09
Puglia 17.93 18.34 .97 18.19 18.42 .98
Basilic 2.91 3.53 .82 2.87 3.47 .82
Calabria 9.53 11.36 .83 8.54 11.01 .77
Sicilia 24.40 25.43 .96 25.53 25.42 1.00
Sardegna 8.96 7.27 1.23 8.14 7.64 1.06
Source: y's for 1951 and 1961 from Table B-6, Appendix B
X's for 1951 and 1961 from Table IV-6
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TABLE IV-8
RATES OF GROWTH OF POPULATION FOR MEZZOGIORNO
AND ITS SUB-REGIONS FOR SELECTED PERIODS
Rate of Growth
% Per Annum (compounded)
1936-1951 1951-1961 1936-1953 1953-1964
Mezzogiorno .9 .6 .9 .9
Abruzzi & Molise .3 - .4 .3 - .4
Campania 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
Puglia 1.3 .7 1.3 .7
Basilic .9 .5 .9 .3
Calabria .9 .3 .9 .3
Sicilia .8 .6 .8 .7
Sardegna 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.1
Source: Table IV-1
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the list, the arithmetic differentials of the highest and the lowest
values of the indices for 1961 is less than in 1951.
Coefficients of correlation are found for the percentage share in
population and the percentage share in net product by sub-regions for
1951 and 1961. These coefficients are r = .9871 for 1951 and
r = .9908 for 1961.15 Both coefficients are significant at the .005
level. The regression coefficient has improved slightly over a
decade, which supports the previous conclusion on the trend toward
equalization of per capita regional incomes within Mezzogiorno.
Another indication of both correlation coefficients is that all sub-
regions of Mezzogiorno are relatively in the same degree of under-
development as far as regional income is concerned.
2. Per Capita Income. During the period 1951-61, per capita
national income grew by 5.2 percent per year. That of the North
increased at the rate of 5.3 percent per annum. The Central region's
per capita income grew at the highest rate in the nation, 5.6 percent
per annum, and Mezzogiorno's at the lowest rate, equal to 4.1 percent
per year during the decade.
The annual rates of change in per capita gross income of
Mezzogiorno show a sharp fluctuation between 1951 and 1961, character-
istic of a region under developmental programming. In the years
15The regression equations fitted to the percentage values of income
share (y) and the percentage values of population share (x) for
1951 and 1961 are:
1951: y = -.3822 + 1.0267x and
1961: y = -1.2146 + l.0850x
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RELATION BETWEEN PERCENTAGE SHARE OF REGIONAL
INCOME AND PERCENTAGE SHARE OF REGIONAL POPULATION
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TABLE IV-9
PERCENTAGE ANNUAL GROWTH
PER CAPITA GROSS INCOME, 1951
Italy
1.35
6.22
4.18
6.42
3.77
5.81
3.43
7.64
6.48
7.24
2.00
5.05
5.08
7.63
4.72
5.86
1.91
7.94
8.33
4.65
RATE OF
/50 - 1961/60
3.44
5.83
5. 11
7.49
2.43
5.44
5.48
8.56
5.91
7. 18
I II
- 3.10
10.20
1.42
.70
4.89
7.33
2.48
3.03
2.94
12.00
Source: Table B-8, Appendix B
9;
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52/51
53/52
54/53
55/54
56/55
57/56
58/57
59/58
60/59
61/60
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1952-53 and 1960-61, Mezzogiorno enjoyed the highest rate of growth
in per capita income term than any other region during the
decade (Table IV-9).
The per capita income of Mezzogiorno as a percentage of the
North (North and Central combined) during 1951-60, declined by
10 percent. In spite of the previous low level of per capita
income in the South, which under ceteris paribus conditions would
lead to a higher rate of growth, Mezzogiorno's growth in per
capita income did not keep pace with the rate of growth of the
North, even with massive doses of investments (Table IV-10).
TABLE IV-10
PER CAPITA INCOME OF MEZZOGIORNO
AS PERCENTAGE OF THE NORTH
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
51.8 48.6 51.0 48.8 45.8 46.2 47.1 44.3 43.4 41.8
Source: Table IV-21
To observe the behavior of per capita net income of the sub-
regions of Mezzogiorno in relation to Mezzogiorno as a whole and
other regions of Italy, the percentages of per capita income at
all levels of regional sub-division are calculated and shown in
Table IV-ll.
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TABLE IV-11
, REGIONAL NET
AS PERCENTAGE OF
1951
INCOME PER CAPITA
THE NATIONAL AVERAGE
and 1961
1951 1961
North 1.31 1.28
Central .95 1.02
South .64 .63
Islands .66 .65
North 1.20 1.20
Mezzogiorno .64 .64
Italy
Abruzzi and Molise .62 .65
Campania .71 .70
Puglia .63 .63
Basilic .53 .53
Calabria .53 .49
Sicilia .62 .64
Sardegna .80 .68
Source: Informazione SVIMEZ, Anno
23 gennaio 1963.
Percent
Annual
Vari ation
- .3
+ .7
- .2
- .2
0.0
0.0
+ .4
- .2
0.0
0.0
-. 8
+ .3
- 1.4
SVI - n. 4
On the net income basis and as a percentage of the national
average, Mezzogiorno shows no change in per capita income during
1951-1961. The same is true for the North. On the 4-division
Moro
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breakdown of the national territory, the only region showing a
positive rate of growth is the central, and all other three regions'
per capita income as a percent of the national average show
negative variations. Within Mezzogiorno itself, three sub-regions
declined, two remained constant and two showed increases in the
ratio. The results shown in Table IV-11 are compatible with those
we observed from Table IV-7 on the indices of regional prosperity.
When the variations in absolute amounts of per capita incomes are
computed for each region, the results are not as decisive as are
shown in Table IV-11. The choice of the time interval is, indeed,
to some extent responsible for different results. These calculations
show that Mezzogiorno's per capita income during 1952-58 grew
faster than the per capita income in the North and Italy. They also
show that Puglia and Sicilia were the fastest growing regions (in
terms of per capita income) in Mezzogiorno. These results are
shown in Table B-10, Appendix B.
3. Sectoral Structure of the Regional Economies. Recent
data on sectoral composition of the regional economies are available for
1958 and 1961. The sectoral composition of the Italian economy as a
whole has shifted from 40 percent agricultural and 20 percent indus-
trial at the beginning of the century to 20 percent and 60 percent
respectively in 1958. Italy has had a rapid rate of growth in
industry, commerce and transportation during the 1950's. At the
same time, the percentage share of agriculture has been dropping
steadily. Nevertheless, Mezzogiorno's share in agricultural produc-
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FIGURE IV-5
ITALY, CENTRO-NORD
NET PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1951-1960
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FIGURE iv-6
ITALY, MEZZOGIORNO
NET PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1951-1960
(current lire)
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TABLE IV-12
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF REGIONAL
INCOME BY MAJOR SECTORS IN 1958
Industry,
Agri. & Commerce, Other Public
Forestry Trans., etc. Sectors Admin. Total
16.9 65.7 7.7 10.4 100.0
34.5 40.7 7.3 17.5 100.0
ITALY 20.7 60.3 7.1 11.9 100.0
Abruzzi & Molise 40.3 37.4 6.8 15.5 100.0
Campania 26.4 47.5 7.4 18.7 100.0
Puglia 38.0 36.6 7.6 17.8 100.0
Basilic 50.6 28.3 5.9 15.2 100.0
Calabria 41.6 33.9 6.0 18.5 100.0
Sicilia 35.1 40.3 7.4 17.2 100.0
Sardegna 32.2 43.3 8.8 15.7 100.0
Source: Prosp. 2 - Informazioni SVIMEZ - Anno XIII - n. 1 -
6 gennaio 1960, p. 23
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TABLE IV-13
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF REGIONAL
PRODUCT BY MAJOR SECTORS IN 1961
Industry,
Agri. & Commerce,
Forestry Trans., etc.
Other
Sectors
Public
Admin. Total
No rd
Mezzogiorno
ITALY
Abruzzi & Molise
Campania
Pugl Ia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sici 1 ia
Sardegna
13.6
29.0
17.2
38.4
21.0
33.7
47.9
35.9
27.2
27.5
67. 1
44.8
61.8
39.5
52.8
40.4
31.6
40.0
44.5
44. 1
9.0
9.8
9.2
7.9
10.0
9.8
6.8
6.9
10.9
11.5
10.3 100.0
16.4 100.0
11.8 100.0
14.2
16.2
16.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
13.7 100.0
17.2
17.4
100.0
100.0
16.9 100.0
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno SVI - n. 4 - 23 gennaio 1963
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tion as a percentage of total regional income was twice as much as
the corresponding share of the North in 1958.
Total regional income of the Mezzogiorno during 1951-1960 rose
by 5.3 percent per annum. Only the agricultural sector had a lower
rate of growth than that of the total output. Transportation and
communication rose at the rate of 7.3 percent per year, and manufactur-
ing increased by 14.9 percent per year (Table IV-14). In comparison
with the North, only industry (not manufacturing) had an equal rate
of growth in both regions, all others showed a lower growth rate in
the Mezzogiorno.
The rates of growth of sectoral outputs, however, are not
indicative of the absolute or comparative regional advantages for
development of specific sectors. Therefore, an efficiency index
was established to measure the relative sectoral advantages in each
region.
TABLE IV-14
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NET PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS
FOR MEZZOGIORNO AND THE CENTRO-NORD, 1951-1960
Agri- In- Trans. Total Regional
cul- dus- and Income in
ture try Commun. Mfg. Others Market Prices
Mezzo-
giorno 2.4 5.7 7.3 14.9 6.2 5.3
Centro-
Nord 2.1 6.3 7.5 19.7 6.2 6.1
Source: Table B-15, Appendix B
- "0'
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TABLE IV-15
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NET INVESTMENT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS
FOR MEZZOGIORNO AND THE CENTRO-NORD, 1951-1960
Agri- In- Trans. Total
cul- dus- and Net
ture try Commun. Mfg. Others Investment
Mezzo-
giorno 8.5 5.7 10.3 20.0 9.3 8.5
Centro-
Nord 11.7 -4.4 8.1 13.8 10.8 9.2
Source: Table B-15, Appendix B.
This efficiency index is expressed as percentage changes in
sectoral output with respect to the percentage changes in sectoral
investment (public and private). The results are shown in Table IV-16.
The income elasticity of investment in the Mezzogiorno for total
sectoral activities is less than in the North. Only two sectors
(agriculture and miscellaneous economic activities under the heading
of ''others'') show absolute advantages for the Mezzogiorno. In
terms of output per unit of investment, the Mezzogiorno has a
comparative advantage in developing sectors in the following order:
Industry, Manufacturing, Transportation and Communication, Other
economic activities (excluding Agriculture) and Agriculture. The
same ordering holds for the North.
The pattern of sectoral expansion in the 1950's confirms the
strategies chosen by the Economic Plans regarding heavy investment in
agriculture and an attempt toward industrialization of the South.
I.
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TABLE Iv-16
RATIO OF PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NET PRODUCT
TO THE PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN NET INVESTMENT BY
ECONOMIC SECTORS FOR THE
MEZZOGIORNO AND THE CENTRO-NORD, 1951-1960
Mezzogiorno
Centro-Nord
Agri-
cul-
ture
.2823
.1794
In-
dus-
t ry
Trans.
and
Comm.
1.0000 .7087 .7450
.9259 1.4275
Mfg. Others Total
.6666
.5740
.6235
.6630
*The net investment in Industry for Centro-Nord during the 1951-60
period decreased, while the net product increased. Consequently,
a negative coefficient was found. Since the interpretation of the
negative coefficient could not be made, in the absence of a de-
tailed study, it was therefore omitted from the Table.
Source: Table B-15, Appendix B.
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4. Investment. It is widely believed that the backwardness
of Mezzogiorno is due largely to the lack of investment in the past
and the sluggish response of the private sector in the present.
The Mezzogiorno with more than half the population of the North
absorbs only one-third of the total gross fixed investment made by
the public and private sectors in Italy (Table B-13, Appendix B).
It is particularly important to note that the ratio of investment in
Mezzogiorno, relative to the investment in the North from the
beginning of the implementation of the Vanoni Plan, has been declin-
ing continuously, and the overall annual growth rate of the ratio,
1.8 percent, is the result solely of sharp increases in the ratio
for the years 1952 and 1953 (see Table B-13, Appendix B). This
ratio, however, is expected to rise during the 1960's, for which
no data is as yet available.
The marginal capital-output ratios by major industrial sectors
for Mezzogiorno and the North (Table IV-17) shed light on the fact
that additional private investments are not materializing in the
South as fast as they were expected. With the exception of manu-
facturing, almost all other industries during 1951-60 required more
investment per unit of output in Mezzogiorno than in the North.
Coefficients of correlation found for the relation between the
net capital formation and the net output (with no lag) for the
Mezzogiorno and the North revealed the extreme efficiency of the
16Rosenstein-Rodan, 116 and 117.
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TABLE IV-17
MARGINAL CAPITAL - OUTPUT RATIO CALCULATED
TRIANNUALLY FOR TWO MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF ITALY
(amounts in billions of 1954 lire)
Net Income
Increment
Period
Net
Investment
Period AK
Marginal
Capital-Output
Ratio
AKt-l
AQ
Mezzogiorno
228.8
338. 1
208.3
385.3
426.4
378.7
265.9
Cent ro-No rd
2
2
2
,591.9
,487.7
,613.7
,374.6
,043.3
,486.9
,896.4
Source: Table 118, La 'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol. 1,
p. 312
1952-54
1953-55
1954-56
1955-57
1956-58
1957-59
1958-60
1951-53
1952-54
1953-55
1954-56
1955-57
1956-58
1957-59
963.3
,108.3
,320.5
,432.9
,558.0
,575.6
,649.4
4.21
3.27
6.33
3.71
3.65
4. 16
6.20
1952-54
1953-55
1954-56
1955-57
1956-58
1957-59
1958-60
1951-53
1952-54
1953-55
1954-56
1955-57
1956-58
1957-59
2,240.8
2,330.7
2,717.5
3,173.1
3,582.0
3,784.4
4,161.6
1.40
1.56
1.68
2.31
1.75
1.52
1.43
AQ
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North over the Mezzogiorno. These coefficients were: r = .4515
for the South which is not significant, and r = .8515 which is
significant at the .01 level of confidence. This can be inter-
preted as inefficiency of the South's industries. But it is
important to remember that the marginal capital-output ratios at
initial stages of implementation of a regional plan are not accurate
or reliable indicators of the efficiency of the industries. Most
of the sectoral activities in the South use outmoded technology,
and any process for updating the industrial technology requires
substantial amounts of investment initially. This is particularly
true for agriculture.
The net investments in Mezzogiorno as percentages of the
North during the period 1951-60 are shown in Table IV-19. There
were only two sectors which received higher proportional (consider-
ing the population size of the two regions) investment throughout
the 1950's: agriculture and public works (with the exception of
1959 for the latter). Industries (not manufacturing) received a
higher percentage in the years 1955, 1959 and 1960. Manufacturing
investment in absolute terms remained as low as 7 percent of the
North in 1951 and as high as 20 percent in 1960. During the period
1951-1960, the total net investment in Mezzogiorno as a percentage
of that of the North increased by 21.6 percent. Within individual
sectors, investment as a percentage of the North grew in industry,
transportation and communication and manufacturing, and declined
in agriculture and public works over the period 1951-1960.
132
FIGURE IV-7
ITALY
RELATION BETWEEN INCREMENTAL CHANGE OF
NET PRODUCT AND CAPITAL, BY REGION, 1951-1960
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TABLE IV-18
NET INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF NET PRODUCT BY
SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
(absolute values: in billions of current lire & sums of three years)
Total
Net Investment/
Trans. Net Produce in
Period Agri. Industry & Comm. Mfg. Others Market Prices
Mezzogiorno
1951-1953 8.31 7.74 36.47 60.18 5.69 15.11
1952-1954 10.15 6.98 44.20 84.07 5.23 16.20
1953-1955 11.32 6.42 50.45 105.47 4.96 17.92
1954-1956 11.26 5.91 56.54 115.11 5.04 18.52
1955-1957 11.29 6.54 57.67 112.90 5.54 19.10
1956-1958 11.13 5.32 53.53 104.03 6.13 18.30
1957-1959 12.36 5.38 47.82 96.32 6.59 18.22
1958-1960 13.99 7.45 46.80 88.64 7.39 19.77
1951-55 9.89 6.80 44.85 88.57 5.36 16.65
1956-1960 12.67 6.92 51.00 95.19 6.84 19.35
1951-1960 11.40 6.87 48.61 93.37 6.24 18.22
Centro - Nord
1951-1953 1.85 5.44 43.75 233.18 3.62 10.47
1952-1954 1.44 4.41 46.18 247.14 3.16 10.20
1953-1955 1.96 3.06 44.63 267.11 2.95 10.97
1954-1956 2.63 2.92 43.57 257.30 3.19 11.72
1955-1957 2.98 3.19 39.55 232.40 3.76 12.53
1956-1958 2.95 2.99 37.83 188.36 4.36 12.53
1957-1959 2.98 2.22 38.85 167.79 4.81 12.82
1958-1960 4.14 1.67 45.83 148.29 5.35 13.50
1951-1955 2.04 3.21 44.11 257.13 3.37 10.90
1956-1960 3.79 2.32 43.60 167.18 4.78 13.22
1951-1960 2.95 3.08 43.80 184.44 4.22 12.28
Source: Table 125, La 'Cassa" E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol. I,
pp. 324, 325
TABLE
NET INVESTMENT - MEZZO
IV-19
GIORNO AS A PERCENTAGE
OF CENTRO-NORD BY SECTORS 1951-1960
(absolute values in current prices)
Trans.
Agri. Industry & Comm.
.97
4.00
4.55
3.31
2.48
1.74
2.49
2.69
2.31
1.31
.14
.27
.36
.28
.57
.32
.31
.35
.91
1.11
.25
.30
.33
.38
.51
.52
.56
.45
.33
.32
Public
Mfg. Others Works
.07
.12
.14
.18
.18
.19
.20
.19
.18
.20
.40
.38
.54
.50
.41
.41
.37
.35
.36
.41
.02
.13
.14
.96
.88
.94
.62
.66
.46
.59
Source: Table B-16, Appendix B
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Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Total
.33
.42
.50
.46
.48
.43
.41
.41
.38
.42
1
1
1
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FIGURE Iv-8
ITALY
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT BY REGION, 1951-1960
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FIGURE IV-9
ITALY, MEZZOGIORNO
NET INVESTMENT BY SECTOR, 1951-1960
(current ire)
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FIGURE IV-10
ITALY, CENTRO-NORD
NET INVESTMENT BY SECTOR, 1951-1960
(current I ire)
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Two hypotheses were set to be tested with the available data
on net investment and per capita income. These hypotheses were
stated as follows:
Hypothesis A: The rate of growth of per capita gross regional
income of Mezzogiorno increases when the rate of growth of net
investment increases (Table IV-20).
Hypothesis B: The increase in net investments in Mezzogiorno
as a percentage of the North will result in the rise of per capita
income of Mezzogiorno as a percentage of per capita income in the
North (Table IV-21).
Test of Hypothesis A: A regression analysis was performed.
The coefficient of correlation between the two variables: the
rate of growth of per capita gross regional income and the rate of
growth of net investment for 10 pairs of data (ten years) was found
to be r = .7536 which is significant at the .01 level.17 The result
is obviously significant considering only one period lag (one year)
between the investment and per capita income in the short time
interval. In other words, the investment programs have made an
immediate impact on the regional per capita income of Mezzogiorno.
17The linear regression equation fitted to the values of rate of
growth of per capita income (y) and the rate of growth of
investment (x) for 1951-1961 is: y = 2.3341 + .0621x.
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TABLE IV-20
PERCENTAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF PER CAPITA
GROSS INCOME AND PERCENTAGE ANNUAL INCREASE
OF NET INVESTMENT OF MEZZOGIORNO, 1950-1961
Per Capita
Gross Income
Growth Rate
- 3. 1
10.2
1.42
.70
4.89
7.33
2.48
3.03
2.94
12.00
Net Investment
Growth Rate
-14.0
-30.0
90.6
34.3
11.4
43.6
-29.0
- 4.0
2.4
28.6
148.8
Source: Prosp. 3, p. 378, Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 15 -
10 aprile 1963 and Prosp. 3, Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI
nn. 9-10 - 27 febbraio - 6 marzo 1963
Period
1951/1950
1952/1951
1953/1952
1954/1953
1955/1954
1956/1955
1957/1956
1958/1957
1959/1958
1960/1959
1961/1960
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Test of Hypothesis B: This hypothesis was set up objectively
to measure the degree of success of the Vanoni Plan in closing the
gap between the regional per capita incomes. The results of
findings here, however, are subject to some qualifications. First,
half of the period used in statistical analysis belongs to the pre-
plan period. Secondly, the second half of the Vanoni Plan (1960-65)
is not included in the analysis because of non-availability of data.
The regression analysis yielded a coefficient of correlation,
r = -.2614. The negative correlation obtained is not significant.
Therefore the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The negative
value of r can be attributed entirely to chance.
A third hypothesis was set up to be tested on the data for
Gross Fixed Investment and the Incremental Value Added.
Hypothesis C: The incremental value added in Mezzogiorno is
a function of gross fixed investment in that region (Table IV-22).
Test of Hypothesis C: A regression analysis was used for the
data on gross fixed investment with one-period delay and the incre-
mental value added in Mezzogiorno for the period 1951-1959. The
coefficient of correlation was found to be r = .5523 which is not
significant. Therefore, the positive association found statistically
must be attributed to chance.
The result, however, was predictable, since a large portion
of investment in this period was made in the agricultural, trans-
portation and communication, and public works sectors which are
essentially long-run investments (see Table B-15, Appendix B).
142
FIGURE IV-12
ITALY, MEZZOGIORNO
RELATION BETWEEN NET INVESTMENT AND PER CAPITA
INCOME AS PERCENTAGES OF CENTRO-NORD, 1951-59
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FIGURE IV-13
ITALY, MEZZOGIORNO
RELATION BETWEEN INCREMENTAL VALUE ADDED AND
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, 1951-1959
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TABLE IV-21
NET INVESTMENT IN MEZZOGIORNO AND PER CAPITA
INCOME OF MEZZOGIORNO AS PERCENTAGE OF THE NORTH, 1950-59
Net Investment in
Mezz. as % of the
Net Investment in
the North
t-1
13.05
11.41
9.14
8.22
16.54
9.49
18.28
11.02
16.75
11.22
Per Capita Income in
Mezz. as Percentage
of the Per Capita Income
in the North
t
51.8
48.6
51.0
48.8
45.8
46.2
47. 1
44.3
43.4
41.8
Source: Prosp. 7, Informazioni, SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - nn. 9-10 -
27 febbraio - 6 marzo 1963, p. 235
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
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TABLE IV-22
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT AND INCREMENTAL
VALUE ADDED - MEZZOGIORNO, 1951-60
(in billions of lire)
Gross Fixed Incremental
Investment Value Added
Year t-l t
1951 91.8 24.8
1952 124.8 60.0
1953 127.0 31.6
1954 118.4 28.6
1955 150.5 30.8
1956 147.7 38.5
1957 159.0 54.2
1958 153.9 21.8
1959 181.1 68.4
1960 249.6 -
Source: 22 - ''Cassa" Per il Mezzogiorno, I, pp. 336 & 337
'U
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5. Consumption. The data on consumption were analyzed for
the period 1951-1960. Table IV-23 shows the marginal and average
propensity to consume for Mezzogiorno and the Centro-Nord. The
trend in the consumption pattern, as in the case of other variables
observed, is symptomatic of the existing dichotomy between the rich
and the poor regions. The marginal propensity to consume for
Mezzogiorno in the 1950's has been steadily increasing, while that
of the North has been decreasing (Table IV-23).
A comparison is made in Table IV-20 between the values of per
capita income of Mezzogiorno as a percentage of the North and the
corresponding values for per capita consumption for the years 1951-60.
The data reveal that the per capita income of Mezzogiorno as a
percentage of per capita income of the North during the decade
dropped 10 percent, at the rate of 1.1 percent per annum (compounded).
In the same time interval, Mezzogiorno's per capita consumption,
as a percentage of per capita consumption of the North, remained
relatively the same. The indication is that, while investments in
Mezzogiorno could not match the amounts of investment on a per
capita basis of the North, and thus close the gap of regional
income inequality, it did succeed in keeping the ratio of per capita
consumption relatively constant throughout the period. On the
other hand, the higher propensity to consume, which is responsible
for keeping the latter ratio constant over time, is an obstacle
for a rapid growth of the Mezzogiorno. From a social point of view,
the constancy of ratio of per capita consumption is desirable, in
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FIGURE IV-14
ITALY
RELATION BETWEEN PER CAPITA REGIONAL INCOME AND
PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION FOR MEZZOGIORNO AND CENTRO-NORD, 1951-61
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TABLE IV-23
THE AVERAGE PROPENSITY TO CONSUME
BY TWO MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF ITALY
y = 100
Year
Mezzogiorno
104.9
114.1
108.5
110.4
111.7
112.3
108.0
109.1
111.6
114.0
110.6
Centro-Nord
85.0
86.2
86.4
84.2
80.8
80.7
79.2
74.8
75.6
75.0
80.5
*C = Per Capita Consumption
Y = Regional Income Per Capita
Source: Table B-20,
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
% %
Appendix B
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TABLE IV-24
PER CAPITA INCOME AND CONSUMPTION IN
MEZZOGIORNO AS PERCENTAGE OF THE CENTRO-NORD
(values in 1954 lire)
Per Capita
Income
YM
YC-N
51.8
48.6
51.0
48.8
45.8
46.2
47.1
44.3
43.4
41.8
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
Annual
Change
-6.
4.
-41.
-6.
1.
-5.
-2.
-3.
Per Capita
Consumption
CM
CC-N
63.9
64.4
64.0
64.0
63.3
64. 3
64.2
64.6
64.1
63.6
64.1
-= Per Capita Income in Mezzogiorno
YC-N = Per Capita Income in Centro-Nord
M = Per Capita Consumption in Mezzogiorno
CC-N = Per Capita Consumption in Centro-Nord
Source: Table 138, La 'Cassa'E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol. I,
p. 348
46.6
Annual
Change
.7
-. 6
.0
-1.0
1.5
-. 1
.6
-. 7
-. 7
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spite of the declining ratio of the per capita income. If the
Vanoni Plan has not yet been successful in its regional economic
objectives (although it may still be too soon to judge), it has,
however, already served a regional social objective.
6. Regional Centers. The shift in percentage share between
the rural and urban population in Italy has been very slow between
the years 1936-51.
On the regional basis, Mezzogiorno in 1936-38 had a 21.8 percent
urban and 78.2 percent rural population. These percentage shares
by 1951 were 24.1 and 75.9 respectively.
The North had a higher percentage of urban population in
1936-38 with 30.4, and by 1951 it had risen to 33.6 percent of the
total population.
The pattern of urban growth and rural decline in Mezzogiorno
in the context of Italian urbanization for the years for which data
are available reveal most of the characteristics of depressed areas
of underdeveloped countries. The highest rates of urbanization
in the recent history of Italy belong to the 1930's. (Table IV-25).
In 1936-38, the Northern urban areas had 17.7 percent in-migration.
In the same period, Mezzogiorno had only 6.6 percent urban in-
migration. The percentages show a considerable decline in the
years 1947-49, but urban in-migration is still much higher in the
North (7.9 percent as compared to 4.8 percent in the South). In 1951,
Mezzogiorno had only .9 percent of its total population as migrants
to urban centers as compared to 8.6 percent in the North.
151
[s.s]
<1) [.31
[2.5]
( [.4)
s CALAMIA t211 [.&)
49) [i..]
FIGURE IV-15
ITALY, MEZZOGIORNO
MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS
TABLE IV-25
RATE OF GROWTH OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION BY TWO MAJOR
REGIONS FOR SELECTED YEARS AS PERCENTAGE OF EXISTING POPULATION
Average Average
1936 - 1938 1947 - 1949 1951
Natural Migra- Net Natural Migra- Net Natural Migra- Net
Growth tion Increase Growth tion Increase Growth tion Increase
Mezzogiorno 12.8 - 2.0 10.8 16.6 - 2.1 14.4 13.7 - 4.4 9.3
Urban 10.7 + 6.6 17.4 15.5 + 4.8 20.3 13.4 + .9 14.3
Rural 13.4 - 4.4 9.0 16.9 - 4.3 12.7 13.8 - 6.0 7.8
North 7.1 + 1.3 8.4 6.8 + 1.7 8.5 4.3 + .8 5.1
Urban 4.6 +17.7 22.4 4.7 + 7.9 12.6 3.2 + 8.6 11.8
Rural 8.1 - 5.7 2.4 7.9 - 1.3 6.6 4.9 - 2.8 2.1
ITALY 9.1 + .1 9.2 10.5 + .3 10.7 7.8 - 1.1 6.7
Urban 6.4 +14.5 20.9 7.9 + 7.0 14.9 6.3 + 6.2 12.5
Rural 10.1 - 5.2 4.9 11.4 - 2.5 9.0 8.4 - 4.1 4.3
Source: SVIMEZ Statistics, Table 69, Wadsted 139 , Table 6A MZ, p. 58
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The rate of migration to urban areas, however, should not be
mistaken with the rate of growth of urban areas. Mezzogiorno's
urban population growth rate was less than the North's in 1936-38
because of a high percentage rate of urban in-migration in the
North. In 1947-49, the rate of net increase in urban population in
Mezzogiorno was 20.3 percent as against 12.6 percent in the North.
Almost 75 percent of this high rate of urban population increase was
due to natural growth and only 25 percent could be attributed to
the urban in-migration, while almost 40 percent of the net increase
in urban population of the North was due to natural growth. In
1951, the situation in Mezzogiorno was worse: 93 percent of the
net increase in urban population was caused by a natural increase,
and 7 percent by rural-to-urban migration. Meanwhile 43 percent of
the natural growth of the rural areas in Mezzogiorno was absorbed
by urban areas (7 percent by urban centers within the Mezzogiorno
and 36 percent by urban centers outside Mezzogiorno). The natural
growth of urban areas as a percent of the total existing population
of Mezzogiorno in 1951 was four times the corresponding percentage
for the North. And the percentage of migration to urban areas for
Mezzogiorno was one tenth of the corresponding percentage for the
North.
This pattern of urban growth is similar to what Kingsley Davis
has described as "overpopulation" and urbanization not caused by
industrialization but merely by the natural growth of existing
population in the cities. 18
18Davis, 30, pp. 17 and 18.
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A rank-size distribution test is performed to observe the
pattern of national distribution of cities according to their rank
and size (Table B-21, Appendix B). The cities chosen are those
with 100,000 or more population. The results of each pair of
information (rank and size) plotted on a double-logarithmic scale
for each city for the years 1961 and 1965 are shown in Figures 16
and 17. A 450 line with the slope of -1 can be fitted to the
plotted rank-size values, indicating a normal distribution of
cities in the Italian landscape. If such a line is fitted, Naples,
Palermo, Catania and Bari among Southern cities show a higher
population share than their corresponding rank values (above the
450 line). Other regional cities with 100,000 or more population
are on or below the 450 line. These cities are Messina, Cagliari,
Taranto, Reggio di Calabria, Salerno and Foggia.
The normalcy of city-size distribution in Italy is due mostly
to the high density of population on the land, higher natural in-
crease in the South and short distances between the city centers.
It is obvious that rank-size distribution analysis is not an
accurate measure of the regional equality and normalcy. And, it is
also important to note that a system of cities distributed along
a 450 line with a downward slope according to their ranks and
sizes is by no means representative of economic equality among
regional entities. Nevertheless, rank-size distribution analysis,
when made for comparison of the city structure between two countries,
would reveal some facts about the stages of economic development,
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FIGURE IV-16
I TALY
RELATION BETWEEN RANK AND SIZE OF 32 ITALIAN CITIES
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size and potential of local markets and growth poles in the regions.
7. Regional Migratory Movements. The mobilization of popula-
tion, as expected, is higher in the North than in the South. In
1960, 3.16 percent of the population of the North emigrated either
to the South or to some regional point within the North as against
2.80 percent in the South. But Mezzogiorno, with a lower migratory
percentage index, had lost 135 thousand population in absolute
numbers to the North in the same year. Within the Mezzogiorno
itself,the rates of migration differ among sub-regions.
A test is performed to consider percentage emigration of the
population to the North as an index of regional prosperity.
Explicitly, the hypothesis states that a region is more prosperous,
if it has a lower percentage of emigrants to the North. The
general observation is that the variation in the ranks given to
the percentages of emigrants to the North in Table IV-26 is
tentatively in the same direction of variation of index of regional
prosperity shown in Table IV-7, although the rank correlation
coefficient is not found to be significant.
A second hypothesis postulates that the larger the per capita
migratory movement is for each region,the lower the migration to
the North and consequently the more prosperous the region will be.
The observation of the data, with some exceptions, proved the
opposite. Five out of seven regions showed almost the same rank for
per capita migratory movements in 1960 and percentage of migration
to the North. In other words, the higher the per capita migratory
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MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS TO
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Source: Data from Informazioni
SVIMEZ, 1963, p. 609
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TABLE IV-26
MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS TO THE NORTH AND WITHIN
MEZZOGIORNO AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REGIONAL
EMIGRATIONS BY SUB-REGIONS OF MEZZOGIORNO
Abruzzi & Molise
Campania
Pugli a
Basil ic
Calabria
Sici 1 ia
Sardegna
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
North
34.83
21.63
37.39
30.84
33.20
23.88
19.73
South
65.17
78.37
62.61
69.16
66.80
76.12
80.27
Source: Table 4, Informazioni
11 maggio 1960, p. 378
SVIMEZ, Anno XIII - n. 19 -
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movements were, the higher the regional percentage of migration to
the North. The two exceptional regions were Sardegna, with the
lowest percentage of migratory movements to the North, but with
the highest per capita mobility of population, and Puglia, with
the second highest rank in the percentage migration to the North
and the lowest per capita migratory movements.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The summary of the statistical analyses and the conclusions
reached in this Chapter can be listed as follows:
1) A large size of population and a higher rate of natural
growth in the South does not seem to be helping the
development of the region. With the introduction of
structural and technological changes in the Southern
economy, however, the large size of population in the
future may provide a large enough market for Mezzogiorno's
products.
2) The level of production in the North is based on past
production and years of massive and gradual investment in
capital goods. A short-run investment program with all
its natural limitations would not affect the productivity
of the South, to close the gap of regional inequalities
between the South and the North.
3) The planning experiments in Mezzogiorno during the 1950
decade were in a sense unsuccessful, since the percentage
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share of income relative to the percentage share in population
for the South declined, while it improved slightly for the
North and to a higher degree for the central region. The
same was true of the regional per capita incomes. It was
suggested that the growth of the Central region may have a
spatial implication, namely, that any investment in a
depressed region which is geographically remote from an
already highly developed area, would increase the rate of
growth of a third region located between the two regions.
4) Per capita income of Mezzogiorno as a percentage of the North
during 1951-60 declined. This is considered as evidence of
failure of the Vanoni Plan to close the regional per
capita income gap. It also points to the fact that prevail-
ing economies of concentration and gravitational forces of
existing market places are often underestimated by
politicians. A policy of decentralization of economic
activities must be supported with extraordinary and massive
amounts of investment in capital goods as well as in human
resources to reverse past trends, if this is considered to
be a desirable goal. The Vanoni Plan with $1 billion
investment funds for ten years seems to be unproportional
to the magnitude of the problems in Mezzogiorno.
The objective of regional equalization, if unsuccessful
on a nation-wide basis, was successful in Mezzogiorno itself.
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5) There were tremendous shifts in the sectoral structure of
Mezzogiorno's economy in favor of industry, commerce and
transportation. Mezzogiorno during 1951-60, showed the
highest rate of growth in manufacturing because of large
public and private investment (induced by the government).
It holds the promise of bringing structural change to
Mezzogiorno's economy. Among all sectors, only agriculture
showed an absolute advantage over the North.
6) The investment in the South, even in the short-runhas
caused the rise in per capita income. But the net invest-
ment in Mezzogiorno, as a percentage of the North has not
increased the per capita income of Mezzogiorno as a percentage
of the North. The conclusion may be drawn that, although
investments did not satisfy the objective of regional
equalization of income, they did help to raise the regional
per capita income of the South in absolute terms, which in
the absence of such investment, may have worsened.
The correlation between the gross fixed investment and
the incremental value added was found to be non-significant
because of the long-run nature of investments in the
agriculture, transportation and communication and public
works sectors. It is important to note that, when the
objectives of an economic plan are on a long-term basis,
statistical analysis of short-run trends may be quite mis-
leading.
163
7) It was shown that investment in Mezzogiorno kept the
region's per capita consumption constant as a percentage
of the North during the 1950's, while the percentage of
per capita income dropped. The conclusion was that the
development program, although it has not achieved its
economic goals, has at least served a social objective.
It has kept the consumption level as a percentage of the
North from falling. 19
8) The Mezzogiorno contains several population centers of
100,000 and more inhabitants.
metropolitan areas, three are
(rank 3), Palermo (rank 6) and
The urban centers of the
systems of cities, show relati
when plotted according to thei
logarithmic paper. This norma
not representative of any kind
the South and the North. Any
on urban-industrial expansion,
Among ten top-ranked Italian
in the Mezzogiorno: Naples
Catania (rank 9).
South, within the Italian
vely normal distribution
r size and rank on a double-
1 distribution, however, is
of regional equality between
industrialization policy based
as was the one accepted by
the Italian government, must recognize the potentials of
regional centers as competitive economic entities in the
19Note that in this particular analysis and also in other
types of analyses made in Chapter IV, the change of
variables are considered mostly in relation to the North
rather than absolute regional changes.
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national market. For example, in choosing a center for
industrial expansion in the South, one must follow the
procedure of selecting a city with the closest rank to
a major industrial center in the North, other factors
(such as availability of resources) being equal.
9) The interregional migratory movement shows that the South,
during the 1950's, still had not developed enough indus-
trial activities to absorb unemployed labor. The more
prosperous regions were generally those with lower
percentage out-migration. The dispersion of economic
activities over the entire Southern territory may have
been responsible for the fact that during 1950-60,no
strong regional center emerged to curb the out-migration
of the labor force from Mezzogiorno and divert it toward
Southern regional centers. The conclusion may be drawn
that it is to the advantage of the South, at initial
stages of development, to promote the rapid expansion of
industries in cities such as Naples, Palermo, Catania
and Bari, which already stand above the normal distribution
line. 2 0
2 0The industrial development Areas and Nuclei already chosen
far exceed the number suggested above. They are: Latina,
Pescara, Caserta, Naples, Salerno, Bari, Brindisi, Taranto,
Catania, Siracusa, Palermo and Cagliari. EIU, 135, p. 10.
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In closing, we must reiterate our belief that, within the
economic system of a developed country which suffers from regional
inequalities, the strategy of concentrated decentralization
proves to be the most practical solution for a rapid change in
the regional economic structure, leading to rapid growth and a
reduction of inequalities. The Italian experience has clearly
shown the tendency of economic planning toward this strategy.
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CHAPTER V
THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE STRATEGY
OF CONCENTRATED DECENTRALIZATION - GUAYANA PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION
The development program for the Guayana region is a unique
venture in many respects. The Guayana region has not been a
highly populated or a depressed region. The rich natural endowments
of the region have played a crucial role in its selection by the
planning authorities for developmental programming. Therefore,
the basic question in the case of Guayana to be answered,is whether
the selection of any other region may have served the objectives of
the plan better.
In this case study, the economic structure of the Guayana region
is of no interest to ussince there have not been much development
or sub-regional differentials within the Guayana region. Instead,
our main objective, which is reflected throughout the investigation
procedure of this Chapter, is to picture the Venezuelan economic
structure in a regional context prior to the Guayana program.
The demographic and economic data from 1926 to 1965 are
analyzed to answer the following questions.
IF
.11111111111w,
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1. What forces have created the existing structure of Venezuelan
economy? Has the historical pattern of concentration of
population and economic activities in a few places and sectors
served the development objectives?
2. What overall growth strategy prompted the Venezuelan planning
authorities to choose the Guayana region for development?
3. What kind of regional standards have emerged from the histori-
cal development path? Have the regional differentials widened?
4. Is the Guayana program designed to be more responsive to the
national growth objectives or to the specific regional goals?
Would it help to close the gap among the regions?
5. Where does the Guayana program stand in the spectrum of
'balanced' vs. 'unbalanced' growth? Is the strategy of
'concentrated decentralization' in the Venezuelan case
synonymous to 'unbalanced' growth?
6. Does the Guayana program serve the employment objective?
7. Would Ciudad Guayana be capable of competing with large established
metropolitan centers of Venezuela for the absorption of people
and economic activities?
B. THE HISTORY OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN GUAYANA
1. A Brief Review of the Historical Background. The history
of Venezuela and her largest region, Guayana, both begin in the
sixteenth century when Spanish explorers came to seek mineral wealth
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in the mountains. In Guayana, the attraction of riches in unknown
territories was highlighted by the search for the fabled region of
El Dorado. Whereas many lost their lives in the search and attempts
at settlement failed in Guayana in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, other areas of Venezuela, after initial hopes of finding
precious minerals had also faded, were successful in founding
permanent settlements of farmers and ranchers, along the belt of
fertile agricultural land in northern and northwestern Venezuela. 2
In the face of unyielding topography and tropical climate,
the Guayana region remained relatively inactive and by the middle
of the 1700's could count only 8,000 population, with settlements
along the lower course of the Orinoco, in the general area of
Santo Tome de Guayana, along the lower Caroni and upper Cuyuni
river basins, and at Upata, the only truly Spanish community,
founded by civil authorities in 1762.3 By 1825, the population
had risen to 21,000. There was a surge of activity and growth
after 1829, when commercial gold mining operations were begun in
Callao, south of Upata, but after 50 years' operation, the mines
closed. The population in 1890, partly reflecting the impact of
the Callao mining activities was 56,000.4
Other regions of Venezuela, which had been developing a more
Friedmann, John, 39, p. 170.
2 Ibid., p. 127.
31bid., pp. 173-174.
4 lbid., p. 174.
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substantial, if still primitive agrarian society in the rich
western mountain country in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
also developed town centers as points of access, distribution
centers, instruments of colonization, and sub-centers for political
authority. 5 Having first been founded as mining centers, or if
on the coast, as port centers, these towns by the middle of the
twentieth century have grown to be among the largest urban centers
in Venezuela. Among them are Caracas, Maracaibo, Barquisimeto,
Valencia, San Cristobal, Valera, Merida, and Puerto Cabello.6
By the end of the nineteenth century, Venezuela was still
sparsely settled with a total population under three million,
it had an agrarian economy with isolated centers of commerce,
distribution, and administration, produced sugar, tobacco, hides,
cacao, and coffee for export, and had a long political history of
strong dictatorships arising from feudal control of land by wealthy
land owners. 7
A turning point in the economic development of Venezuela
came at the close of World War I, when European and American oil
companies began to invest in and develop oil producing areas. By
1925, the "boom" had begun, and the impact on Venezuelan society
51bid., pp. 145-146.
6 Ibid p. 145.
71bid., p. 129.
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was strongly evident by the mid-1940's. Urban areas had grown,
the agricultural sector had declined, and census figures for
8
1950 showed a total population of 5 million. The pressures
arising from an unequal distribution of wealth, however, forced
a change in governmental structure in 1958, and with a more
democratic form of government, a new system of national economic
planning was initiated. 9 It is worth noting that Venezuela,
having been an agricultural society for at least four centuries,
counted in its 1961 census,4.3 million people, nearly 60 percent
of the total population, living in 128 cities throughout the
10
country.
Although not untouched by the oil-based growth and prosperity
of Venezuela as a whole, the Guayana region has, however, staked
its future economic development on different primary sources --
11iron ore and water power. In the early 1950's, commercial iron
ore mining was begun at El Pao and Cerro Bolivar by Venezuelan
subsidiaries of Bethlehem Steel and U.S. Steel. The Venezuelan
government not only gave assistance, but enlarged the scope of
the economic program, so that by 1958, when the major change in
Ibid., p. 236.
Ibid., p. 123.
10
Ibid., p. 133. A city is defined as containing 5,000 or more
inhabi tants.
11
Ibid., p. 175.
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the national government had taken place, the following programs had
already commenced: the first of a series of hydroelectric dams,
a nationally-owned steel plant on the Orinoco, the dredging of a
deep channel for ocean-going vessels through the Orinoco delta, and
narrow-gauge railways leading into the two iron ore mining areas.12
The program and projects have since been expanded and were incor-
porated in 1960 under the title of the Corporacio'n Venezolana de
Guayana (CVG).
2. Recent Development Planning Activities. The Alliance
for Progress prompted most of the Latin American countries to adopt
some kind of national planning policies not only to achieve strictly
economic goals, but to bring democracy and equality to the nations
of a fast-growing continent.
Venezuela's Plan de la Nacio'n was one example of these planning
activities and probably the most ambitious one.1 3
The Guayana regional program was designed as an integrated part
of the national economic plan. The main objective of the Guayana
program,in general ,was to help achieve a certain national rate of
growth, and in particular, to create a base for heavy industry in
the region as a first step toward sectoral diversification. The
program was also designed to create a new regional economic pole
away from the existing large centers of population, and decentralize
12l bid., pp. 175-176.
13Bl1anco and Ganz, 14, p. 60.
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the already over-concentrated demographic and economic system.
Of the above objectives, heavy weight must be assigned to the
strong desire of a new breed of politicians and economists in
Venezuela,to shift the source of foreign exchange earnings of the
country from oil to other industries, if not wholly, then by as much
of a balance as can be reached. Sectoral diversification, however,
cannot be meaningfully justified on the grounds of raising the
national growth rate, since the Venezuelan economy prior to 1960
had always enjoyed a high rate of growth. The desire for diversifi-
cation and balanced growth can only be described in terms of
political realities of the world as viewed by politicians.
The Plan de la Nacio'n, 1963-1966 and the Plan de la Nacio'n,
1965-1968 have set the targets at the national level. Production
of goods and services are planned to rise 7 percent per annum. Such
a rate of growth would mean a tripling of the per capita gross
income of the country by 1980. The long-run sectoral objectives
of the plans for the growth rates in the period 1965-80 are:
1) to raise the rate of growth of agricultural production to
twice that of population growth,
2) to curtail the rate of growth of mining and petroleum to
slightly more than one-third of the rate achieved in the
period 1936-58, (9.1),
3) to increase the rate of growth of manufacturing to 10.8 percent
14Blanco and Ganz, 14, p. 62.
"OMEN'
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per annum, one and one half times the rate of growth in
1936-58, and
4) to keep the rate of growth of construction, power,
commerce and service sectors slightly lower than the
1936-1958 period, at 7.4 percent per annum.
The highest rate of growth in employment is planned for manufac-
turing, 6.1 percent per year for the period 1964-1980. The national
average rate of growth in employment for the same period is set at
3.6 percent per year. 15
The Guayana program's objectives are dramatic only with respect
to the percentage share of the region in total manufacturing products,
21.0 percent in 1980, and the percentage share in exports, 23.5
percent in the same year.
The gross product per worker in Guayana will be more than three
times that of the nation by 1980. But Guayana will employ only a
minute fraction of the national labor force, 2.3 percent by 1980.
Thus, the Guayana regional program will primarily serve the national
objectives. Although it contributes more to the regional income
than its proportional share of the national income, it should,
however, be considered mostly as a sectoral development program
rather than a regional program.
C. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
1. Growth of Population and Product. The population of Guayana
was 3.0 percent of the national population in 1936. In 1961,this
15 Blanco and Ganz, 14, Table 3.2 and 3.3, p. 63.
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TABLE V-1
POPULATION OF SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS
OF VENEZUELA FOR SELECTED YEARS
(in thousands)
1953 1961
Annual Rate of Growth
36-53 53-61 36-61
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Ll anos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
Source: For 1936 and 1961, Friedman 39.
1953 population figures are derived by extrapolation of 1950
data (given by Friedmann as the national total and regional
percentage distribution) by applying the rate of growth for
regional population between 1936 - 1961.
1936
490
640
1,220
350
340
220
100
3,360
913
856
2,165
560
421
462
169
5,546
1,260
1 ,000
3,100
780
490
630
260
7,520
3.7
1.8
3.4
3.8
1.3
4.5
3.2
3.0
4.1
2.0
4.6
4.2
1.9
3.9
3.9
3.8
1.8
3.8
3.3
4.3
3.9
3.3
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FIGURE V-3
VENEZUELA
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY
REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE v-4
VENEZUELA
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
a'. (1957 bolivares)
4-j
U
0
U
4 J
E
0
0l
0
I-
C)
Sm L..
1936 1953
VENEZUELA
SERvICES
PETROLEUM
TRANS A COMM
MANUFACTURING
AGRICULTURE
CONSTRUCTION
MINING
1961
Source: Tables C-4, C-5 and C-6, Appendix C
178
179
FIGURE V-5
VENEZUELA, WESTERN OIL
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE v-6
VENEZUELA, MOUNTAIN
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-6a
VENEZUELA, MOUNTAIN
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-7
VENEZUELA, CENTRAL
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-7a
VENEZUELA, CENTRAL
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
4-j'
U
0
0
0
PETROL EUM
.. MINING
19"1
Source: Tables C-4, C-5 and C-6, Appendix C
184
FIGURE v-8
VENEZUELA, LLANOS
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-9
VENEZUELA, EAST COASTAL
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-10
VENEZUELA, EASTERN OIL
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-lI
VENEZUELA, GUAYANA
GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT BY SECTOR, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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percentage rose to 3.5, and an increase occurred between 1953 and
1961. Therefore, Guayana has never had a population problem with
respect to congestion or unemployment of the labor force. The region
has been thinly settled and still is.
The shift in share of population, however, has been more
dramatic for the other regions of Venezuela. In general, two oil
states and the Central region of which Caracas is a part, have
gained between 2-5 percent of the total population within a quarter
of a century. The Llanos region had the same percentage share in
1961 as it did in 1936. The two other states, Mountain and the
East Coastal, were the only losers of population during 1936-61
(Table V-2).
During the period 1936-53, the Eastern Oil region grew at the
highest rate, 4.5 percent per annum. The Western Oil, the Central and
the Guayana regions all grew at a higher rate than the national
average. The Mountain, the East Coastal and the Llanos Regions
increased their population at rates lower than the national average
(Table V-1).
During 1953-61, all the regions with the exception of Eastern
Oil grew at rates higher than the previous time interval. Guayana
with the smallest percentage share in total population had the
highest rate of growth in the nation, 5.5 percent. Next in ranking
was the Central region with a 4.6 percent rate of growth per year. The
Central region accounted for 41.1 percent of the total national
population in 1961, the highest ever. If there has been any apparent
problem with regard to population growth in Venezuela, the trend
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TABLE V-2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
BY SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS
FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1936
OF POPULATION
OF VENEZUELA,
, 1953 and 1961
Region
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Ll anos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Source: Table V-1
1936
14.6
19.1
36.3
10.4
10.1
6.5
3.0
1953
16.5
15.4
39. 1
10.1
7.6
8.3
3.0
1961
16.8
13.3
41.1
10.4
6.5
8.4
3.5
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toward high concentration in the Central region can be counted as
the most important one. The closest regions to the Central in
terms of regional population growth rates (excluding Guayana) in
the period 1953-61 were Western Oil and Llanos. The geographical
proximity of the Llanos states to the Central states can partially
explain the fast growth of the former.
The high rate of population growth of Guayanawhich is
undoubtedly a direct result of investment in the Guayana project,
may not have any effect on the pattern of population distribution
in the rest of Venezuela, even in the long-run.
The pattern of regional income distribution of Venezuela has
changed slightly over 25 years, from 1936-1961. In 1936, the
Central region produced 41.4 percent of the gross national product.
Its share in 1953 was 44.2 percent. During 1953-61,the regional
share of the Central states dropped from 44.2 percent to 35.4 percent,
which,with regard to the increase of population of the Central region,
can be considered as a sign of a diminishing return at the center.
The Guayana region,whose percentage share of national income
remained unchanged between 1936-53, increased its percentage share
from 2.1 to 2.7 percent during 1953-61. The Mountain and the East
Coastal regions experienced a continuous decline from 1936 to 1961.
The Western Oil region showed a large shift in the percentage share
of income, surpassing the Central region for the first time. Its
share in total national income increased from 30.9 percent in 1953
to 36.2 percent in 1961. The Eastern Oil states' income share
191
during the same period increased slightly (Table V-3).
The regional income growth from 1936 to 1961 has been correlated
with the rate of population growth. The rate of increase of regional
income during 1936-53 was at least one and one half times the rate
of population growth, for the Mountain states, and was at most double
the rate of population growth for the Eastern Oil region.
In the period 1953-61, the gross product of Venezuela increased
by 9.1 percent per year. Some of the regions' incomes grew at rates
three times the rate of population growth (Guayana, Llanos and
Western Oil, and East Coastal). The Mountain states' income grew
four times faster than its population (Table V-4).
The ratio of percentage income share by regions to the percentage
regional population shares, called the index of prosperity, is shown
for each region and for the years 1936, 1953 and 1961 in Table V-5.
The results are accurate indicators of the regional economic changes
over the 25-year period, 1936-1961.
According to the index, the Western Oil region has been the most
prosperous region throughout the period 1936-61, with a low point in
1953.
The Central region,which in 1936,had a higher percentage share
of income than population, had reversed its condition in 1961. Its
index has steadily decreased since then.
The Eastern Oil region, ranked third in 1936, rose to the second
rank in 1953 and remained so in 1961, although the value of the index
decreased during 1953-1961.
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TABLE V-3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY
SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS OF VENEZUELA,
FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1936, 1953 and 1961
Region 1936 1953 1961
Western Oil 31.1 28.5 36.2
Mountain 8.6 5.5 5.3
Central 41.4 44.2 35.4
Llanos 4.8 5.2 6.3
East Coastal 4.8 3.0 2.4
Eastern Oil 7.2 11.5 11.7
Guayana 2.1 2.1 2.7
Source: Tables V-8, V-9 and V-10
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TABLE V-4
THE RATES OF GROWTH OF GROSS PRODUCT
FOR SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS OF VENEZUELA
FOR 1936-53, 1953-61 and 1936-61 PERIODS
1936-53 1953-61 1936-61
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
Source: Computed from Tables V-14 & V-15 and Tables C-4 & C-6,
Appendix C
Region
5.8
3.0
11.2
8.7
6.8
11.8
5.9
8.8
16.4
9.1
6.2
3.0
9.0
4.0
5.8
4.8
6.2
8.0
3.9
8.9
8.0
6.8
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Of four regions with values below one (unity), the Mountain
states have been deteriorating, although they have shown some
sign of improvement from 1953 to 1961; the Llanos has been steadily
improving and occupied the fifth rank among the seven regions in
1961; the East Coastal region has been declining over this 25 year
period, holding the lowest value for the index in 1961. Finally,
the Guayana region, ranked fourth in 1936, has kept its rank in
1961 with slight improvement in the index value (Table V-5).
A regression line was fitted to each set of paired data on
percentage share regional income and percentage share regional
population for each of the three years 1936, 1953 and 1961.16
The coefficients of correlations were found for the three sets
of data. The results are as follows:
r936 = .8274 (the null hypothesis is rejected at the
.025 level of significance)
r1953 = 8744 (the null hypothesis is rejected at the
.01 level of significance)
r1961 = .7874 (the null hypothesis is rejected at the
.025 level of significance)
The improvement of the coefficient of correlation in 1953 rela-
tive to 1936 can be interpreted as a tendency toward regional income
16>
The regression equations fitted to the percentage values of income
share (y) and the percentage values of population share (x) for
1936, 1953 and 1961 are:
1936: y = 2.2663 + 1.1586x
1953: y = 2.2905 + 1.1603x
1961: y = .8863 + .9379x
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INDEX
REGIONS OF
TABLE V-5
OF PROSPERITY FOR SEVEN MAJOR
VENEZUELA FOR 1936, 1953 AND 1961
Region
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana .70 .53 .77
Source: Computed from Tables V-1 and V-3.
For the formula, see Section F-3 of Chapter
1936
2.13
.45
1.14
.46
.47
1.10
1953
1.87
.35
1.07
.51
.39
1.43
1961
2.15
.39
.86
.60
.36
1.39
il1.
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FIGURE V-12, FIGURE V-13 AND FIGURE V-14
VENEZUELA
RELATION BETWEEN PERCENTAGE
SHARE OF REGIONAL INCOME
AND PERCENTAGE SHARE OF
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equalization. The worsening of the coefficient in 1961, in the
same way, can be attributed to three major factors: 1) deliberate
national economic policy of the government favoring further exploita-
tion of already high-income regions such as Western Oil, 2) deter-
ioration of the economic conditions at the center - Central region,
and 3) lack of a national policy to deal with the problem of
depressed areas such as the Mountain and East Coastal regions.
172. Per Capita Income. The per capita income of the Guayana
region increased at the lowest rate in the nation during the period
1936-53. It increased at the highest rate in the nation during
the years 1953-61(Table V-6). In absolute terms, however, the
Guayana region ranked fourth among seven regions of Venezuela, after
Western Oil, Eastern Oil and the Central states, and it amounted to
two thirds of the per capita income in the Central region,and
almost one third of the highest per capita income region, Western Oil.
Althouth the two relatively depressed regions, Mountain and
East Coastal, enjoyed a higher rate of per capita income growth than
the Central states during the 1953-61 period, they nevertheless,
remained the poorest in the nation in absolute values of per capita
income.
The Central states' per capita income grew at the lowest rate
in the period 1953-61, which might be an indication of the persisting
17 Regional income
Per capita income =
Regional population
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TABLE V-6
PER CAPITA GROSS PRODUCT BY
SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS OF VENEZUELA
Region
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
1936
3,273
696
1 ,752
712
725
1,690
1 ,070
1953
4,547
860
2,604
1 ,240
960
3,481
1 ,286
1961
7,712
1 ,431
3,066
2,178
1,300
5,012
2,816
1,536 2,425 3,574
Annual
36-53
1.9
1.2
2.3
3.3
1.7
4.3
1.1
2.7
Rate of
53-61
6.8
6.6
2.0
7.3
3.9
4.6
10.2
5.0
Growth
36-61
3.5
2.9
2.3
4.6
2.4
4.4
4.0
3.4
Source: Computed from Table V-2 and Tables C-4, C-5 and C-6,
Appendix C
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flow of migrants to the Central region,despite a policy of decentrali-
zation of economic activities.
In the long-run analysis of the trend of per capita income
growth, (for the period 1936-61), the Llanos region had the highest
rate of growth, while the Central states showed the lowest in the
nation. The ranking of the regions according to their long-run rates
of per capita income growth are shown in Table V-7.
TABLE V-7
RANKING OF REGIONS BY THE RATE OF
PER CAPITA INCOME GROWTH
Reg i on
Llanos
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Western Oil
Mountain
East Coastal
Central
Rate of Growth
1936-61
4.6
4.4
4.0
3.5
2.9
2.4
2.3
Source: Table V-6
3. Sectoral Structure of the Regional Economies. The major
shifts in sectoral composition of the Venezuelan economy occurred
between 1936-1953. The share of agriculture in the total gross
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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FIGURE V-15
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - AGRICULTURE -
BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
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FIGURE v-16
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - MINING -
BY REGION (GUAYANA ONLY), 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-16a
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - MINING -
BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-17
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - PETROLEUM -
BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE v-18
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - MANUFACTURING -
BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-19
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - CONSTRUCTION -
BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bolivares)
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FIGURE V-20
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - COMMERCE - BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bol i vares)
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FIGURE V-21
VENEZUELA
GROSS SECTORAL PRODUCT - SERVICES -
BY REGION, 1936, 1953, 1961
(1957 bol ivares)
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domestic product,which counted for 21 percent in the year 1936, dropped
to 8.6 percent in 1953 (Tables V-8 and V-9). The petroleum industries,
a major contributory sector of the national economy, increased its
share during this period from 20.7 percent to 29.7 percent. Manufac-
turing with 11.7 percent of the total GDP in 1936,dropped to 8.0 per
cent in 1953. Meanwhile, the services increased their share from 26.8
percent in 1936 to 33.1 percent in 1953.
In 1961, the agricultural sector showed further decline. Manu-
facturing reached the level of percentage share held in 1936. The
commerce sector declined by 3 percent in total share. Mining increased
at a high rate, but as a percentage of the total national gross output
amounted to only slightly more than one percent in 1961 (Table V-10).
The regional shift in percentage share for agriculture followed
the national trend. All regions' shares in agricultural production
dropped in varying degrees during the period 1936-53. The share of
agriculture decreased further during 1953-61, for all regions except
Western Oil. The ranking of the regions according to their percentage
share in agricultural production is shown in Table V-ll.
TABLE V-8
REGIONAL - SECTORAL COEFFICIENTS FOR
GROSS PRODUCT OF VENEZUELA, 1936
Commerce
Agri. Min. Petroleum Mfg. Const. (or Trade) Services Total
Western Oil .0354 .0000 .1761 .0265+ .0061 .0284+ .0378+ .3106
Mountain .0395 - - .0097 .0046 .0101 .0223+ .0863+
Central .0662 - - .0638+ .0129 .1032 .1679 .4141+
Llanos .0242 - - .0028 .0036 .0045 .0130 .0482+
East Coastal .0204 - - .0074+ .0020+ .0057 .0119+ .0477+
Eastern Oil .0160 .0000 .0310+ .0056+ .0039+ .0049+ .0102 .0720
Guayana .0081 .0010+ - .0014 .0015 .0032 .0053+ .0207
Venezuela .2101 .0011 .2072 .1175 .0349 .1602+ .2687+ 1.0000
Source: Table C-4, Appendix C
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TABLE V-9
REGIONAL - SECTORAL COEFFICIENTS FOR
GROSS PRODUCT OF VENEZUELA, 1953
Commerce
Agri. Min. Petroleum Mfg. Const. (or Trade) Services Total
Western Oil .0085 .0000 .1934 .0082+ .0020 .0352+ .0382 .2858
Mountain .0140 .0000 .0000 .0017+ .0018+ .0084+ .0285+ .0547+
Central .0251+ .0002 .0052 .0648 .0254 .1121+ .2089+ .4420
Llanos .0196+ .0000 .0071 .0007+ .0010 .0058 .0171+ .0516
East Coastal .0080+ .0001+ - .0015 .0004 .0051 .0147 .0300
Eastern Oil .0083 .0000 .0815 .0028+ .0007 .0056+ .0155+ .1147+
Guayana .0024+ .0044+ .0029 .0004+ .0005+ .0020 .0079+ .0209+
Venezuela .0862 .0049+ .2902+ .0805 .0320+ .1746 .3312+ 1.0000
Source: Table C-5, Appendix C
TABLE V-10
REGIONAL - SECTORAL COEFFICIENTS FOR
GROSS PRODUCT OF VENEZUELA, 1961
Commerce
Agri. Min. Petroleum Mfg. Const. (or Trade) Services Total
Western Oil .0127 - .2211+ .0135 .0057+ .0213 .0870 .3615
Mountain .0109+ .0000 - .0043+ .0034 .0124 .0219+ .0532
Central .0186 - .0007+ .0855+ .0211 .0843 .1431 .3535+
Llanos .0150 .0000 .0087+ .0010 .0046 .0129 .0208 .0632
East Coastal .0050+ - - .0016 .0019+ .0054 .0095+ .0237
Eastern Oil .0045 - .0669 .0047+ .0026+ .0075 .0310+ .1174+
Guayana .0015+ .0127 - .0010 .0012 .0021 .0085+ .0272
Venezuela .0686 .0127 .2976 .1118 .0408 .1460 .3222 1.0000
Source: Table C-6, Appendix C
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TABLE V-li
RANKING OF REGIONS BY THEIR PERCENTAGE SHARE
IN AGRICULTURE, 1936, 1953, 1961
Rank
Region 1936 1953 1961
Central 1 1 1
Mountain 2 3 4
Western Oil 3 4 3
Llanos 4 2 2
East Coastal 5 6 5
Eastern Oil 6 5 6
Guayana 7 7 7
Source: Tables V-8, V-9 and V-10.
In the mining sector, only Guayana showed some percentage share
in 1936. Mining activities expanded to other regions, namely, Central
and East Coastal, during 1936-53, but the level of production between
1953-61 was low enough to show no percentage share for these latter
regions in 1961.
The petroleum industries in 1936,accounted for 20 percent of gross
domestic product produced by two regions, Western and Eastern Oil. In
1961, Eastern Oil had doubled its share of petroleum production.
Western Oil had an increase of 30 percent during the same period. The
Central and the Llanos regions also showed some percentage share in the
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petroleum industries in 1961.
Manufacturing, over 25 years (1936-61), showed no change in its
percentage share in the gross domestic product of Venezuela. A drive
for an expansion of manufacturing in Venezuelan economic plans stems
mostly from a long-time neglect in the development of this sector.
In this sense, the objective of the Plan de la Nacion, somehow favors
the unbalanced growth of manufacturing in the present stage of develop-
ment, for the achievement of long-run balance.
The shift in the ranking of regions with respect to the percentage
share in manufacturing production is shown in Table V-12.
TABLE V-12
RANKING OF REGIONS BY THEIR PERCENTAGE SHARE
IN MANUFACTURING, 1936, 1953, 1961
Rank
Reg ion 1936 1953 1961
Central I 1 I
Western Oil 2 2 2
Mountain 3 4 4
East Coastal 4 5 5
Eastern Oil 5 3 3
Llanos 6 6 6
Guayana 7 7 7
Source: Tables V-8, V-9, and V-10.
The construction sector has shown a slight increase in percentage
share over the period 1936-61. It increased at the national level from
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3.5 percent in 193 6,to 4.0 percent in 1961. In all three observation
years, 1936, 1953 and 1961, the Central region has had the highest
percentage share and Guayana the lowest (with the exception of 1953)
in the nation.
The commerce (or trade) sector accounted for 16.0 percent of the
gross domestic product in 1936, 17.4 percent in 1953 and 14.6 percent
in 1961.
The ranking of the regional shares in each of the three years are
shown in Table V-13.
TABLE V-13
RANKING OF REGIONS BY THEIR PERCENTAGE SHARE
IN COMMERCE (TRADE), 1936, 1953, 1961
Rank
Region 1936 1953 1961
Central 1 1 I
Western Oil 2 2 2
Mountain 3 3 4
East Coastal 4 6 6
Eastern Oil 5 5 5
Llanos 6 4 3
Guayana 7 7 7
Source: Tables V-8, V-9 and V-10.
The extreme shifts in the regional ranking in trade are shown
in Table V-13 for the East Coastal and Llanos regions.
El
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In the case of Llanos, the shifts in the ranking of the percent-
age share in commerce and agriculture show a high correlation with
the index of prosperity calculated for the region over the time
interval, 1936-1961.
The decline of the East Coastal in the index of prosperity was
also highly correlated with the falling rank of the region in manu-
facturing and the commerce sectors.
The Social Overhead Capital Sectors comprised of Electricity,
Gas, Transportation and Communication, and the Urban Housing sector
in the data analyzed here, are combined with the sectors under
Services. Analysis of the variation of the percentage share of such
an aggregate sector did not seem to be an accurate way of measuring
the regional differentials. Therefore it was avoided.
An exposition of the operational capability of the static
decision-making model presented in Section C of Chapter III,is made
by calculating the rates of growth of economic sectors for each region
for two periods, 1936-53 and 1953-61.
The 1936-53 Growth Rates Matrix, actually presented as an
example in Chapter I1I, and a new matrix for the period 1953-61,are
presented to observe the shift in the selection of the sectors and
the regions, if only past performances of the sectors within the
regions are regarded as the determinant factor.
According to the simple criterion established in Chapter 111,
namely, that each industry and region,showing a higher rate of growth
than the averageat the sectoral-regional and the national-sectoral
II
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respectively,would receive priority for expansion, Table V-14
would recommend the expansion of the Central, Llanos and the
Eastern Oil regions. The sectors to be developed in these regions,
according to this criterion,would be manufacturing, construction,
commerce and services in the Central states, agriculture, commerce
and services in Llanos, and petroleum, commerce and services in the
Eastern Oil states.
Table V-15, showing the rates of growth for the period 1953-61,
would recommend the selection of Western Oil, Llanos and the
Guayana for further expansion. The sectors within the regions to be
expanded are petroleum, manufacturing, construction, commerce and
services in the Western Oil states, all sectors, except agriculture,
in Llanos, and mining, manufacturing, construction and services
in the Guayana.
Although the exposition of the results is obvious evidence of
the failure of the technique for proper selection of the regions
and sectors for development, it brings up at least two important
points: 1) a deliberate policy of shifting the composition of the
sectoral and regional output can succeed even in a decade, and
2) the shift in the composition of sectoral share in output is
more difficult than the shift in composition of the regional shares
in total output.
4. Investment. The characteristics of the Venezuelan economy
are best reflected in the degree of sectoral accumulation of capital
stock. In 1950, agriculture accounted for 18.6 percent of the
TABLE V-14
REGIONAL - SECTORAL GROWTH RATES OF
GROSS PRODUCT, 1936 - 1953
Commerce
Agri. Min. Petroleum Mfg. Const. (or Trade) Services Total
Western Oil -1.9 * 6.4 -1.0 - .8 7.1 5.9 5.8
Mountain - .5 * * -2.5 .2 4.7 7.3 3.0
Central - .1 * * 5.9 10.1 6.3 7.2 5.9
Llanos 4.5 * * -1.4 - 1.5 7.4 7.5 6.2
East Coastal .2 * 12.0 -2.3 - 2.4 5.0 7.1 3.0
Eastern Oil 1.8 -2.7 - 1.6 - 2.4 6.6 8.4 9.0
Guayana -1.1 15.1 7.9 - .7 .1 3.0 8.3 4.0
Venezuela .4 15.3 3.5 5.3 6.3 7.1 5.8
Source: Tables C-4 and C-5, Appendix C
"-
.mamalmemmilalbllillno
TABLE V-15
REGIONAL - SECTORAL GROWTH RATES OF
GROSS PRODUCT, 1953 - 1961
Commerce
Agri. Min. Petroleum Mfg. Const. (or irade) Services iotal
Western Oil 14.6 10.9 15.9 24.0 2.4 21.0 11.2
Mountain 5.7 .3 22.0 17.8 14.3 5.5 8.7
Central 5.1 * - 7.0 12.9 6.5 5.2 3.9 6.8
L1anos 5.4 10.4 11.8 12.4 32.0 21.0 11.7 11.8
East Coastal 2.9 * - 9.9 33.0 9.9 3.3 5.9
Eastern Oil 1.0 * 6.4 16.1 28.0 13.0 18.8 8.8
Guayana 3.2 24.0 * 19.8 19.0 9.5 10.0 16.4
Venezuela 5.9 23.0 9.3 13.6 12.4 6.6 8.6 9.1
N.)
Source: Tables C-5 and C-6, Appendix C
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total capital stock as against 17.4 percent in goods producing
sectors, 51.2 percent in Social Overhead Capital sectors and 12.8
percent in commerce and services (Table V-16).
The main objective of the national economic plans was an
increase in the level of activities of the commodity producing
sectors. This objective, at the end of the 1950's decade, has
been achieved at the expense of the agricultural and the Social
Overhead Capital sectors. The capital stock for the latter sectors,
indeed, was very high in 1950, but the agricultural sector suffered
most.
The net capital stock during 1953-60,increased at the highest
rate, 24.0 percent per annum, in the Guayana and at the lowest
rate, 4.8 percent per year for the Eastern Oil region. The Llanos
enjoyed the second highest rate next to Guayana, at 12.2 percent
per year (Table V-17).
The Output-Capital ratios computed for 1960 show the Guayana
region as the least efficient region, which is quite normal with
regard to the newness of the investment projects in the region.
The ranked-ordered list of the regions, according to their
efficiency in 1960, is presented in Table V-18.
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TABLE V-16
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL STOCK
BY ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1950-1959
Social
Commodity Overhead Commercial
Production Capital &
Year Total Agri. Sectors Sectors Services
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
18.6
17.4
16.5
15.6
15.1
14.7
14.3
14.0
13.6
13.4
17.4
18.3
19.3
19.5
19.6
20.0
21.1
22.8
23.4
23.7
51.2
50.3
49. 4
49.6
50.4
50.6
50.2
48.5
48.3
47.5
12.8
14. 0
14.8
15.3
14.9
14.7
14.4
14.7
14.7
15.4
Source: Table 22-16, Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela
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TABLE V-17
NET CAPITAL STOCK
(in millions of bolivares - 1957 prices)
1953
Regions
K53
Western Oil 9,842 1
Mountain 2,082
Central 11,070 2
Lianos 1,826
East Coastal 1 ,023
Eastern Oil 4,115
Guayana 582
1960 AK Compounded Annual
K Rate of Growth
K6 0 AK=K60- 53 53 of Capi tal Stock
6,024 6,182 62.8 7.2
3,779 1,697 81.5 8.9
1,379 10,309 93.1 9.9
4,078 2,252 123.3 12.2
1,717 694 67.8 7.6
5,706 1,591 38.6 4.8
2,559 1,977 339.6 24.0
Source: Ganz, Unpublished Data
TABLE V-18
OUTPUT-CAPITAL RATIO BY
Region
Western Oil
Eastern Oil
Central
Mountain
Llanos
East Coastal
Guayana
1960
Rank Value
1 .57
2 .56
3 .44
4 .39
5 .39
6 .37
7 .33
19801
Rank Value
4 .44
2 .46
3 .45
5 .37
6 .34
7 .33
1 .51
1Projection made by A
Source: Ganz, unpubl
lexander Ganz.
ished data.
An index of sectoral capital intensity 18 is computed for four
major sectoral categories of the Venezuelan economy. The results are
presented in Table V-19. According to the indices shown in this Table,
the trend in the 1950's has been toward less capital intensive agri-
culture and SOC sectors and more capital intensive activities in the
sectors producing goods and services.
In terms of employment objectives, Table V-19 may serve as a
decision matrix. A sector which employs the same percentage of the
18The formula is given in Section F-3 of Chapter III.
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TABLE V-19
INDEX OF SECTORAL CAPITAL INTENSITY'
Commodity
Production
Sectors
.80
.86
.86
.89
.88
.93
.93
.97
.02
.03
'For formula, see Section F-3 of Chapter
Social
Overhead
Capital
Sectors
4.37
4.19
4.18
4.03
4.06
4.01
4.08
3.97
3.83
3.74
Commerce
&
Servi ces
.56
.60
.63
.64
.62
.59
.58
.58
.56
.57
I11.
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-16
and 22-18
Agri.Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
.42
.39
.38
.36
.36
.35
.35
.35
.35
.35
1
1
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total labor force as its percentage share in capital stock,satisfies
the employment objective more than a sector which employs a lower
percentage of labor force,relative to its share in total capital
stock. A naive interpretation of the ratio may be that,as the
percentage share of capital in a sector increases and its labor
share decreases, the sector becomes more capital intensive. The
ratio does not imply efficiency at all. Both a capital intensive
and a labor-intensive sector can be efficient or inefficient. The
Table shows low coefficients for Agriculture and Commerce and Services
sectors, implying that with a lower level of capital stock, a higher
level of employment can be achieved. The Social Overhead Capital
sectors coefficients reveal that, relative to the capital require-
ment in these sectors, the employment share is the lowest among
all sectors.
The ratio of the percentage distribution of the gross
fixed investment to the percentage distribution of gross product
by economic sectors shown in Table V-20, clearly explains the con-
flict between the choice of the most efficient sector and the
one which satisfies the objective of a higher level of employment.
According.to this Table, the Agriculture and the Social Overhead
Capital sectors are the most inefficient sectors in terms of rate
of return to investment. The sectors producing goods and services
are the most efficient sectors.
Of these two latter sectors, only the commerce and services
sector satisfies the employment objective as well as the investment
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TABLE V-20
RATIOS OF PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS
FIXED INVESTMENT TO PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
OF GROSS PRODUCT BY ECONOMIC SECTORS (T)' 1950-1959
Commodi ty
Production
Sectors
.64
.65
.68
.59
.56
.61
.73
.86
.76
.71
Social
Ove rhead
Capital
Sectors
1.73
1.97
2.02
2.00
2.51
2.38
2.26
1.67
2.07
1.61
Comme rce
&
Services
.92
.88
.80
.80
.51
.56
.47
.67
.58
.86
'The formula for T is given in Section F-5 of Chapter Ill.
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Tables 22-4
and 22-15
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
Agri.
1.40
1.13
1.08
1.10
1.52
1.57
1.58
1.61
1.36
1.68
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efficiency criterion. This fact by itself,is an explanation of the
flow of population to the large metropolitan areas with a high
concentration of tertiary activities. In 1961, 64.3 percent of
the total gross product of the Central region was from commerce and
services.
5. Regional Centers. The distribution of urban population
in the seven major regions of Venezuela is not unusual, if the large
size of the country, small size of population, the lineal stretch
of fertile agricultural land and the spotty regional development
around the oil fields and mineral resources are considered altogether.
In 1936, in the Central region, 60 percent of population was urban.
This percentage has declined over the period 1936-61,rather than
increased. The changes in the percentage distribution of urban
population for the regions are shown in Table V-21.
The large cities of Venezuela are mostly clustered in the
Northeast-Southwest agricultural belt. Only a few cities, such as
Santo Tomas De Guayana (Ciudad Guayana), Cabruta and Maracaibo
are exceptions, the former two on the banks of the Orinoco River,
and the latter on the shore of Lago de Maracaibo. The foundation
of these cities dates back from as far back as 1500 to the end of the
16th century. The ranks of the cities,according to population
for the top four cities,has remained almost unchanged. Most of the
extreme shifts in city ranks, between 1926-1961, have occurred
among cities ranked 5 to 10 in 1926. Table V-22 shows the ranking
of the ten largest cities of Venezuela from 1926 to 1961.
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TABLE V-21
DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN POPULATION BY
GROUPS OF STATES 1936, 1950, 1961
(in thousands)
1936 1959 1961
Regions No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
Western Oil 145 19.5 379 17.9 801 18.5
Moun tain 50 6.7 159 7.5 297 6.9
West Central 63 8.5 155 7.3 321 7.4
East Central 382 51.4 1,012 47.7 2,046 47.2
Llanos 8 1.1 115 5.4 256 5.9
East Coastal 57 7.7 112 5.3 160 3.6
Eastern Oil 17 2.3 143 6.7 319 7.4
Guayana 21 2.8 46 2.2 133 3.1
Source: Friedmann, 39
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TABLE V-22
RANKING OF THE TEN LARGEST VENEZUELAN CITIES
ACCORDING TO THEIR POPULATION SIZE
Cities 1926 1936 1950 1961
Caracas 1 1 1 1
Maracaibo 2 2 2 2
Valencia 3 3 4 4
Barquisimeto 4 4 3 3
C. Bolivar 5 8 - 10
Cumana 6 7 7 9
S. Cristobal 7 6 6 6
Muiquentia 8 - 9 8
Coro 9 -
Maracay 10 5 5 5
- Indicates dropping of the city from the Top Ten list in that year.
Source: Friedmann, 39.
The data on population growth of urban centers for the period
1950-1960,reveal that cities with over 100,000 population gained
less than 100 percent, and the cities which gained more than 100
percentwere in the range of 7-64 thousand in population size
(Table V-23).
A rank-size distribution test was performed for the major
urban centers of Venezuela for the years 1926, 1936, 1950 and 1961.
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TABLE V-23
TYPICAL CITY EXPANSIONS, 1950-1961
(in thousands)
Population
Percent
Cities 1950 1960 Gain
Maraciabo 235 421 79.1
Cabimas 42 93 121.4
San Carlos Del Zulia 7 14 100.0
San Cristobal 54 99 83.3
Barquisimeta 105 200 90.5
Valencia 89 164 84.3
Maracay 64 135 110.9
Caracas Metropolitan Area 694 1,336 92.5
Acarigua 16 31 93.7
San Juan De Los Morros 14 37 164.2
Puerto La Cruz 28 59 110.7
Maturin 25 54 116.0
Ciudad Bolivar 31 64 106.4
Source: Friedmann, 39
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FIGURE V-23
VENEZUELA
RELATION BETWEEN RANK AND SIZE OF CITIES WITH
10,000 OR MORE INHABITANTS, 1926, 1936, 1950, 1961
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The results are shown in Fig. V-23. A curve, which would be convex
to the origin, can be fitted to the plotted information pairs
for 1926.
The 1936 city distribution shows a skewed and linear distribution
of the five largest cities, while showing a straight horizontal line
for the other five cities. In 1950, the distribution pattern shows
more linearity for the total number of cities -in the sample, but
the distribution is more skewed. Finally, the 1961 plotted informa-
tion on the rank and size of the thirteen largest cities shows a
concave curve for eleven cities, and only the two largest cities,
Caracas and Maracaibo, have grown much in size relative to the others.
It is also possible to fit a straight line to the points on
the graph for 1961, which passes from the point showing the rank
and size of the largest city, Caracas. If this is done, Maracaibo,
Barquisimeto, and San Carlos Del Zulia fall below the line and
other cities are either on or above the line. The steepness
of the regression line is characteristic of underdeveloped countries
with the historical pattern of a center-periphery relationship.
6. Regional Migratory Movements. Among seven major Venezuelan
regions, the Mountain, East Coastal and Guayana have lost population
to other regions between 1936-1950. If the losses of the West
Central region are included, 64.4 percent of the total losses by the
regions is absorbed by the East Central region (Table V-24).
Caracas and the East Central region have received a large portion
of their in-migration from foreign countries, which is not reflected
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TABLE V-24
INTERNAL AND FOREIGN MIGRATION,
VENEZUELA 1936 - 1950
(in thousands)
(1)
Province And
Region
Western Oil
Mountain
West Central
East Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
Out
Migration
57
119
76
112
45
69
29
25
532
(2) (3)
Net
In Internal
Migration Migration
95
17
14
274
43
2
79
8
532
38
- 102
- 62
161
- 2
- 67
50
- 17
0
(4)
Foreign
Immi grat
17
16
6
106
8
1
8
3
165
(5)
(3) +
ion Total
55
- 86
- 56
268
6
- 66
58
- 14
165
Source: Friedmann, 39
(4)
FIGURE V-24
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reflected in the percentage shown above. The second and the third
poles of population absorption during the period 1936-50 were the
Eastern Oil and Western Oil states. There are high correlations
between the economic decline of the Mountain states and the East
Coastal region on one hand,and the rate of out-migration on the other.
D. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The findings and conclusions of the statistical analysis can be
summarized as follows:
1) The rate of population growth for Venezuela has been
quite high, 3.3 percent per year for over a quarter
of a century. There have been regional differentials
in terms of population growth rates, ranging between
1.3 - 5.5 percent increase per year. The differential
rates of population growth have been a function of
economic performances of the regions. This is
especially true for Guayana, where the high rate of
investment has resulted in the highest regional rate
of population increase during 1953-1961.
2) Venezuela has experienced a high level of concentration
of population and economic activities in the Central
region and in its center, Caracas. In spite of an
absolute increase in the share of the Central region in
the national income, the region has been subject to
progressive retardation, since its percentage share in
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population is increasing more than its percentage share
in income. On economic grounds, therefore,a policy of
decentralization of economic activities seems quite
justified and promising.
On the basis of existing economic potentials, as late as
1961, the Western Oil and the Eastern Oil states, should
have received priorities for development over the Guayana
region. But in view of the fact that Venezuela, in the late
1950's,was determined to diversity its economic activities
and especially, to shift its source of foreign exchange
earnings from oil to other industries, the selection of the
Guayana region with its rich iron-ore resources seems to
have been an inevitable choice. Geographic proximity of
the Guayana development region to the Eastern Oil states
may create some degree of interregional flow of people,
goods and services. But the most important impact of the
Guayana project, if pursued objectively in the future,
is the creation of strong economic links between the
Guayana industrial complex on one hand,and the regional
economies of the Llanos states and the Eastern Oil on the
other.
l9It is important to remember that the impact of the Guayana
project will be felt more on the regional economies of the
neighboring states rather than the Guayana region as a
whole, because of the marginal location of the Guayana
development region in relation to the entire region.
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The contribution of the Guayana project to the
Venezuelan economy as a whole,unquestionably will be
significant in the long-run, especially in manufacturing,
which is projected to produce 21.0 percent of Venezuela's
manufacturing product and 23.5 percent of Venezuela's
total export by the year 1980.20
3) The trend in 1953-60,prior to the Guayana program,has been
toward more per capita income inequality among the regions
than existed between 1936-1953. One reason for this trend
is the heavy reliance of Venezuela's expanding economy on
oil, as a source of foreign exchange earnings, which forces
the Venezuelan government to expand oil industries in
already high-income regions - Western and Eastern Oil.
Deterioration of economic conditions at the center and the
lack of a national policy to deal with the problem of
depressed areas (the Mountain and the East Coastal), can
be counted as additional factors responsible for the trend
toward regional inequality in the 1953-61 period.
This sacrifice, however, is of a temporary nature,
and it is obviously the price the Venezuelan economy ought
to pay for the diversification of its sectoral activities.
As for the Guayana region itself, the investments
made, even prior to the development programming, have had a
2 0 Blanco and Ganz, 14.
238
positive effect, raising the growth rate of the regional
per capita income.
4) The regional growth of the Venezuelan economy has been
more in balance than the sectoral growth. If the two-point
observation of data (1936 and 1961) for all major sectors
of the Venezuelan economy are connected with straight lines
(showing a linear long-run trend of sectoral growth),2 1
it could be observed that the sectoral 'unbalanced' growth
has, indeed, been the prevailing characteristic of the
Venezuelan economy from 1936-1961.
Petroleum and mining have grown at a far greater rate
than any other sector in the economy. Agriculture has grown
at a rate far below the national growth rate in gross
product (which for Venezuela is quite high) and even below
the population growth rate.
Manufacturing and construction show a balanced growth
pattern in the long period 1936-61, but when they are
broken down into two periods, 1936-53 and 1953-61, the
pattern of "unbalanced" growth is again evident. The slow
growth of these two sectors during 1936-53 is compensated
with high growth rates during 1953-61. The Plan de la
Nacidn, 1963-1966 and the Plan de la Nacidn, 1965-1968 has
obviously aimed at achieving a sectoral 'balanced' growth
2 1 See Figure V-4.
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pattern. The sectoral growth may even approach the von
Neumann balanced growth type for many sectors of the
economy in the future. Although it is quite unlikely
that in the near future, Venezuela will be able to curtail
the rapid growth of some sectors, such as petroleum and
mining, nevertheless, in the short-run, the strategy of the
Venezuelan government in developmental planning may well be
described in the conceptual framework of the 'concentrated
decentralization' strategy. The Plan de la Nacid'n, 1963-
1966, made a firm commitment to the concept of concentrated
decentralization growth strategy by "calling for 10 percent
22
of the nation's investment, public and private," to be
made in developing a region at the periphery.
The difference between the "balanced" and "unbalanced"
growth strategies in this case, is actually the difference
between the long-run objective of sectoral balanced growth
and the short-run strategy of rapid expansion of one sector
over the other.
5) A higher level of employment can be achieved by expansion
of agriculture, commerce and services, which show lower
capital-requirement with respect to employment opportunities.
The Guayana program has not been concerned with a strict
employment objective,such as to use a capital-intensity
2 2Blanco and Ganz, 114.
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index as a criterion for the selection of the sectors for
development.
It was found that the commerce and services sectors
satisfy both the employment objective and the investment
efficiency criterion, providing adequate reason for a
migration of labor force to the large metropolitan areas
with a high concent
Ciudad Guayana, as
industries, will be
enough for tertiary
other metropolitan
this dissertation.
Ciudad Guayana need
which would satisfy
in order to become
ration of tertiary activities. Whether
a metropolitan area with its basic
able to generate a market large
activities, to be competitive with
areas,is indeed beyond the scope of
But, it can generally be said, that
s to develop those economic sectors
the higher level of employment objectives,
a major population magnet.
6) The rank-size distribution of the thirteen largest
Venezuelan cities,from 1926 to 1961,showed a tendency
toward linearity. The slope of the line fitted to the
plotted rank-size values for 1961 - the last observation,
is quite steep, a fact that is often considered an abnor-
mality in the distribution of cities. But another way of
interpreting the steepness of the line is that a fast-
growing economy with small population size, such as that
of Venezuela, requires skewed rank-size distribution of
cities in order to sustain its normal function. Therefore,
9MM'
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it is inconceivable that the existing pattern of population
distribution among urban areas change drastically in the
near future. The newly expanded growth poles such as
Ciudad Guayana, would at most reduce the rate of out-
migration of the labor force in their spatial realm of
influence.
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CHAPTER VI
COMPARISON OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTIONS
IN ITALY AND VENEZUELA
A. INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this Chapter are: 1) to provide a statistical
comparison of the two case studies with respect to all economic
variables used in data analysis, 2) to sketch the differences in the
social and political settings of the two countries observed, and
interpret their corresponding planning styles accordingly, and 3) to
make general observations on the major topics of this dissertation,
namely the derivation of planning objectives in relation to the
different stages of development, the tendency of the regional and
sectoral economies toward 'balance' or 'imbalance' as a result of
developmental programming in different phases of economic development,
and the performance of the strategy of concentrated decentralization
at work and in a normative perspective.
B. STATISTICAL DIFFERENTIALS
1. Population and Product. In 1961, Italy had a population of
50 million, while Venezuela contained 7.5 million.
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The Mezzogiorno counted for two fifths of the total population
of Italy. In contrast, the Guayana had 3.4 percent of the national
population in 1961. The simple population differentials between
the two regions for which the development projects were designed,
explains the particularities of planning activities of each
country, with respect to the emphasis on regional objectives and
the degree of integration of each program in the context of their
respective national plans. Mezzogiorno's development program, while
being a part of the national plan, was designed specifically to
solve numerous regional problems. The Guayana program essentially,
was not directed to solve regional problems, since they were non-
existent at the time of initiation of the project.
The gross national product of Italy in 1961 was about 30 billion
dollars, that of Venezuela about 8 billion. The Mezzogiorno's share
in GNP was 20 percent, while the share of the Guayana region was
about 2.7 percent in 1961.
The objective of regional equalization of income has obviously
been one of the main concerns of the Mezzogiorno's development
program. This could not logically be an objective in the Guayana
program as a strictly regional goal, although it might have been
considered as a national objective.
2. Per Capita Income.
The per capita GNP of Venezuela in 1961 was substantially
higher than that of Italy ($1066 vs. $600). The per capita gross
regional product for Mezzogiorno and Guayana were lower than their
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respective national averages. But Mezzogiorno showed greater differ-
ential with Italy's average than Guayana's, relative to Venezuela's
average ($312 for Mezzogiorno and $846 for Guayana). Although the
per capita disposable income of the two countries was substantially
lower than the per capita GNP, it kept the same proportion as the
latter ($350 for Italy vs. $600 for Venezuela). Both indices, as
is well known, do not reveal the real picture of development in the
two countries. The available data for income distribution in the
Mezzogiorno region in 1948 (not presented or analyzed in this work)
shows 54 percent of families in the low-income bracket (under 390 lire)
and 31.8 percent in the lower-middle. The situation is roughly the
same in Venezuela.
By setting up specific employment objectives for the masses of
the unemployed, Mezzogiorno's development program has come close to
incorporating the objective of more equal distribution of income
into its planning framework. The Guayana program, at its initial
stages of implementation, could not rigorously pursue such an objec-
tive because of two major reasons: 1) The choice of technology of
production as the most modern and capital intensive,I which reduces
the capacity of projects as major sources of job opportunities and
2) the low level of existing skill in the region, which is not
compatible with the labor requirements of a heavy industry complex.
In the Mezzogiorno case, extensive labor market studies were
actually responsible for the development of particular projects for
specific locations.
IBlanco and Ganz, 14, p. 66.
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3. Differences in Sectoral Structures of the Two Economies.
According to 1951-1960 averages, agriculture counted for
20 percent of the net national product in Italy. Industry, trans-
portation and communication, and manufacturing have respectively,
a 50, 6 and 3.5 percent share in the total net national product,
and 20.5 percent counted for other activities. In comparison, the
sectoral share of agriculture,in 1961,was 6.8 percent of the gross
domestic product of the Venezuelan economy. Industry accounted for
35 percent of the GDP, including a 30 percent share of oil industry.
Transportation and communication had a share of 3.8 percent, and
manufacturing counted for 11.1 percent. A large share of the total
product counted for other economic activities, including commerce
and services.
To be meaningfully compared, the structural differences in
the sectoral composition of the two economies need a thorough analysis
at a higher level of industrial disaggregation, which is not within
the scope of this study. Generally speaking, the high concentration
of Venezuelan sectoral activities on the oil and commerce and services
sectors is the apparent difference between the two economies.
The availability of untapped resources in Venezuela, a condi-
tion non-existent in Italy, is a major directive of the development
programs in Venezuela. The classification of Tinbergen is closely
applicable to the planning efforts of the two countries in relation
to sectoral expansion. Venezuela is at the 'middle phase' of
development, trying to concentrate on the development of a few
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sectors within a few regions in order to compensate for past sectoral
imbalances. Italy, entering the "microphase," is planning micro-
regional plans based on project by project evaluation to deal with
detailed and complex regional-sectoral problems.
The analysis of the regional shares in total sector activities
of the two countries arrives at the same conclusion as above. In
1961, the Central region in Venezuela had 35.35 percent share in
total national sectoral products, the region of Western Oil and
Eastern Oil counted each for 36.15 and 11.74 percent of gross
domestic product respectively. The four other regions held a share
of 16.76 percent of total product.
In Italy, for the same year 1961, the Northern region had a
share of 40.73 percent, the Central region 38.89 and the South 20.38
percent in the gross national product.
The planning problem in Italy is concerned with the redistribu-
tion of income among regions. In Venezuela, the problem is opening
new frontiers in an expanding economy.
4. Investment. The rate of return to investment is higher
in Italy than in Venezuela. Although the ratio of net investment
to net product for both Mezzogiorno and the Centro-Nord during the
period 1951-1960 have been rising (Table VI-1), they are still lower
than the ratio for the Venezuelan economy: in 1950, 25.64 percent
and in 1959, 26.05 percent.
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TABLE VI-1
THE RATIO OF NET INVESTMENT TO NET PRODUCT
FOR MEZZOGIORNO AND CENTRO-NORD,
1951-1953 and 1958-1960
Years
1951-53
1958-60
Mez zo-
giorno
15.11
19.77
Cen tro-
Nord
10. 47
13.50
At initial years of investment, when output targets have not yet
materialized, developmental projects by their very nature are to some
extent responsible for the increase of ratios in both countries, but
the lower increase for Venezuela may be attributed to the tendency of
an economy toward a more efficient usage of investments. On the
percentage distribution of gross fixed investment among sectors, the
two countries show remarkable similarities.
TABLE VI-2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT
BY ECONOMIC SECTORS FOR
Italy (1960) and Venezuela (1959)
Italy 1960
Venezuela 1959
Agri-
cul -
ture
9.5
10.6
Industry
(including
Mfg.)
39.7
34.9
SOC
Sectors
33.0
33.7
Commerce
and
Services
17.8
20.8
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5. Differences in the System of Regional Centers.
The differences in the system of regional centers between
the two countries stem from several factors: 1) the difference in
the population size, 2) the differences in topography and climate
and 3) regional economic forces.
In 1965, there were 36 cities in Italy with more than 100,000
population as against 7 cities in Venezuela. Of these 36 cities,
10 were in Mezzogiorno, and none of the seven Venezuelan cities
were in the Guayana region.
The rank-size distribution pattern for both countries showed
a tendency toward linearity with a steeper slope for Venezuelan
cities, which can be interpreted as a necessary condition for support-
ing the domestic economy by the creation of large market centers.
In the Mezzogiorno's development program, the already existing
population and activity centers can be developed further, to become
competitive entities with the strong industrial centers of the
North. But in the case of Guayana, the regional center, Ciudad
Guayana, will have a limited effect on the reorientation of popula-
tion distribution in Venezuela.
6. The Differences in the Regional Migratory Movements. There
is a tremendous degree of population mobility in Italy, most probably
one of the main reasons for the achievement of the highest rate of
growth among European nations after World War II. In 1960 only,one
million of the population of the North migrated, either within the
North itself or to the South. In the same year, half a million
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population in the South moved within or outside the South. Eighty-
four percent of the North's migrants moved within the region as
against 71 percent of the Southerners, who moved within the South.
In absolute figures, in 1960, Mezzogiorno lost 135 thousand of its
population to the North.
One of the objectives of the planning programs for Mezzogiorno
is the reduction of outmigration, although plans have even been
suggested to encourage migration to the North, in order to create a
balance between the regional population and income share. 2
In Venezuela, data for the 1936-1950 period show net gains
for the regions of Central, Western Oil and Eastern Oil, and net
loss for the other four regions.
The Guayana project at most, can hope to add one region to the
list of gaining regions. But it would not drastically affect the
state of the migration pattern within the national boundaries.
C. DIFFERENCES IN THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SETTING
AND PLANNING STYLE
The social and political settings of the countries are greatly
responsible for the formulation of national and regional objectives.
Should the formulation of goals follow the diagnostic stage, then the
role of social groups and political organizations is quite important
in bringing the problems to the surface. A benevolent dictator, by
2
Rosenstein-Rodan, 117, p. 13.
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by the use of highly qualified experts, may diagnose the national
problems and take remedial action toward their solutions, and his
effort may well serve the public interests. A nation may also
formulate its national objectives and priorities by a wide range of
social participation in the different forms provided in a
democratic system.
To be sure, the list of priorities established by the two
political systems described above, will be somewhat different, both
in terms of their content and in view of the strategies chosen for
the implementation of plans for remedial action. But there are
plenty of reasons why such a gap in practice is not as wide as it
may theoretically seem to be. The most important reason is that there
are no black and white type contrasts between the prevailing social
and political systems in the world. The social and economic problems
are fairly well diagnosed under any political system, but the channels
of transmission of information,which leads to diagnosis of the
problems, may differ from country to country.
When the problems are recognized, the body of knowledge and
intelligence, internationally available, is adequate to seek their
solutions. If enough resources can be mobilized to solve the
problems, there remains only one major difference between the
eventual outcomes of the two planning styles: the establishment of
priority orders and the degree of public support each item in the
list may receive.
The responsiveness of the masses to developmental programs are
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usually overlooked at the time of the establishment of global and
aggregative targets. We have indeed, some vague knowledge about
how a Burmese farmer responds to the use of fertilizer in agriculture
as against a Japanese or an Indian farmer. But we still need more
knowledge on the psychology of masses who have lived under repressive
or liberal regimes and their reactions toward certain developmental
projects, which have significant social repercussions.
The economic data available to social researchers, such as those
used in the previous two case studies, do not adequately represent
the differences among the countries with regard to social attitudes,
collective responses, and psychological behavior of masses.
Even indicators, such as per capita regional incomes, are crude
economic measures for a comparative study of the well-being of populations
of two regions or two nations. There is no shortage of technique and
methodology for the evaluation of the impact of a developmental program
on a society, but there is simply a lack of data.
Therefore, our purpose here,is confined to a descriptive compari-
son of the Italian and Venezuelan social and political system and
their respective effects on the choice of strategy for economic
development.
Italy has experienced an extreme shift from regionalism to
centralism as a result of unification. At the present time, only
4 out of 19 regional entities enjoy local autonomy and have separate
regional parliaments. Of these four, Sicilia and Sardegna are in
the South, and the other two are ethnic minority states of Italy.
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For all practical purposes, however, the Italian system of government
is highly centralized. Regions are run by prefecteurs who are
appointed by the Central government.
The political parties in Italy have always been critical of
the regional differentials and the high rate of unemployment in the
South. But, in spite of their unanimity on the necessity to seek
solutions to the problems of the South, no concrete results were
reached until recent years, because of ideological differences among
the parties. For a long time, the alliance of the Communists and
Socialists was a block toward the formation of a government of the
moderate left, making effective planning impossible. The failure
of the Vanoni plan is mostly attributable to the party conflicts
prior to the formation of Aldo Moro s coalition government.3
The problem of the South has been widely discussed for years.
There has been a nation-wide awareness of the difficulties. Political
parties, labor unions and middle class urban groups, all have been
active in transmitting the demand for reform to the central government.
At the same time, the central government also had recognized the
necessity for action in the South. There was a reciprocal relation-
ship between the demands of the South and the desire of the central
government to do something about them. This situation has been a
major burden on the performance of the regional programs, because it
created competition among local authorities for the limited development
3Hanson, 52, p. 130.
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funds. The over-participation of local authorities in the central
decision-making process, eventually resulted in more control of the
central planning authorities in the allocation of funds. It was
an obvious choice for the central government to be more selective
in the choice of location and the degree of concentration of invest-
ment in the South.
Venezuela for centuries, has had a highly centralized government
system and still has. None of the 23 provinces of Venezuela enjoys
political independence. The 1958 revolution of middle-class city
dwellers in alliance with the army, brought down the dictatorship of
Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez. The revolution, among other things,
brought about ideas of economic planning in general, and regional
planning in particular. The national plan, however, was not formed
by the participation of all segments of the society. Although the
men in power had changed, the traditional way of planning from 'above'
remained intact as a revolutionary practice.
The CORDIPLAN, a national planning agency created in 1958, was
supposed to follow the stated national goals set up by the central
government as follows: "the greatest possible welfare for all
Venezuelans, to be achieved through full employment of the labor
force and through an equitable distribution of wealth, using the
expanding resources of the several regions of the country in the most
efficient way possible; and economic independence, through an adequate
4 Friedmann, 39, p. 152.
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diversification of the economy and an optimal growth of the national
product, especially on the basis of the best possible utilization
of the income obtained from the just participation of the nation in
the extractive industries." 5
The national goals to be followed by a national economic plan
for development was nothing but a two-player game played by one
person. The achievement of the targets was assumed to be 100 percent
and the satisfaction of the public was guaranteed.
The policy of decentralization of economic activities, combined
with sectoral diversification, singled out a region for development
which was sparsely populated, and encountered opposition from more
populated regions. The rivalry among the regions has become a
common political exercise after the Guayana regional development.
Although the Guayana program is hardly a response to the
immediate regional needs, it has had the effect of persuading other
regions to participate more actively in the decision-making process,
and applying more pressure in obtaining their share of investment
funds. Thus, a more dynamic play of forces in the Venezuelan social
and political arena is anticipated.
D. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have deliberately chosen two countries with different histori-
cal, social and political backgrounds at different stages of economic
development. Our main objective was to explore the differences in the
5Friedmann, 39, P. 156.
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way regional development objectives are formed, the relationship of
these objectives to the phases of national economy, and the strategies
they use under different circumstances and constraints to achieve
these objectives. The results of our findings may be summarized as
follows:
1. The planning objectives at the middle-phase of development
(Venezuela) are arrived at on the national level. The so-called
regional plans in this phase are actually 'regionalized' programs,
designed primarily to achieve national goals. There is limited citizen
participation in the entire planning process, from diagnosis of
the problems to implementation of the plans. The goals are stated
strictly in economic terms, and the evaluation criteria used for
assessment of the degree of achievement of the plans are mostly
based on the measurement of the absolute or percentage changes in
the growth of the national or regional economy.
In the micro-phase, regional differentials have reached
a saturation level (Italy), probably as a direct result of the
general strategy followed by most underdeveloped countries at
the middle phase.
If the country has followed the rules of the market, shaped
by the private sector, the need for planning and government interven-
tion is felt momentarily. The social pressures may reach a point of
explosion. Even if the direct participation of the masses in the
decision-making process is not practiced, the public, through
various democratic channels, would let the authorities know of its
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grievances and its expectations from the central government.
The regional problems, such as a low level of per capita dispos-
able income, or a high rate of unemployment, may be excellent
campaign issues for political parties from the extreme left to
the extreme right, but it helps, nevertheless, to build up
pressure on the central administration for planning and action.
The problems, brought to public attention in this fashion,
would result in the formulation of national priorities and
regional objectives, which are more responsive to the immediate needs
of the communities, rather than to long-range, global goals.
The main objective of the regional development programming
in this phase, is redistribution of the national wealth among all
people of the regions.
2. The course of development followed in the middle-phase widens
the regional and sectoral imbalances. In spite of the fact that
national planning objectives, in the Venezuelan case, explicitly
sought a way out of sectoral imbalances, the necessity for financ-
ing the programs made it obligatory to expand still further the
more developed sectors, such as petroleum and mining. The
regional imbalances are also expected to grow larger, as long as
the regional resources are exploited to achieve the national
objectives, rather than being employed to benefit the regions.
Some benefits, nonetheless, may still accrue to the regions.
Since the projects in the micro-phase are designed to solve
some of the urgent problems of the regions, a reduction of social
U.
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tensions and even a betterment of economic indicators may result.
But the strong forces of regions already developed to higher
standards, will make the process of regional equalization of
income, long and tedious. The Italian experience showed that,
although the standards of life are improving in the South, they
do not keep pace with the rate of improvement in the North. In
other words, the gap is still widening.
3. The adoption of the strategy of "concentrated decentralization"
is a way out of the development dilemma, exposed in both cases of
middle phase and micro-phase planning. This strategy does not
suggest the pursuance of a market mechanism to augment the degree
of concentration of economic activities in already developed areas,
but suggests rather, a simulation of the processes responsible
for the growth of these areas in new and potential regions, in
creating competitive markets for labor and commodities within
the existing centers.
The development processes of developed economies in the
past have shown the importance of the large market areas or metro-
politan centers. The strategy of concentrated decentralization
proposes metropolitan planning as the spatial system superimposed
over the national plan.
The Guayana regional project with great emphasis on the
creation of Ciudad Guayana as a new competitive market area, is
a daring attempt toward realization of the decentralization of
economic activities. While Ciudad Guayana may encounter some
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difficulties in the achievement of such an ambitious goal, the
large metropolitan centers of the Mezzogiorno would have less
difficulty in becoming competitive with the centers of the North,
if the degree of concentration of investments were to become
greater than what it is in actuality.
It is true that a policy of concentrated decentralization
in the micro-phase, and in an environment characterized by more
democratic participation, would tend to be discriminatory, con-
sequently building up regional tensions. There are, therefore,
limitations in the degree of spatial concentration which may be
exercised. Thus, the strategy of concentrated decentralization
has a special political dimension, which ought to be incorporated
into a spatial economic plan.
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APPENDIX A
Income Distribution Objective and The Rate of Growth and The Strategy
of Concentration
We start by introducing Harrod-Domar model in which:
Y = income (output)
S = saving
I = investment
S
s = = the savings ratio
k A the marginal capital-output ratio
AY
and the rate of growth of income g =
then: g = } because ex post S = 1.
If S = I ,
t
then I = sY and since g = Twe can write (1) I = gk Y
Now, we introduce Kaldor's model of income distribution. In his model
Y = W + P
I = S
S = S + S
w p
where
W = wage bill
P = prof it
S = saving out of wage income
S = saving out of profit income, and
S =s W
w w
I
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S s P
p p
where
s = average propensity to save of wage-earners and
s = average propensity to save of profit recipients.
If we substitute I in Eq. 1 of Harrod-Domar model with its
equivalent in Kaldor's model, we will have
s W + s P = gkY
w p
or
s W + s P
w YP = gk
or
s - + s - = gk
w Y PY
and subsequently
(2) = 1 W Pg - [s -+ s-]
K w Y p Y
If k = constant, then the variation in g is a function of wage-output
ratio, profit-output ratio and the propensities to save for the wage-
earners and the profit recipients.
Equation (2) describes that:
1) The high rate of growth in some of the underdeveloped countries
is partially due to the low capital-output ratio.
2) If the initial share of labor from the national income is
lower than the share of the capitalist's profit, and the average
propensity to save is higher for capitalists, s > s , it would lead
to a higher growth rate, if the investment causes the share of profit
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from income to rise. Usually in underdeveloped countries, the average
propensity to save for capitalists is greater than that of wage-
earners, suggesting that in the initial stages of development, it is
desirable to choose development policies which further increase the
relative share of capitalists in the national income to attain a high
rate of growth.
3) Two extreme strategies can be adopted in order to achieve a
certain rate of growth:
W P
If at the initial stage - <' - and s < s: Strategy 1:Y p
Invest in sectors and regions in which the share of profit and
the propensity to save by capitalists is already higher, and further
increase them.
Strategy 2:
Introduce a radical structural change to reverse the relative
shares, so that, even with constant propensities, the growth rate is
equal to that of Strategy 1 or higher.
A numerical example may help to illustrate the impact of the
two strategies.
Let us assume that k = constant = 3. We assume also for the
initial stage:
W P
- .40, - .60, s = .075, and s = .25
then according to Eq. (2)
g -- [.075 x .40 + .25 x .60] = 6%3
According to Strategy 1, the development plan aims at changing the
relative share still further in favor of the capitalists. At the
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same time, such an atmosphere of entrepreneurial opportunities
creates a tendency for a higher rate of savings for the capitalists.
Let us assume that this strategy will change the initial
conditions as follows:
S .30, - .70, s = .075, and s = .30Y Ywp
then
g - [.075 x .30 + .30 x .70] = 7.75%
The radical changes suggested by strategy 2, if implemented
successfully may result in the following conditions:
W P
- = 1.0, - 0.0, s = .075 and s .25Y Y w p
then
g = [.075 x 1.0 + .25 x 0] = 2.5%3
This example shows that by eliminating profits entirely, with an
unchanged propensity to save by the wage-earners, the rate of growth
drops from 6 to 2.5 percent. In order to keep the growth rate at
the 6 percent level, the average propensity to save for the wage-
earners must rise from 7.5 percent to 18 percent.
It is conceivable that the low-level of consumption in the pre-
planning period for wage-earners in underdeveloped countries would
result in higher consumption rather than higher savings in the case of
Strategy 2. The profits, however, in Strategy 2 ought not to be
eliminated. In other words, not all the national income must be
distributed among the population. An economic system may consider P
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in Eq. (2), as profit accrued to the public sector. And by strict
planning, the savings rate for the public sector may be kept adequately
high. This is essentially what the socialist economy is all about.
In the initial stages of development the wage earners' share is as low
as in a developing capitalist economy. But in the long run, the trans-
fer of public profits to the producers seems to be an easier task than
transferring the profits of private corporations to wage-earners. A
capitalist system such as that of the U. S. may claim that through a
progressive tax system the transfer problem can easily be solved,
without hampering the entrepreneurial incentives for investment. In
most underdeveloped countries, however, the administration of a sound
tax system is very difficult. This is probably one of the reasons
that some underdeveloped countries would rather adopt socialist
economic principles rather than administer a tax system, in order to
solve their income distribution problem, while maintaining a certain
rate of growth.
In our analysis, equation (2) can be valid for capitalist as well
as non-capitalist economies. The difference is only in the ownership
of capital. The point shared in either system is the initial emphasis
on a "concentrated growth'' strategy. In the long run both systems tend
to have more equal distribution of income. Theoretically if sw = sP
W P
with constant k (capital-output ratio), any transfer from - to - or
vice versa would not affect the rate of growth g [see Eq. (2) ]. The
fact that some developed capitalist economies have a low rate of growth
can be explained partially by the higher relative share of the wage-
earners in the national income and their higher propensity to consume
(i.e. a lower savings ratio).
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B-24
B-25
B-26
289
290
291
Pop. ) 292
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TABLE B-1
POPULATION BY THREE MAJOR REGIONS OF ITALY, 1951-61
Italy
Absolute values
47,397
47,656
47,933
48,262
48,582
48,852
49,094
49,372
49,715
50,067
50,438
Regions
I I
in 1000's
11,716
11,775
11 ,837
11,921
12,015
12,105
12,204
12,351
12,541
12,752
13,004
17,290
17,360
17,414
17,483
17,540
17,589
17,632
17,693
17,788
17,889
18,017
I II
18,391
18,521
18,682
18,858
19,027
19,158
19,258
19,328
19,386
19,426
19,417
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 15 - 10 aprile 1963
Yea r
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
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TABLE B-2
GROSS TOTAL INCOME OF THREE MAJOR
REGIONS OF ITALY, 1951-61
(in 1954 constant prices)
Italy
Absolute values
10,511
10,719
11 ,480
12,027
12,860
13,413
14,280
14,832
16,088
17,258
18,663
I
in billions
4,084
4,194
4,433
4,689
5,088
5,369
5,719
5,902
6,472
7,135
7,602
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 15 - 10 aprile 1963
Year
Reg ions
I I
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
of lire
4,016
4,169
4,423
4,666
5,042
5,174
5,465
5,783
6,316
6,726
7,257
I I I
2,411
2,356
2,624
2,672
2,730
2,870
3,096
3,197
3,298
3,397
3,804
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TABLE B-3
NET PRODUCT BY PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR, 1951-61
(in millions of lire - 1954 constant prices)
1951 1961 %
Increase
Millions % Millions % 1951-61
North 4,771,500 58.5 8,180,200 57.3 +71.4
Central 1,416,200 17.3 2,713,000 19.0 +91.6
South 1,314,000 16.1 2,246,400 15.7 +71.0
Islands 658,300 8.1 1,140,400 8.0 +73.2
Nord 6,187,700 75.8 10,893,200 76.3 +76.0
Mezz. 1,972,300 24.2 3,386,800 23.7 +71.7
ITALY 8,160,000 100.0 14,280,000 100.0 +75.0
Campania 533,800 6.6 951,300 6.7 +78.2
Abruzzi & Molise 180,700 2.2 292,300 2.0 +61.8
Puglia 353,700 4.3 616,200 4.3 +74.2
Basilicata 57,700 0.7 97,300 0.7 +68.6
Calabria 188,100 2.3 289,300 2.0 +53.8
Sicilia 481,400 5.9 864,700 6.1 +79.6
Sardegna 176,900 2.2 275,700 1.9 +55.9
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 4 - 23 gennaio 1963
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TABLE B-4
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF REGIONAL INCOME
BY MAJOR SECTORS IN 1961
Industry,
Ag. & Commerce,
Forestry Trans., etc.
13.6
29.0
17.2
67.1
44.8
61.8
Other Public
Sectors Admin.
9.0
9.8
9.2
10.3
16.4
Total
100.0
100.0
11.8 100.0
Campania
Abruzzi & Molise
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 4 - 23 gennaio 1963
Nord
Mezz.
ITALY
21.0
38.4
33.7
47.9
35.9
27.2
27.5
52.8
39.5
40.4
31.6
40.0
44.5
44.1
10.0
7.9
9.8
6.8
6.9
10.9
11.5
16.2
14.2
16.1
13.7
17.2
17.4
16.9
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Ent it ies
North
Central
South
Islands
No rd
Mezzogiorno
ITALY
Campania
Abruzzi & Molise
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
TABLE B-5
NET INCOME BY PRIVATE SECTOR AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
1951-1961 REGIONAL PERCENTAGES
Regional Percentages
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960
58.5
17.3
16.1
8.1
58.0
18.3
15.8
7.9
56.4
18.1
16.6
8.9
56.2
18.8
16.3
8.7
57.0
19.0
15.7
8.3
56.7
18.8
16.0
8.5
56.5
18.7
16.2
8.6
56.8
19.2
15.7
8.3
57.2
19.4
15.3
8.1
58.1
19.0
15.2
7.7
1961
57.3
19.0
15.7
8.0
75.8 76.3 74.5 75.0 76.0 75.5 75.2 76.0 76.6 77.1 76.3
24.2 23.7 25.5 25.0 24.0 24.5 24.8 24.0 23.4 22.9 23.7
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6.6
2.2
4.3
0.7
2.3
5.9
2.2
6.4
2.3
4.3
0.7
2.1
5.6
2.3
6.4
2.3
4.8
0.7
2.4
6.6
2.3
6.4 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.7
2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0
4.8
0.7
2.2
6.4
2.3
4.3
0.7
2.1
6.1
2.2
4.4
0.7
2.2
6.3
2.2
4.6
0.7
2.2
6.5
2.1
4.3
0.7
2.1
6.2
2.1
4.3
0.7
2.0
6.1
2.0
4.3
0.6
1.9
5.8
1 .9
4.3
0.7
2.0
6.1
1 .9
SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 4 - 23 gennaio 1963, p.Source: In f ormaz ion i 108
TABLE B-6
NET INCOME PRODUCED BY PRIVATE SECTOR & PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REGIONAL INCOME - MEZZOGIORNO
1951
Mezzogiorno
Campania
Abruzzi &
Molise
Puglia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
27.06 27.20+ 24.97+ 25.35+ 26.56
100.00 100.00 100.00
26.86 26.95+ 27.30+ 27.07
1960 1961
100.00 100.00
28.32+ 28.08+
9.16 9.66+ 8.93+ 8.84+ 9.08 8.77+ 8.06+ 8.53 8.63 8.40+ 8.63
17.93+ 17.98+ 18.71+ 19.06+ 17.91+ 17.96 18.63 18.15+ 18.40+ 18.54+ 18.19
2.91+ 2.91 3.00+ 3.06+ 2.97 3.02 2.81 2.76 2.73+ 2.56+ 2.87
9.53+ 9.03 9.27 8.76 8.98 8.81 8.81 8.54+ 8.65 8.47+ 8.54
24.40 23.67+ 26.03+ 25.68+ 25.55 25.58 26.07 25.98 25.87 25.09+ 25.53+
8.96+ 9.51 9.05 9.21+ 8.92 8.97+ 8.65 8.70+ 8.62 8.57 8.14
Source: Computed from Prosp. 7 - Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 4 - 23 gennaio 1963
F...,
r..3
Now
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TABLE B-7
GROSS INCOME BY THREE MAJOR REGIONS OF ITALY, 1951-61
Italy
Absolute amounts in
10,511
10,719
11,480
12,027
12,860
13,413
14,280
14,882
16,088
17,258
18,663
I
billions
4,084
4,194
4,433
4,689
5,088
5,369
5,719
5,902
6,472
7,135
7,602
Regions
I I
of lire
4,016
4,169
4,423
4,666
5,042
5,174
5,465
5,783
6,318
6,726
7,257
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 15 - 10 aprile 1963
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
I1I
2,411
2,356
2,624
2,672
2,730
2,870
3,096
3,197
3,298
3,397
3,804
TABLE B-8
PER CAPITA GROSS INCOME BY THREE
MAJOR REGIONS OF ITALY, 1951-61
(in 1954 prices)
Regions
Italy
a) absolute amounts in
222
225
239
249
265
275
291
301
324
345
370
1000's of
349
356
374
393
423
443
469
478
516
559
585
I I
lire
232
240
254
267
287
294
310
327
355
376
403
b) index numbers,
100.0
101.4
107.7
112.2
119.4
123.9
131.1
135.6
145.9
155.4
166.7
1951 = 100.0
00.0
02.0
07.2
112.6
121.2
126.9
134.4
137.0
147.9
160.2
167.6
15 - 10 aprile 1963, p. 378
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Year IIf
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
131
127
140
142
143
150
161
165
170
175
196
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
100.0
103.4
109.5
115.1
123.7
126.7
133.6
140.9
153.0
162.1
173.7
100.0
96.9
106.9
108.4
109.2
114.5
122.9
126.0
129.8
133.6
149.6
I
1
1
1
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n.
I.
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TABLE B-9
NET INCOME PER CAPITA, 1951-61
(constant prices - 1954 lire)
Absolute Amount
1951 1961
North
Central
South
Is lands
No rd
Mezz.
ITALY
Campania
Abruzzi & Molise
Pugl ia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
225,601
163,198
110,204
114,208
207,412
111,512
171,717
122,814
107,308
109,835
91,731
92,023
107,280
138,608
362,465
290,917
180,516
186,207
341 ,545
182,393
282,982
200,015
184,442
180,699
150,161
141,438
183,546
195,077
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - n. 4 - 23 gennaio 1963
PER CAPITA
(annual
TABLE B-10
INCOME BY REGIONS,
percentage variati
1952-58
53/52 54/53 55/54 56/55 57/56 58/57 Annual Rate
North
Central
South
Islands
7.2
7.6
15.1
26.1
No rd
Mezz.
Italy
7.2
18.3
9.2
Abruzzi &
Mol i se
Campania
Pugl ia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sici 1 ia
Sardegna
8.7
7.4
23.2
21.6
21.7
30.4
10.8
5.4
9.8
5.0
3.6
6.3
4.8
6.2
5.0
5.9
7.5
7.7
-2.0
2.8
8.1
8.3
9.5
4.8
3.4
8.8
3.7
7.4
7.6
10.2
-4.0
0.0
7.2
3.6
1.5
8.0
6.8
7.3
8.4
7.3
8.0
7.9
5.3
9.3
8.1
10.3
5.6
8.7
8.1
4.0
4.7
10.2
10.0
4.3
9.9
5.5
1.6
10.0
15.1
1.8
11.7
11.2
6.1
6.5
7.3
5.4
4.2
6.5
5.2
6.0
12.5
6.3
2.1
4.5
1.9
4.3
4.5
Source: Prosp. 4, p. 26, Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XIII - n. I. - 6 genn.
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1952-58
on)
6.5
7.6
7.9
9.0
6.8
8.1
7.0
6.8
8.1
8.4
7.5
7.6
9.8
6.4
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TABLE B-11
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY REGIONS AND PROVINCES
(1961-1964 average)
Percentage
Distribution
Mezz. = 1.00
Italy
Total Mezz.
Campania
Caserta
Naples
Salerno
Abruzzi &
Pescara
1.0000
.2648
Mol i se
Apul ia
Bari
Brindisi
Taranto
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicily
Catania
Palermo
Siracusa
Sardinia
Cagliari
Lower Lazio
Latina
.0817
.1818
.0267
.0809
.2504
.0800
.0332
Total Per Head
bn Lire 000 Lire
19491.0 378
4820.4 244
1276.9 263
206
311
241
394.1 383
301
876.5 253
281
224
242
128.8 196
390.3 190
1207.3 254
238
271
376
386.1 296
292
160.4 205
278
Reg'
Per Head
as % of
Mezz's Av.
1 .07
.84
1 .27
.98
1.56
1.23
.03
.15
.91
.99
.80
.77
1.04
.97
1.11
1.54
1.21
.84
1.13
Reg' 1
Per Head
as % of
Italy's Av.
.69
.54
.82
.63
1.01
.79
.66
.74
.59
.64
.50
.67
.62
.71
.99
.78
.54
.73
Source: E.1.U. Report,
The Economist
Investment Conditions in Southern
Intelligence Unit
Italy,
1
1
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TABLE B-12
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT BY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS
Mezzogiorno Centro - Nord
1951 20.8 79.2
1952 23.8 76.2
1953 25.9 74.1
1954 25.2 74.8
1955 25.7 74.3
1956 24.5 75.5
1957 24.1 75.9
1958 23.9 76.1
1959 23.3 76.7
1960 27.7 75.3
Source: Table 114, La 'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno,
Vol. I, p. 307
Year
TABLE B-13
THE GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT BY
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS, 1951-60
(in billions of current lire)
Absolute Values
Centro-Nord
(2)
1471.9
1600.5
1669.3
1834.8
2041.0
2299.4
2605.4
2616.2
2902.0
19070.5
3322.2
22392.7
(1)/(2)
.26
.31
.35
.33+
.34+
.32
.31+
.31+
.30
.31+
.32+
388. 1
500.5
584.7
619.2
709.0
746.6
828.6
834.8
884.0
6095.5
1087.8
7183.2
Annual Compounded Rate of Change 1951-59
Source: Derived from Table 133, La 'Cassa'
Mezzogiorno, Vol. I, pp. 340 & 341
E Lo Sviluppo Del
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Year
Mezz.
(1)
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1951-59
1960
1951-60
Annual
Change
19
12+
-6
3
-6
-3
0
-3
.32
1.8%
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TABLE B-14
FIXED INVESTMENT BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES, REGIONAL PERCENTAGE - ITALY = 100
1951 1960
Investment Sectors Mezz. Centro-Nord Mezz. Centro-Nord
Agriculture
Industry
Trans. & Comm.
Housing
Public Works
Others
Total Fixed Invest.
Variation
Total Gross Investment
Source: Table 131, La
Vol. I, p. 339
'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno,
32.1
13.0
20.0
14.4
47.3
21.7
20.8
24.0
21.2
67.9
87.0
80.0
85.6
52.7
78.3
79.2
76.0
78.8
40.9
20.5
24.8
17.8
36.6
23.5
24.7
19.9
24.3
59.1
79.5
75.2
82.2
63.4
76.5
75.3
80.1
75.7
TABLE B-15
NET PRODUCT AND NET INVESTMENT BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES AND BY
TWO MAJOR REGIONS, 1951-60 - 3 YEAR AND 5 YEAR AVERAGES
(in billions of current lire)
Agriculture
Net
Periods Product
Mezzogiorno
1951-52-53
1952-53-54
1953-54-55
1954-55-56
1955-56-57
1956-57-58
1957-58-59
1958-59-60
1951-55
1956-60
1951-60
Centro
1951-52-53
1952-53-54
1953-54-55
1954-55-56
1955-56-57
1956-57-58
1957-58-59
1958-59-60
Net Net
Industry
Net
Trans. & Comm.
Net Net
Mfg.
Net
Invest. Product Invest. Product Invest. Product
2,384.5 198.3
2,515.8 255.6
2,689.3 304.5
2,707.8 305.0
2,850.7 322.0
2,972.6 331.1
3,049.9 377.2
2,948.2 412.7
4,159.
4,919.
9,079.
- Nord
4,412.
4,585.
4,855.
4,865.
4,860.
4,896.
5,092.
5,342.
9
5
4
411.8
623.4
1,035.2
81.7
66.4
95.5
128.0
145.0
144.0
151.8
221.3
1,609.7
1,776.7
1,939.9
2,077.1
2,210.8
2,360.8
2,484.8
2,651.3
2,945.9
4,170.7
7,116.6
8,617.3
9,197.3
10,060.1
10,920.9
11,876.2
12,718.2
13,735.2
14,993.7
119.8
124.1
124.7
122.8
144.8
125.8
133.8
197.7
200.4
289.0
489.4
469.2
405.9
308.3
319.2
379.2
381 .0
306.2
251.3
392.3
438.2
491.3
545.4
601.5
646.1
679.8
737.7
735.0
,157.5
,892.5
1,080.7
1,202.8
1,333.7
1,486.6
1,638.5
1,778.9
1,904.2
2,085.3
143.1
193.7
247.9
308.4
346.9
345.9
325.1
345.3
329.7
590.4
920.1
472
555
595
647
648
673
739
955
139.9
165.2
189.8
234.2
301 .5
374.3
435.0
490.4
273.2
719.8
993.0
297.1
363.8
431.2
552.8
742.5
,029.7
,273.0
,500.6
.9
.5
.3
.8
.1
.1
.9
.7
7,703.1 157.2 15,608.1 657.6 2,014.0
8,478.5 321.6 23,194.3 538.0 3,232.5
16,181.6 478.8 38,802.4 1,195.6 5,246.5
888.5
1,409.6
602.8
2,074.2
2,298.1 2,677.0
Source: Table 125, La 'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol. I, pp. 324 & 325
1951-55
1956-60
1951-60
1
1
1
1
1
281
Others Total Total
Net Regional
Net Invest. Income
Product In At
Net Net Net Private Public Market Net
Invest. Product Invest. Sector Works Prices Invest.
84.2 977.4 55.7 5,121.3 601.1 6,330.2 956.5
138.9 1,076.5 56.3 5,518.8 768.6 6,830.7 1,106.8
200.2 1,165.7 57.9 5,970.3 935.2 7,408.5 1,327.8
269.6 1,240.2 62.6 6,257.8 1,068.4 7,879.0 1,459.6
340.4 1,328.0 73.7 6,704.6 1,227.8 8,497.0 1,623.4
389.4 1,439.9 88.4 7,162.0 1,279.8 9,124.2 1,670.6
419.0 1,541.8 101.7 7,527.3 1,356.8 9,644.5 1,757.8
434.7 1,673.7 123.8 7,808.5 1,514.2 10,100.4 1,997.3
242.0 1,774.7 95.3 7,169.0 1,279.2 11,382.3 1,895.3
685.2 2,597.7 177.9 12,465.3 2,365.9 16,004.0 3,097.0
927.2 4,372.4 273.2 19,634.3 3,645.1 27,386.3 4,992.3
692.8 3,538.6 128.3 16,590.7 1,844.9 22,001.8 2,305.5
899.1 3,818.5 120.7 17,619.2 2,047.6 23,513.3 2,359.4
1,151.8 4,104.3 121.1 19,087.7 2,273.0 25,503.5 2,799.4
1,422.4 4,494.8 143.4 20,463.2 2,661.8 27,619.0 3,238.6
1,725.6 4,920.0 185.3 22,046.4 3,084.2 29,881.0 3,744.6
1,939.6 5,353.1 233.6 23,619.0 3,373.2 32,100.8 4,025.4
2,136.0 5,762.2 277.3 25,458.7 3,612.2 34,578.5 4,433.2
2,225.3 6,054.3 324.2 27,690.5 3,978.8 37,526.6 5,067.7
1,550.0 6,388.3 215.7 29,756.8 3,469.0 39,668.7 4,324.9
3,467.8 9,658.3 462.1 42,817.6 6,199.1 58,130.0 7,688.0
5,017.8 16,046.6 677.8 75,574.4 9,668.1 97,798.7 12,012.9
I II~
TABLE B-16
NET INVESTMENT BY SECTORS AND BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS
1951-1960
(amounts in billions of lire)
Agriculture Industry
Trans.
& Comm. Mfg.
Public
Others Works
Mezzogiorno
44.9
62.4
91.0
102.2
111.3
91.5
119.2
120.4
137.6
154.7
22.8
52.9
44.1
27.1
53.5
42.2
49.1
33.7
51.0
113.0
34.2
47.6
61.3
84.8
101.8
121.8
123.3
100.8
101.0
143.5
13.2
28.6
42.4
67.9
89.9
111.8
138.7
138.9
141.4
154.4
19.4
18.0
18.3
20.0
19.6
23.0
31 .1
43.3
36.3
53.2
76.6
100.4
124.3
104.4
102.2
104.9
96.8
120.2
109.1
135.6
211 .1
309.9
381 .4
406.4
478.3
495.2
558.2
548.3
576.4
754.4
+
-+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
53.7
7.2
7.6
8.7
45.4
25.6
20.7
22.6
31.6
64.0
Centro - Nord
46.1
15.6
20.0
30.8
44.7
52.5
47.8
44.6
59.4
117.3
159.2
190.1
119.9
95.9
92.5
130.8
155.9
94.3
56.0
101.0
136.8
155.4
180.7
219.4
196.2
233.2
219.7
221.2
300.0
435.5
167.8
230.3
294.6
374. 1
483.1
565.2
677.3
697.1
761.6
766.6
47.6
47.0
33.7
40.0
47.4
56.0
81.9
95.7
99.7
128.8
74.4
88.6
108.7
108.6
115.8
102.1
155.2
179.8
232.9
228.4
631.9
727.1
757.6
868.8
979.7
,139.8
,337.8
,332.7
,509.6
,777.6
+169.3
- 2.8
+ 22.4
+ 26.3
+144.6
+ 79.4
+ 63.3
+ 72.4
+117.4
+258.0
'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol.
Year
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
Total Variation
Gross
Total
264.8
302.7
389.0
415.1
523.7
520.8
578.9
570.9
608.0
818.4
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
801.2
724.3
780.0
895.1
1,124.3
1 ,219.2
1,401.1
1,405.1
1,627.0
2,035.6 r")
N)
1
1
1
1
1
Source: Table 120, La I , p. 317
TABLE B-17
MARGINAL CAPITAL-PRODUCT RATIO BY SECTORS OF ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES AND BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS - COMPUTED TRIANNUALLY
(absolute values in 1954 lire)
Agriculture
Ki(t-1)
AQt
K2(t-1)
AQt
Transportation
& Communication
Ki(t-1)
AQt
K2 (t- 1)
AQt
Industry
Kl (t-1)
AQt
Trade, Credit,
Services & Others
K2 (t-1)
AQt
KI (t-1),
AQt
K7(t-1)
AQt
Total Excl.
Housing
KI (t-1)
AQt
K2(t-l)
AQt
Mezzogiorno
1951-53
1952-54
1953-55
1954-56
1955-57
1956-58
1957-59
6.77
2.82
4.26
5.19
7.56
Centro - Nord
1951-53 3.87
1952-54 2.17
1953-55 -
1954-56 -
1955-57 -
1956-58 3.73
1957-59 3.17
Source: Table 128, La 'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol. 1, pp. 332 and 333
Pe r i od
(not the
same as
the yrs.
of act.
invest.
Housing
Kj (t-1 
AQt
K2 (t- 1)
AQt
11.35
4.81
6.54
7.62
11.35
4.69
2.66
4.37
3.63
5.84
5.71
4.58
6.30
10.54
22.37
8.00
6.24
6.18
6.36
6.44
8.47
9.11
6.96
8.65
8.59
7.10
11.12
14.96
29.48
10.00
6.95
7.01
7.24
7.29
9.50
10.93
8. 15
2.95
3.07
4.35
1.88
3.70
4.02
3.42
3.77
2.28
2.65
2.43
3.60
2.38
2.03
3.91
4.00
5.48
2.28
4.37
4.74
3.98
3.94
2.39
2.79
2.53
3.76
2.50
2.16
1.25
1.45
2.39
1.58
1.27
1.48
1.43
1.27
1.26
1.05
1.01
1.25
1.24
1.29
1.79
1.88
3.01
1.92
1.50
1.75
1.67
.37
.36
.13
.08
.34
.33
.40
3.48
3.01
8.99
2.83
4.18
5.10
9.67
3.46
2.44
3.38
3.12
4.27
2.70
2.39
5.08
4.42
12.92
3.89
5.48
6.66
12.04
3.76
2.67
3.70
3.38
4.62
2.94
2.63
9.77
13.30
8.31
6.03
6.67
8.44
11.17
14.48
17.58
12.56
9.51
7.59
9.36
11.14
12.94
12.25
7.93
7.31
7.86
10.18
13.03
15.64
19.00
13.54
10.16
8.11
10.04
12.02
N.A
TABLE B-18
COEFFICIENTS OF CAPITAL PER WORKER AND PER PRODUCT
TWO MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS OF ITALY, 1951-60
(7) Annual Rate of Increase
Mezzogiorno
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
Centro - No
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
A K
bn of
1954 lire
91 .8
124.8
127.0
118.4
150.5
147.7
159.0
153.9
181.1
249.6
,503.8
rd
609.2
645.2
608.0
631.6
681.5
756.3
828.0
795.1
831 .9
971.4
7,358.2
A L
1000
units
107
-4
178
183
107
45
616
275
79
454
133
130
213
1 ,284
A Q
bn of
1954 lire
24.8
60.0
31 .6
28.6
30.8
38.5
54.2
21.8
68.4
358.7
9.2
267.0
217.4
339.4
164.2
346.5
117.8
532.2
554.6
2,548.3
A Kt
A Lt
mn of
1954 lire
1.406
0.893
0.840
1.692
5.546
2.441
2.478
9.573
1.823
5.978
6.399
4.560
5.730
A Kt-l
A Qt
1954 lire
3.70
2.08
4.01
4.14
4.88
3.83
2.93
7.05
2.64
3.49
66.21
2.41
2.79
1.86
4.15
2.18
7.02
1.49
1.50
2.50
A Qt
A Lt
mn of
1954 lire
0.267
0.216
0.296
0.203
0.152
0.393
1.234
2.078
0.763
0.885
4.093
2.603
1.335
A Qt
A Kt-1
1954 lire
0.27
0.48
0.24
0.24
0.20
0.26
0.34
0.14
0.37
0.28
0.01
0.41
0.35
0.53
0.24
0.45
0.14
0.66
0.66
0.39
of VA
of VA in Other
in Ind. Act.
Source: 22 - CASSA per il Mezzogiorno,
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BY
(5) (6)
4.00
9.31
4.48
3.88
4.02
4.83
6.49
2.45
7.51
5.21
0.27
7.93
5.98
8.81
3.91
7.95
2.50
11.04
10.36
6.48
of VA
Total
-2.84
15.00
0.73
0.36
4.75
8.25
1 .98
2.56
3.19
3.64
3.24
7.17
4.13
7.14
3.62
6.43
5.13
8.44
8.22
5.94
5.72
17.63
-0.87
-1.23
5.09
9.86
2.61
1.12
2.96
6.19
6.47
2.38
5.50
3.31
4.88
7.89
5.85
5.97
5.36
Mimi i
1
I., pp. 336 & 337
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TABLE B-19
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
BY GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS, 1951-60
(amounts in billions of lire)
Current Lire 1954 Lire
Absolute Indices
Values (1951 = 100)Yea r
Absolute Indices
Values (1951 = 100)
Incremental
Change
Mezzog io rno
100
110
119
124
133
145
153
160
169
181
Centro - Nord
100
109
118
123
132
141
150
159
166
179
Source: Table 137,
p. 347
La 'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol.
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
2,180.7
2,405.3
2,594.2
2,716.6
2,891.7
3,167.7
3,331 .8
3,491.3
3,683.2
3,936.3
2,341.4
2,474.2
2,626.3
2,716.6
2,797.8
2,951.6
3,075.4
3,198.3
3,354.2
3,546.7
100
106
112
116
119
126
131
137
143
151
5.67
6.14
3.43
2.98
5.49
4.19
3.99
5.03
5.73
4.68
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
5,747.3
6,279.7
6,769.8
7,066.4
7,564.3
8,121.3
8,603.2
9,121.7
9,554.8
10,315.7
6,166.6
6,455.8
6,867.7
7,066.4
7,344.2
7,613.4
7,924.6
8,204.7
8,672.8
9,254.3
100
105
111
115
119
123
129
133
141
150
4.68
6.38
2.89
3.93
3.66
4.08
3.53
5.70
6.70
4.68
I,
U.
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TABLE B-20
REGIONAL PER CAPITA INCOME AND CONSUMPTION (PUBLIC & PRIVATE)
BY TWO MAJOR GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS, 1951-60
(in 1954 lire)
Regional Income
Per Capita
1,000's Annual
Year of lire Increment
Per Capita
Consumption
1,000's Annual
of lire Increment
Average
Propensity
to Consume
C
100
Mezzogiorno
126.3
121.7
134.5
135.1
136.1
141.5
151.9
155.5
158.3
162.5
142.6
Centro - Nord
243.8
250.2
263.5
276.4
297.1
306. 1
322.4
350.9
364.1
338. 1
305.6
Source: Table 139,
p. 349
La 'Cassa' E Lo Sviluppo Del Mezzogiorno, Vol.
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
- 3.64
10.51
0.44
0.74
3.96
7.34
2.36
1.80
2.65
2.87
32.6
38.9
45.9
49.2
52.0
58.9
64.1
69.7
76.6
85.3
57.8
4.75
5.03
2.26
1.87
4.53
3.27
3.41
4.06
4.62
3.81
104.9
114.1
108.5
110.4
111.7
112.3
108.0
109.1
111.6
114.0
110.6
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1951-60
2.62
5.31
4.89
7.48
3.02
5.32
8.83
3.76
6.59
5.29
207.2
215.6
227.8
232.8
240.1
247.1
255.4
262.6
275.3
291.0
246.0
4.05
5.65
2.19
3.13
2.91
3.35
2.81
4.83
5.70
3.81
85.0
86.2
86.4
84.2
80.8
80.7
79.2
74.8
75.6
75.0
80.5
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TABLE B-21
RANKING OF CITIES WITH 100,000 AND
MORE INHABITANTS, 1961 AND 1965
City Rank Population
1961 1965 1961
Roma
Mi lano
Napoli
Torino
Genova
Palermo
Bologna
Fi renze
Catan i a
Venez i a
Bari
Trieste
Mess i na
Verona
Pudova
Taranto
Cagliari
Brescia
Livorno
Reggio Di Calabria
Ferrara
Parma
Modena
La Spezia
Foggia
Salerno
Reggio Nell' Emilia
Ravenna
Bergamo
Perugia
Prato
Ancona
Vicenza
Rimini
Pescara
Terni
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
22
20
23
26
25
24
29
28
30
31
27
32
33
34
35
36
2,188,160
1,582,534
1,182,815
1,025,822
784,194
587,985
444,872
436,616
363,928
347,347
312,023
272,723
254,715
221,221
197,680
194,609
183,784
172,744
161,077
153,380
152,654
141,203
139,183
121,923
118,603
117,363
116,445
115,525
114,907
112,511
111,285
100,485
1965
2,484,737
1,669,536
1,228,092
1,111,669
845,427
628,102
481,527
454,858
391,709
361,980
332,486
280,534
263,254
242,320
212,944
207,536
203,304
192,381
169,036
158,222
157,907
161 ,813
154,928
128,878
130,464
133,592
123,104
125,276
120,640
119,959
125,596
105,550
105,514
105,387
102,582
101,587
Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbooks 1963 - 1967
Annual
Rate Of
Growth
+ .9
+1.7
+1.9
+1.5
+ .8
+1.6
+2.5
+ .8
+2.2
+3.3
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TABLE B-22
INTERREGIONAL INTERNAL MIGRATORY
MOVEMENTS (1957)
North
220,649
120,261
340,910
South
39,924
37,250
77,174
Total
260,573
157,511
418,084
Source: Informazioni
p. 377
SVIMEZ, Anno XIII - n. 19 - 11 maggio 1960,
F rom/To
North
South
Total
TABLE B-23
En t i t i e s
INTERREGIONAL MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS BY ORIGINS AND DESTINATIONS 1957
Total North Central South Islands (2) & (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) North
Piemonte
Valle d'Aosta
Liguria
Lombardia
Trentino-Alto Adige
Veneto
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Emilia-Romagna
Marche
Toscana
Umbria
Lazio
Campania
Abruzzi & Molise
Pugl ia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
North
Central
South
Islands
North
South
ITALY
Source: Informazioni
128,860
2,455
34,272
202,444
18,353
136,110
31 ,577
144,718
51 ,798
97,224
24,625
64,201
102,220
44,082
75,540
15,783
49,521
107,374
38,503
698,789
237,848
287,146
145,877
112,110
2,249
28,378
192,827
16,743
129,276
28,331
134,101
7,255
12,243
1,836
8,765
11,540
5,411
22,048
3,284
12,158
18,063
4,341
653,015
30,099
54,441
22,404
2,950
98
3,129
4,621
841
4,251
1 ,643
6,866
42,132
80,341
21,629
45,098
10,576
9,943
6,196
1,584
4,281
7,581
3,255
24,399
189,200
32,580
10,836
3,159
73
1 ,629
3,400
498
1 ,571
998
2,391
1 ,843
2,871
828
7,904
78,170
28,195
45,758
10,717
31,029
5,369
1 ,171
13,719
13,446
193,869
6,540
1,641
35
1,136
1,596
271
1,012
605
1 ,360
568
1,769
332
2,434
1 ,934
533
1 ,538
198
2,053
76,361
29,736
7,656
5,103
6,256
106,097
936,637 683,114 213,599 27,165 12,759
433,023 76,845 43,416 200,409 112,353
1,369,660 759,959 257,015 227,574 125,112
SVIMEZ, Anno XIII - n. 19 - 11 maggio 1960, P. 378
124,060
2,347
31 ,507
197,448
17,584
133,527
29,974
140,967
49,387
92,584
23,465
53,863
22,116
15,354
28,244
4,868
16,439
25,644
7,596
677,414
219,299
87,021
33 ,240
896,713
130,261
(4) & (5)
South
4, 800
108
2,765
4,996
769
2,583
1,603
3,751
2,411
4,640
1 ,160
10,338
80,104
28,728
47,296
10,915
33,082
81 ,730
30,596
21 ,375
18,549
200,125
112,637
39,924
312,261
1,016,974 352,686
PQ)
;;Z Q
TABLE B-24
INTERNAL MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS BY REGIONS, 1960
Out- In-
Entities Migration Migration Result N -+ S S -+ N Result
Piemonte 131,774 196,163 + 64,389 5,988 48,659 + 42,671
Valle d'Aosta 2,353 2,898 + 545 109 515 + 406
Liguria 38,041 57,159 + 19,118 3,435 14,797 + 11,362
Lombardia 233,877 300,994 + 67,117 7,374 45,438 + 38,064
Trentino Alto Adige 19,671 19,356 - 315 812 1,303 + 491
Veneto 149,005 110,850 - 38,155 3,408 4,957 + 1,549
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 32,666 31,011 - 1,655 1,693 2,683 + 990
Emilia-Romagna 157,352 155,408 - 1,944 4,584 10,547 + 5,963
Marche 51,586 42,319 - 9,267 2,600 2,999 + 399
Toscana 100,820 106,807 + 5,987 5,313 14,501 + 9,188
Umbria 26,260 21,166 - 5,094 1,251 1,588 + 337
Lazio 71,552 105,844 + 34,292 11,720 35,318 + 23,598
Campania 118,307 100,381 - 17,926 11,464 30,624 - 19,160
Abruzzi & Molise 47,580 34,934 - 12,646 5,690 18,133 - 12,443
Puglia 97,045 61,777 - 35,268 9,450 45,253 - 35,803
Basilicata 20,520 11,593 - 8,927 1,259 8,804 - 7,545
Calabria 59,870 36,324 - 23,546 4,685 26,682 - 21,997
Sicilia 127,645 100,492 - 27,153 11,656 40,513 - 28,857
Sardegna 49,280 39,728 - 9,552 4,083 13,296 - 9,213
Nord 1,014,957 1,149,975 +135,018 48,287 183,305 +135,018
Sud 520,247 385,229 -135,018 48,287 183,305 -135,018
ITALIA 1,535,204 1,535,204 48,287 183,305
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XVI - nn. 26-27 - 26 giugno - 3 luglio 1963, p. 609
I U ~-
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TABLE B-25
QUOTIENTS OF INTERNAL IMMIGRATION 1957
Immigrants Per 1000 Pop. of the City
Of The
TownEntities
Piemonte
Valle d'Aosta
Liguria
Lombardia
Trentino-Alto Adige
Veneto
Friuli-Venezia Giulia
Emilia-Romagna
Marche
Toscana
Umbria
Lazio
Campan i a
Abruzzi & Molise
Pug1lia
Basilicata
Calabria
Sicilia
Sardegna
North
Central
South
Islands
Nord
Sud
ITALY
34.8
24.8
20.9
29.3
24.0
34.9
25.3
39.9
37.6
29.9
30.0
17.6
22.0
26.0
22.1
24.0
23.1
22.7
27.6
23.4
26.1
22.8
23.8
30.2
23.1
27.5
Of The
Same
Regions
27.5
13.2
12.6
24.3
15.5
19.9
15.3
30.7
25.5
23.2
18.1
10.7
15.4
15.0
11.5
9.9
13.0
16.0
20.9
14.9
18.0
13.5
17.1
21.8
14.7
19.1
Of Other
Regions
7.3
11.6
8.3
5.0
8.5
15.0
10.0
9.2
12.1
6.7
11.9
6.9
6.6
11.0
10.6
14.1
10.1
6.7
6.7
8.5
8.1
9.3
6.7
8.4
8.4
8.4
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XIII - n. 19 - 11 maggio 1960,
p. 376
TABLE B-26
IMMIGRANTS TO THE LARGE CITIES (OVER 100,000 POP.) IN 1957 (TOTAL, SOUTH)
Cities
Roma
Mi lano
Torino
Genova
Fi renze
Bologna
Venez i a
Trieste
Verona
Padova
Li vorno
Bresci a
Ferrara
Parma
Modena
La Spezia
Bergamo
Reggio Emilia
Perugia
Ravenna
Cities With
over 500,000 inhabitants
200,001-500,000 inhabitants
100,001-200,000 inhabitants
over 100,000 inhabitants
Total Southern Ab. &
Imm. Imm. Molise
43,219
39,115
50,389
17,241
13,393
17,639
7,318
3,977
6,461
5,287
4,108
4,929
4,075
4,727
4,066
4,704
3,045
2,943
4,111
4,498
149,964
42,327
52,954
245,245
16,672
8,638
15,455
4,840
1,923
1 ,973
918
711
440
453
868
437
259
327
321
869
286
165
330
320
45,605
5,525
5,075
56,205
3,834
559
490
243
155
202
84
37
32
35
73
45
37
47
47
34
31
14
71
54
5,126
478
520
6,124
Camp.
3,814
,362
,387
789
469
381
232
159
111
79
174
87
49
70
73
178
48
41
53
73
7,352
1,241
1,036
9,629
Puglia Basilic. Calabria Sicilia Sard.
2,574
3,925
6,377
832
326
464
227
213
107
110
183
98
54
71
66
287
73
26
50
57
13,708
1,230
1,182
16,120
454
246
957
167
85
61
16
10
5
5
20
16
2
10
10
20
13
12
14
22
1 ,824
172
149
2,145
2,195
755
2,130
937
145
250
92
47
47
56
62
36
36
31
28
83
40
22
36
27
6,017
534
504
7,055
2,611
1,536
3,351
1 ,409
554
469
190
200
87
130
227
135
63
67
63
146
66
39
51
62
8,907
1,413
1,136
11,456
1,190
255
763
463
189
146
77
45
51
38
129
20
18
31
34
121
15
11
55
25
2,671
457
548
3,676
Source: Informazioni SVIMEZ, Anno XIII -
n. 19 - 11 maggio 1960, p. 380
to the cities:
over 500,000
200,000-500 ,000
100,000-200,000
over 100,000
% of the Southern imm.
over the total imm.
30.4
13.1
9.6
22.9
N)
I)
U------
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Net National Income, Disposable Income and
Per Capita Disposable Income of Venezuela,
1950-1959
Net National Income Per Capita in Current
Prices
Percentage Distribution of National Income
C-1
C-2
C-3
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Economic Sectors, 1953
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295
296
297
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298
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299
Regions and by
300
tage Composition of Gross Product by
Sectors for Seven Regions of Venezuela, 301
Gross Fixed Investment, Depreciation and Net
Investment for Venezuelan Economy, 1950-59
Gross Fixed Investment, Depreciation and Net
Investment as Percentage of Gross Product
302
303
Table
Gross
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Gross
Major
Gross
Major
Percen
Major
1960
C-5
C-6
C-7
C-8
C-9
294
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C-11 Gross Fixed Investment by Economic Sectors 305
C-12 Gross Fixed Investment as a Percentage of Gross
Product, 1950-1959 306
C-13 Percentage Distribution of Active Population by
Economic Sectors, 1950-1959 307
c-14 Capital Stock in Major Sectors 308
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Guayana Region and in Venezuela 309
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Output-Capital Ratio by Regions 310
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of Venezuela for Selected Periods 311
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Venezuelan Cities, 1961, 1963, 1964, 1965 and
1966 312
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TABLE C-1
NET NATIONAL INCOME, DISPOSABLE INCOME AND
PER CAPITA DISPOSABLE INCOME OF VENEZUELA, 1950-1959
(millions of bolivares)
Annual
Growth
Rate
10.9
7.2
6.5
11.4
7.4
12.6
14.0
8.9
2.2
Disposable
Income
6,828
7,328
7,802
8,514
9,402
9,909
10,962
11 ,979
13,162
14,100
Annual Per Capita
Growth Disposable
Rate Income
% (in bolivares)
7.3
6.4
9.1
10.4
5.3
10.6
9.2
9.8
7.1
,350
,396
,432
,497
,584
,598
,697
,781
,892
,957
8.4
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, p. 72,
Table 19-2
Net
National
Income
(absolute va 1 ues)
Annual
Growth
Rate
8,607
9,547
10,236
10,903
12,154
13,057
14,712
16,782
18,279
18,689
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1950-59
3.4
2.5
4.5
5.8
.8
6.1
4.9
6.2
3.4
4.29.0
296
TABLE C-2
NET NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA IN CURRENT PRICES
(in bolivares)
Net National
Per Capita
1,702
1,819
1 ,878
1,917
2,048
2,105
2,277
2,495
2,627
2,594
Source: Cuentas Nacionales,
Income Percent
ChangeYear
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
7
3
2
7
4
8
10
5
- 1
De Venezuela, Table 22-22Banco Central
297
TABLE C-3
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME
(between two factors of production:
Labor
60
58
58
57
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
labor and capital)
Capital
40
42
45
42
43
44
45
48
46
40
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central
55
52
54
60
De Venezuela, Table 22-21
TABLE C-4
GROSS PRODUCT BY SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS
AND BY MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1936
Agri.
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
182.931
204.089
342. 102
125.357
105.571
82.786
41.990
1,084.826
Min.
.002
.468
5.514
5.984
Petroleum Mfg.
909.500 137.182
- 50.138
- 329.844
- 14.629
- 38.545
160.500 29.197
- 7.405
1,070.000 606.940
Const.
31.683
23.906
66.767
18.795
10.740
20.406
7.876
180.253
Commerce
(or Trade)
146.910
52.290
532.860
23.240
29.880
25.730
16.600
827.510
Services
195.571
115.425
867.014
67.228
61.950
52.921
27.641
1,387.750
Source: Ganz, Unpublished Data
Total
1,603.779
445.928
2,138.587
249.249
246.686
372.008
107.026
5,163.263
TABLE C-5
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
GROSS PRODUCT
AND BY MAJOR
Petroleum
2,601.90
.40
70.30
96.10
1,097.00
39.40
.80
.50
2.90
.10
2.40
.20
60.00
BY SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS
ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1953
Mfg.
111.30
23.60
872.10
10.70
20.50
38.70
6.50
Const.
27.00
25.00
342.00
13.70
5.60
10.00
8.00
Commerce
(or Trade)
474.60
114.20
1,509.10
78.60
68.90
76.20
27.50
Services
514.40
384.60
2,811.40
231.00
198.10
209.70
107.30
66.90 3,905.10 1,083.40 431.30 2,349.10 4,456.50
Total
3,844.70
736.80
5,946.20
694.70
404.30
1,543.70
282.00
13,452.40
Source: Ganz, Unpublished Data
N)3
Agri. Min.
114.70
188.50
338.40
264.50
108.80
111.90
33.30
1,160.10
~- -.-- -
TABLE C-6
GROSS PRODUCT BY SEVEN MAJOR REGIONS
AND BY MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1961
Min Petroleum Mfg.
Commerce
Const. (or Trade)Services
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Venezuela
342.68
295.43
501.21
403.79
136.76
121.78
42.82
1,844.50
- 5,945.39 363.27
.51 - 117.28
- 20.50 2,300.19
.22 235.35 27.38
- - 43.60
- 1,799.26 127.88
342.07 - 27.58
342.80 8,000.50 3,007.20
155.57
92.59
567.43
124.32
53.38
71.47
32.34
1,097.10
573.
334.
2,267.
348.
146.
202.
56.
3,926.
36
18
39
70
08
25
94
90
2,339.82
591.18
3,848.19
559.77
257.36
835.27
230.44
8,662.03
9,718.09
1,431.17
9,504.91
1,699.44
637.18
3,157.91
732.19
26,880.89
Source: Ganz, Unpublished Data
w-.
C)
0
Agri. Total
4 M
TABLE C-7
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF GROSS PRODUCT BY
MAJOR SECTORS FOR SEVEN REGIONS OF VENEZUELA, 1960
(absolute values in millions of bolivares, 1957 prices)
Petro-
Total Agri. Mining leum
Western Oil
Mountain
Central
Llanos
East Coastal
Eastern Oil
Guayana
Total
35.0
5.3
35.8
6.0
2.4
12.2
3.2
99.9
17.0
15.7
31.0
19.7
7.7
7. 1
1.9
100.1
0 72.6
.1 0
0
0
0
99
.2
.4 2.9
0
24.2
.6 0
100.1 99.9
Mfg.
11.6
3.8
76.3
.8
1.5
4.5
1.4
Const-
ruction
15.0
9.3
55. 1
10.2
4.4
4.4
1.6
99.9 100.0
Trade Services
13.7
8.4
58.9
8.1
3.9
5.5
1.6
100.1
27.0
6.8
44.4
6.5
3.0
9.6
2.7
100.0
Source: Ganz, Unpublished Data
Regions
302
TABLE C-8
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, DEPRECIATION AND
NET INVESTMENT FOR VENEZUELAN ECONOMY, 1950-59
(in millions of bolivares - 1957 prices)
Gross Fixed
Investment
(1)
3,263,881
3,471 ,430
4,358,198
4,784,269
5,465,987
5,160,599
5,596,546
5,950,283
6,098,458
6,788,870
Depreciation
(2)
990,811
1,081,854
1,240,758
1,407,061
1,565,182
1,712,789
1,858,858
2,014,250
2,203,257
2,394,237
Net
Investment
(3)
2,273,070
2,389,576
3,117,440
3,377,308
3,900,805
3,447,810
3,737,688
3,936,033
3,895,201
4,394,633
Rate of Growth
(1) (3)
6.3
25.5
9.7
14.2
- 6.0
8.4
6.3
2.4
11.3
5.1
30.4
8.3
15.5
-12.0
8.4
5.3
- 2.0
12.8
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-9
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
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TABLE C-9
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT, DEPRECIATION AND
NET INVESTMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF GROSS PRODUCT
Gross Fixed
Investment
25.64
24.43
28.58
29.55
30.80
26.70
26. 19
24.95
25.24
26.05
Depreciation
7.79
7.61
8.14
8.69
8.82
8.86
8.70
8.45
9.12
9.18
Net
Investment
17.86
16.82
20.44
20.86
21.98
17.84
17.49
16.51
16.12
16.86
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-9
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
PERCENTAGE
INVESTMENT
Total Agri.
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
11.2
9.3
8.8
8.7
11.0
11.0
10.8
10.2
8.9
10.6
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TABLE C-10
DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS FIXED
BY ECONOMIC SECTORS, 1950-59
Commodity
Production
Sectors
30.2
31.0
33.3
28.0
26.8
29.8
36.7
43.0
37.1
34.9
Social
Overhead
Capital
Sectors
35.2
37.1
37.9
44.7
48.8
44.8
40.3
28.7
38.2
33.7
Commerce
&
Services
23.4
22.6
20.0
18.6
13.4
14.4
12.2
18.1
15.8
20.8
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-14
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
- U
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GROSS FIXED IN
(millions of
Total Agri.
3,264
3,472
4,359
4,784
5,466
5,161
5,597
5,950
6,099
6,789
365
322
383
417
603
570
605
608
540
719
TABLE C-11
VESTMENT BY
bolivares, i
Commodity
Production
Sectors
985
1 ,076
1,450
1,340
1 ,464
1,538
2,055
2,560
2,263
2,369
ECONOMIC SECTORS
n 1957 prices)
Social
Overhead Commerce
Capital &
Sectors Services
1,150 764
1,290 784
1,652 874
2,138 889
2,667 732
2,314 739
2,258 679
1,707 1 ,075
2,330 966
2,289 1,412
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-9
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
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TABLE C-12
GROSS FIXED INVESTMENT AS A PERCENTAGE
OF GROSS PRODUCT, 1950 - 1959
Commodity Social
Production Overhead Commerce
Sectors Capital &
Year Total (incl. Agri.) Sectors Services
1950 25.6 19.5 39.3 26.6
1951 24.4 17.7 41.8 24.4
1952 28.6 21.2 51.6 25.6
1953 29.6 19.9 59.3 23.8
1954 30.8 21.4 69.4 17.3
1955 26.7 19.7 56.8 16.3
1956 26.2 22.0 52.8 13.6
1957 24.9 23.7 37.1 18.2
1958 25.2 21.1 46.5 16.4
1959 26.0 21.5 42.0 22.5
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-17
TABLE C-13
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
POPULATION BY ECONOMIC SECTO
OF ACTIVE
RS, 1950-1959
Commodity
Production
Total Agri. Sectors
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
44.0
43.7
42.6
42.2
41.4
41.3
40.3
39.3
38.5
Year
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
21.7
21.2
22.4
21.9
22.2
21.4
22.6
23.4
22.9
22.8
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central De Venezuela, Table 22-18
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100.0 37.8
Social
Overhead
Capital
Sectors
11.7
12.0
11.8
12.3
12.4
12.6
12.3
12.2
12.6
12.7
Commerce
&
Services
22.6
23.1
23.2
23.7
24.0
24.7
24.8
25.1
26.0
26.7
TABLE C-14
CAPITAL STOCK IN MAJOR SECTORS
(billions of bolivares - 1957 prices)
Petro-
Year Totals Agri. leum Mining Mfg.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1950 18,131 2,313 864 39 745
1951 19,872 2,396 1,029 105 815
1952 21,799 2,472 1,247 200 887
1953 23,837 2,568 1,450 211 953
1954 26,128 2,673 1,417 434 1,037
1955 28,314 2,809 1,524 623 1,101
1956 30,973 3,074 1,749 792 1,180
1957 33,480 3,279 2,010 1,093 1,318
1958 36,019 3,422 2,268 1,055 1,469
1959 38,957 3,579 2,785 1,169 1,746
Source: Cuentas Nacionales, Banco Central
Const-
ruct ion
(6)
54
57
49
44
55
61
71
.130
132
123
Elec-
tricity
(7)
73
99
134
136
214
255
313
434
890
1 ,024
Trans-
portation
(8)
1,362
1,720
1,880
2,038
2,554
3,014
3,702
3,816
3,883
3,956
Comm.
(9)
2
2
2
3
4
5
5
6
6
7
Comm-
e rce
(10)
1 ,598
1 ,872
2,178
2,504
2,645
2,729
2,795
2,982
3,161
3,316
Urban
Service Gov't Housing
(11)
1 ,043
1 ,230
1 ,429
1 ,584
1 ,742
1 ,940
2,097
2,409
2,627
3,166
(12)
6,316
6,451
6, 793
7,194
7,732
8, 174
8,524
8,866
9,230
9,547
(13)
3,722
4,096
4,527
5,152
5,621
6,079
6,671
7,137
7,876
8,539
De Venezuela, Table 22-7
co
TABLE C-15
STRUCTURE AND PRODUCTIVITY OF INVESTMENT
IN THE GUAYANA REGION AND IN VENEZUELA
Guayanal
Investment 1964-70
Millions Percentage
of bs. Distribution
Total
I. Resource Development
A. Energy
B. Mining
C. Agriculture
I1. Industry
A. Heavy Industry
1. Basic Metals
2. Heavy Machinery
3. Chemicals
4. Construction Materials
5. Pulp & Paper
B. Light Industry
C. Construction
Ill. Infra-Structure
A. Public Utilities & Comm.
B. Commerce
C. Urban Transport
D. Regional Transport
E. Gov't & Other Service Fac.
F. Housing
7,857
1 ,921
845
817
259
2,695
2,488
1,631
328
222
138
169
74
132
3,241
212
508
166
700
393
1 ,262
100.0
24.5
10.8
10.4
3.3
34.3
31.7
20.8
4.2
2.8
1.8
2.2
0.9
1.7
41.2
2.7
6.5
2.1
8.9
5.0
16. 1
Output Per
Unit of
Investment
0.60
0.49
0.65
0.38
0.30
0.73
0.61
0.45
1.60
0.50
0.33
0.50
0.75
3.00
0.56
1.70
1.00
1.25
0.27
0.33
0.35
Capital Stock 1962
Millions Percentage
of bs. Distribution
57,672 100.0
19,047
9,026
1 ,475
8,546
4,971
1 ,788
1,104
257
388
39
2,814
369
33,654
90
3,940
7,154
13,470
9,000
33.0
15.7
2.6
14.8
8.6
3.1
1.9
0.4
0.7
0. 1
4.9
0.6
58.4
0.1
6.8
12.4
23.4
15.6
Output Per
Unit of
Investment
0.50
0.61
1.03
0.21
0.23
0.89
0.68
0.57
0.96
0.71
1.62
0.74
3.13
0.38
1.72
1.03
1.27
0.33
0.35
'Includes electric power, mining, agricultural and regional transport
Venezuela
W
*1
investment outside Ciudad Guayana
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TABLE C-16
REGIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE VENEZUELAN
ECONOMY OUTPUT - CAPITAL' RATIO BY REGIONS
1960 1980
Regions Actual Projection
Western Oil .57 .44
Mountain .39 .37
Central .44 .45
Llanos .39 .34
East Coastal .37 .33
Eastern Oil .56 .46
Guayana .33 .51
Total .48 .44
'Net Capital
Source: Ganz, Unpublished Data
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TABLE C-17
CHANGE OF POPULATION OF MAJOR
OF VENEZUELA FOR SELECTED PERIODS
1936-1950 1950-19611926-1936
Caracas
Maracaibo
Valencia
Barquis imeto
Cumana
San Cristobal
Maracay
Source: Friedmann, 39
PERCE
CITIES
NT
City
54. 1
46.6
32.4
56.5
15.7
46.6
172.7
167.9
114.5
81.6
191.6
109.0
145.4
113.3
92.5
78.8
84.2
90.4
52.1
83.3
110.9
TABLE C-18
RANK AND SIZE OF POPULATION OF SEVEN LARGEST
VENEZUELAN CITIES, 1961, 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966
Rank
city 1961 1966
Caracas
Maraciabo
Barquisimeto
Valencia
Maracay
San Cristobal
Cabimas
1961
1,336,119
427,166
199,691
163,601
135,353
98,777
92,656
1963
1,507,188
476,445
218,778
177,199
147,898
110,473
105,311
Population
1964
1,589,411
502 ,693
227,357
183,505
153,724
116,176
111,382
Source: United Nations Demographic Yearbooks 1963-1967
1966
Annual
Rate of
Growth
1961-19661965
1,674,728
530,182
235,905
189,933
159,671
122,047
117,734
1,764,274
558,953
244,793
196,411
165,763
128,220
124,420
5.7
5.8
4.1
3.7
4.1
5.4
6. 1
Al
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